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THE SUPREME
COURT OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
1689 of 2011
THE PRINCIPAL
REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT
and
NICHOLAS NI
KOK CHIN
MURRAY J
TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON MONDAY, 29
AUGUST 2011, AT 10.30 AM
(In Chambers)
MS L.A. EDDY appeared for the plaintiff.
The defendant
appeared in person.
29/8/11 1
(s&c)
THE ASSOCIATE: In the Supreme Court of Western Australia,
matter CIV 1689 of 2011, The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of
Western Australia and Nicholas Chin.
MURRAY J: Ms Eddy?
EDDY, MS: May it please the
court. I appear on behalf of the
applicant.
MURRAY J: Thank you,
Ms Eddy. Mr Chin, you are
appearing for yourself this morning?
CHIN, MR: Yes, sir.
MURRAY J: Thank you. Ms Eddy, what has happened to all those
papers? They are all down there. I see, okay.
Have you got volume 1? Thank you
very much. What I have done,
Ms Eddy, is read the originating motion, the application, I have read your
outline and then there is a useful document that is an aide‑memoire there that
helps to focus on particular aspects, I have read Mr Chin's outline, the
authorities to which you have referred and I have read - is it Ms Loh's
affidavit? Yes? I'm sorry.
It's my ignorance not being able to say whether the deponent was male or
female, but I have read the affidavit and I have not gone into detail in
relation to the exhibited documents, so whatever you would like to add to all
that I would be happy to hear.
EDDY, MS: Certainly,
your Honour. It would seem that the
principles of law are not in dispute at all, so I had anticipated,
your Honour, merely taking you through the references referred to in
paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the affidavit so that you can see the exhibited
material that is referred to there.
In essence, though, the aide‑memoire which
was produced to assist your Honour, the affidavit is described in terms of
groups or types of proceedings, and then the aide‑memoire attempts to put them
in chronological order so that one can see what decision is being sought to be
reviewed in each of the subsequent matters and so using that document, together
with the annexures to the affidavit material, was really what I had intended to
take your Honour through to highlight what the applicant says shows that
the respondent has commenced vexatious proceedings and that in the court's
discretion it ought to make both the orders sought.
MURRAY J: Thank you. The application, as I have understood it,
relies on ‑ ‑ ‑
EDDY, MS: There are two orders
sought, effectively, your Honour.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 2
MURRAY J: Yes, there are two
orders. No, that's fine. I have understood that. That wasn't what I was going to take you
to. Yes, the first order is simply the
order in general terms and then the other focuses specifically upon proceedings
which Mr Chin has in course of being dealt with now.
EDDY, MS: They are adjourned sine
die, those proceedings.
MURRAY J: Yes, I'm sorry. They have not been finally disposed of is a
better way to put that.
EDDY, MS: They haven't been finally
disposed of. There certainly are other
proceedings.
MURRAY J: I have noticed that one of
the things that Mr Chin expresses concern about is more active proceedings
which he has in the District Court. Did
you see that?
EDDY, MS: It wasn't entirely
clear. There do seem to be some
proceedings again to do with the caveats whereby Ms Gannaway has applied
to have caveats removed but I had understood they were completed.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 3
MURRAY J: You may be right.
EDDY, MS: There is also the disciplinary proceedings
in the State Administrative Tribunal, which is the VR 87 of 2009 and those
proceedings are currently on foot and it may well be ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: The material that had
caught my eye was - no, I see. It was in
proceedings that are given the number VR 87 of 2009. The case is currently before Judge Sharp, the
deputy president of SAT.
EDDY, MS: Yes. That hasn't been determined yet.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: And that is not a
proceeding that was instituted by Mr Chin, so that wouldn't be affected by
either of the orders proposed.
MURRAY J: No.
EDDY, MS: It could be, however, that
if this court considers that he ought to have the ability to appeal that
proceeding, if he's unhappy with the tribunal's decision, that we could carve
out from order 1 an ability to appeal that decision only, in accordance with
the rules that would allow an appeal from an error of law.
The problem is of course that in the past,
as you will see as I take you through the documents, your Honour,
Mr Chin has shown a very tenacious approach ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: ‑ ‑ ‑ and is not willing to
accept decisions that go against him on appeal; and he then, as you will see
when I take you through in relation to the earlier decision which was the
decision of the legal practice committee and not the disciplinary committee,
Legal Practice Board, to put conditions on his licence he did appeal that but
he has also sought to attack it a number of times in collateral proceedings and
in the wrong courts; certiorari, mandamus et cetera.
He has also sought to attack an
interlocutory decision in this later disciplinary proceedings, VR 87 of
2009, again a number of times. So this
interlocutory decision indicating that res judicata didn't apply to the
disciplinary proceedings, Mr Chin again has shown this tenacious
unwillingness to accept decisions made, so we would submit that great care
ought to be taken as to what should be carved out of order 1, if anything,
subject to your Honour being satisfied the orders are appropriate of
course; because remember even if order 1 is in place, he
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 4
10.36
can obtain leave
from the court if he can show the court
that it's a
proper proceeding and so that it may well be the order wouldn't affect
VR 87 of 2009 being concluded.
If he then had a legitimate right to
appeal, he would simply have to show a judge that and that would save the
courts having to go through, with respect, what the applicant says. An inordinate amount of resources have been
spent in relation to proceedings disputing and seeking to agitate again and
again and again earlier decisions; for example, the earlier State
Administrative Tribunal proceedings.
Your Honour, if one looks just simply
at the aide‑memoire and through the material I will take you to, the first of
the State Administrative Tribunal is 107 of 2008 and that was the review of the
decision of the board to impose the conditions on the respondent's licence.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: You then see that that's
taken to the Court of Appeal and the date is 3/11/2008, CACV 105 of
2008. That's appeal of that State
Administrative Tribunal decision in 107 of 2008. You then see that there's a High Court
application on 28/8/2009 where there's an application for special leave against
the decision of the Court of Appeal.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: That would ordinarily be
what you would expect to be the run of the matter and that should be the end of
it. It isn't in this instance,
however. What one sees then is that
in ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: On 3 May 2010.
EDDY, MS: Before that.
MURRAY J: Before that?
EDDY, MS: 6/1/2010 we have got
CIV 1019 of 2010, an application for certiorari in relation to VR 107
of 2008, also the 87 of 2009.
MURRAY J: Where does that appear in
the ‑ ‑ ‑
EDDY, MS: There's an entry 6th of the
1st ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: I see, right at the bottom
of that page.
EDDY, MS: Yes; and in fact above that you will see
another application for certiorari in relation to 87 of 2009, this is his
interlocutory decision in the current proceedings in the tribunal; so there's
an attempt to, despite the fact that it has gone through to the High
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 5
Court, relitigate
it in the Supreme Court.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: Again, the application for
mandamus in May 2010.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: Again it seems, it's difficult to tell but
this is a case which is often the case in these sorts of proceedings where a
respondent has an honest belief that their position has not been vindicated and
if they keep litigating somehow their position will be litigated, but that any
decision that is made that doesn't suit his perception of events or of what
should have been the answer, he has extreme difficulty accepting and so he just
keeps trying.
He has the legal knowledge to know that
it's completely inappropriate to commence certiorari proceedings or mandamus
proceedings after a matter has been appealed to the High Court. That doesn't stop him. You also see that's just one aspect of which
he is litigating and the amount of time and resources that this takes of the
court and where private litigants are concerned, the expenses involved in them.
Your Honour, the proceedings in
relation to the dispute between the respondent and Mr Thies is an
example. I will take you through the
proceedings, the materials, but what was in dispute was a sum of $6000,
your Honour, and yet that dispute, there is a claim in the Magistrates Court
for recovery of a debt and that's a claim against the respondent. That's concluded by consent orders and that's
referred to you will see, your Honour, in the second line of the first
page of the affidavit, reference to FR 417 of 2007.
After that the respondent commences
FR 944 of 2007, seeking to recover part of the settlement sum and this is
the commencements of these proceedings whereby it's alleged that the consent orders
were obtained by duress and therefore should be invalidated. This goes on so that the decision of the
magistrate to dismiss proceedings 944 of 2007 as effectively an abuse of
process because the proceedings had been determined by the Magistrate's proceedings
417 of 2007 by consent orders and that another Magistrate's proceeding was not
able to do anything in relation to that.
That decision is appealed to the District
Court and that's the third line on the first page, so appeal 6 of 2008 is an
appeal to the District Court in relation to FR 944 of 2007 and that's,
your Honour, the second Magistrates
Court proceedings relitigating what was dealt
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 6
with by consent,
although it's alleged by the respondent that the basis is that the consent
order was obtained by duress.
We follow that through and the District
Court appeal decision is part of the application for review in CIV 1903 of
2008, that's the third line down on the second page of the aide-memoire.
MURRAY J: That application ‑ ‑ ‑
EDDY, MS: This is all about this
dispute originally over $6000 between the respondent and Mr Thies. I think the respondent's son is also involved
in these proceedings but the respondent's son certainly has not litigated in
the way that the respondent has.
MURRAY J: Yes.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 7
EDDY, MS: So he seeks to review the
original Magistrates Court,
FR 944 of 2007, decision, "I can't do this because it has already been
determined by this court." Also a
review of the consent orders in FR 417 of 2007 and also a review of the
District Court appeal in appeal 6 of 2008.
MURRAY J: The ‑ ‑ ‑
EDDY, MS: That decision - I
apologise, your Honour. Were you
going to say something?
MURRAY J: Yes. No; that's all right. It's a useful document, the aide‑memoire,
read together with the way in which the affidavit of Ms Loh breaks the
events up under general headings and makes it possible to follow it through, I
can see that, and I will have to spend some time I think reviewing all of this
material and making sure that I understand where it's going and what it is
about it that is said to give rise to the application of the act, because, as I
have understood it, the application is based upon both limbs of section 4
subsection (1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act; in other
words, what is said to look at is: look
at the past conduct and you will find a series of proceedings which might have
had or originally had elements of understandable dispute to be resolved but
have been pursued and pursued and pursued in different forums and in different
forms despite the fact, as I have understood the submission you are making, the
substantive issue has long since been determined.
What's being said then is this, isn't
it: that conduct of proceedings in that
way in the past over a period of years demonstrates that Mr Chin is likely
to conduct himself in relation to any dispute which arises in which he takes an
interest or has an interest in the same way in the future?
EDDY, MS: That is the submission of the applicant. It's not only the relitigation of matters
which I have taken you through part of, your Honour. I think it's also the way that the respondent
will commence and pursue legal proceedings with no reasonable ground. So not only does he relitigate but he time
and time again has proceedings which - the courts are clearly saying over and
over again, "There's no reasonable ground, there's no reasonable prospect,
there's nothing here. It's manifestly
hopeless."
Those are the references that are referred
in paragraph 15 and the third matter - so it's not just relitigation. It's not just matters that have no prospect
of success. It's the way that the
respondent does it as well and you will find throughout the materials and I
have referred to some of them - the references here, your Honour - if
your Honour goes simply to these references, they encapsulate the
applicant's argument beautifully.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 8
10.46
It is said time and time again by the court
that the respondent's submissions and applications are confused,
incomprehensible. They show a
willingness to make offensive, scandalous and serious allegations without
foundation. So this on top of this
relitigation, on top of a willingness to institute proceedings without any
prospect of success, manifestly hopeless proceedings, shows that the respondent
is a person who needs to be made the subject of this order.
That is an onerous restriction on his
rights but he has shown time and time again that he needs it and that where he
does have a proper cause of action, he will be able to proceed with that
because he will be able to show a judge that he has one, but in the past he
simply doesn't.
MURRAY J: Yes. In the light of that submission, are you able
to identify for me the particular aspects of the definition of vexatious
proceedings upon which the applicant relies?
I think I can identify that you are relying upon paragraph (a). I'm not sure that I have a grasp of what in
the context of this legislation is meant by an abuse of the process of the
court; there's that.
Is it intended to place reliance upon any
aspect of paragraph (b) or is it otherwise intended to rely upon
specifically paragraph (c) of the definition and with elements of paragraph (d)
in relation to the context of some of the processes and the observations that
are made and the imputations that are cast upon the motivations of judicial
officers and others involved in the litigation?
EDDY, MS: The applicant's main
grounds are (a) and (c). Those we say
are the strongest matters. The other
matters both go to - it's very unclear whether there's any subjective intent to
harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment because it does seem that the flavour
of the proceedings is this tenacious belief that somehow if he litigates often
enough, his view of the world will be shown to be true and anyone who makes a
decision contrary to his view of the world must necessarily be biased, must
have altered documents, must have done all sorts of things. It's not clear. So we don't rely on any subjective intent to
harass or annoy.
There is one reference in one of the
transcripts where the respondent is making submissions and effectively saying,
"I'm never going to stop doing this.
I'm going to keep on going and going," but I'm not sure that's
clear enough to say there's a real intent.
So we don't rely on that as such.
We do rely - that the proceedings are conducted in a manner so as to
harass or cause delay or detriment because so many scandalous things are within
these proceedings.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 9
We also rely on that as a factor in the
discretion because of course even if we make out that the respondent has
commenced vexatious proceedings, your Honour
has to be
satisfied in your discretion such an onerous order should be made.
MURRAY J: I want to come back to that
in just a second. Can I ask you whether
there's any authority which deals specifically with what is meant by the term
"an abuse of the process of the court" in the context of this
legislation? Ordinarily, Ms Eddy,
you would look to litigation being characterised as involving an abuse of
process if it was, although potentially justifiable, use of the processes of
the court for an extraneous or collateral purpose.
You are familiar I am sure with the - I
can't remember just for the moment the names of the High Court decisions but
there are a number of them which make abundantly clear that even though you may
have justification for use of the process, it will be struck down if your
motivation is a collateral purpose which is not the proper object of the
availability of the process employed.
Are you content with a meaning like that in the context of this
legislation?
EDDY, MS: Your Honour, those themes are very much
the themes that are referred in the context of this legislation in
Attorney-General v Michael, the 2005 decision of the Western Australian Supreme
Court, 202, also in Granich Partners and Yap which is an earlier decision, a
2003 decision of the Western Australian Supreme Court, 2006, and in
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride and Ors, another Western Australian
decision, 2004, 177.
These all look at what is an abuse of
process within the context of this legislation and they are using exactly that
language, your Honour, as has been highlighted in the submissions at
paragraph 7, references to both Michael and Granich:
Proceedings may be an abuse of process if they are instituted or
pursued without reasonable ground by objective standard regardless of any
subjective intention, motive or state of mind.
That's the theme your Honour
adverting to. Further, Granich confirms,
as outlined in paragraph 9, that the definition even in (d) might be
vexatious regardless of personal intention, motive or state of mind. That's proceedings conducted in a manner set
out to harass or annoy. So that one also
doesn't necessarily need subjective intent.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 10
10.52
At paragraph 10 I think that's a
clear reliance on the High Court authorities, it's a clear case of an abuse of
process and vexatious proceedings where there's further or collateral attempts
to challenge a final decision of a court binding on the party - Commonwealth
Bank of Australia v Bride is referred and relied on in paragraph 11 there
to emphasise that you don't need to show the plaintiff has any ulterior motive,
as long as it emerges that the effect of bringing the proceedings is to
relitigate an issue which has previously been conclusively determined.
Helpfully Commonwealth does also talk
about the idea that proceedings instituted without reasonable grounds including
claims with unintelligible pleadings, misconceived or hopeless appeals, appeals
without any lack of basis and proceedings with no prospect of success - so all
the same sorts of themes.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 11
MURRAY J: You see, that I would have
thought is a general description of what's involved in paragraph (c).
EDDY, MS: It seems that, yes,
instituted or pursued without reasonable ground. There looks like a fair bit of overlap.
MURRAY J: What this litigation is directing itself to
is for the courts and other litigants to have the capacity to protect
themselves from either repetitive behaviour which is not genuinely motivated
towards achieving the legitimate end of the processes that are employed, or a
form of stalking, if you like, or in other words done with the intention to
intimidate or annoy for some other purpose, or simply without any reasonable
prospect of success and that probably covers it reasonably, I would have
thought.
EDDY, MS: It certainly seems there's room for a fair
bit of overlap between the subparagraphs of the definition of "vexatious
proceedings" and in the past most of the people, in fact I would say all
of the people who have been made subject to an order under this legislation in
Western Australia, at least since the current version of the act came out, have
all been people who have not been found to have any subjective
mala fides.
They have all been people who have just been
tenacious, determined people who cannot accept that a matter that they believe
is correct has been finally determined in the court and that character exposes
the courts and other litigants to an incredible amount of resources and costs
because of that tenaciousness, that idea that, "I must be right. Anyone who says I'm not right must therefore
be wrong. As long as I keep trying, I
will be able to validate my position one day," with a refusal to accept
there is a simple appeal process which has only a limited number of steps and
that's the end of it.
MURRAY J: Yes, I understand the submission and that
brings me back then to the next point which was rattling around in my mind as I
read the papers that I said I was going to come back to a minute ago and that
is your reference to the discretionary judgment involved and the decision
whether or not to make an order.
I would welcome reference to any
authorities dealing with that because at first reading it seems to me that the
scheme of the act generally and the way in which section 4 is formulated
in particular would suggest that if the court comes to the conclusions which
are set out in paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), the use of the word
"may" in relation to the forms of order is an empowering rather than
a discretionary "may" and I would find it hard to conceive of a case
where although (a) and/or (b) were established in the mind of the court, it
would say nonetheless let him go
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 12
10.58
on and don't
make an order.
EDDY, MS: I would submit that this legislation - it is
open to read it that the only discretion is whether you make the order, (c) or
(d), not whether you make an order at all but the previous decisions that have
looked at this have all referred to this idea that you have to be wary of what
an extreme remedy it is and therefore you should take into account the person's
rights as well as the rights of society, of the other litigants as well as the
court resources and they do tend to infer - it's not entirely clear, your Honour. They tend to infer that there is a discretion
at large, even if the requirements are satisfied.
MURRAY J: The person who is established to be, if I
can use the general term, "a vexatious litigant" isn't regarded by
the act as having a right to continue to behave vexatiously.
EDDY, MS: I think it's a difficult
point, your Honour, in that it isn't entirely clear and I don't think that
it has been addressed in any of the previous judgments. They certainly all refer to this idea of
discretion and talking about we first have to be satisfied whether it meets the
test and then we have to look at this discretion, and they don't clearly
identify that the discretion is only as to what order to make; and, with
respect, I take your Honour's point and it's a good one that on the
language it may well be that that is the only discretion, which of the orders,
but we haven't presented the case that way because earlier authorities suggest
this wider discretion.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: It may be that a person who has conducted a
series of litigation has in the past commenced vexatious proceedings but by
something else that has happened over time, perhaps by the lapse of time since
they have done anything, it may be that the court may be satisfied that it
would nonetheless not be appropriate to make an order because there's no ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: Yes, all right.
EDDY, MS: ‑ ‑ ‑ suggestion that
anything more would be done; like if it's a subject matter and only one subject
matter and it has been completely concluded and the litigant has given up and
it has been some years perhaps.
MURRAY J: Yes, I understand.
EDDY, MS: That might be this idea that perhaps the
legislation doesn't require an order made in that case or maybe it says only
any existing proceedings should be stayed and otherwise they should be left
alone. In this
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 13
case, we say that
the number of matters which have been the subject of these multiple
proceedings, plus what can be observed if one looks at the respondent's
blogspot which he referred to in his submissions, that in fact he is still
litigating; and that's where litigation is commenced by someone else but he's
resisting litigation in relation to application to have caveat removed on the
same sorts of grounds that were canvassed in that group of proceedings in
relation to his solicitor's lien proceedings.
That alleged lien resulted in the caveat
and then there has been various applications in relation to that caveat by the
person whose property it is and if one sees what purports to be the transcript
of proceedings in August 2011, that the respondent is still making the same
submissions that he has made in the proceedings that have already been
concluded, albeit, as I said, it's an application by the land owner and not by
the respondent.
The way he responds to it is a relevant
fact there; not that he is still instituting proceedings but that he's still
defending them on the same grounds. He
still doesn't accept that the court has determined that he didn't have a
caveatable interest based on that solicitor's lien.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: We say that the number of actions, the
recency of the actions even in the affidavit which go up to December 2010 and
by having regard to, as I say, the blogspot referred to in the respondent's
submissions, as well as the way and the degree of scandalous nature that shows
(a) an ability to assert things without any foundation of fact and it's done
time and time again, it's even done in these submissions, these assertions
without any ground or explained basis.
It shows a continued tenacious thought pattern which we would submit
shows a real likelihood of continued litigation of anything that doesn't match
that thought pattern.
I have been talking a bit longer than I had
anticipated, your Honour. I was
going to take you through the references in the submissions, if you like, but I
have effectively summarised them. Would
you like me to take you through them?
MURRAY J: These where you put them in
14, 15 and 16 you mean?
EDDY, MS: Yes.
MURRAY J: I don't see the point
really, Ms Eddy, unless there is something particularly you wanted to draw
attention to. I wanted to get a clear
understanding of the basis upon which you are proceeding and what you thought
about where it all fitted and how it all fitted into the
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 14
framework of the
legislation so I could see where the application was coming from.
I don't think there's any substitute for
my settling down and reading and understanding the objective facts of the
litigation and the various steps in the litigation which has been undertaken.
EDDY, MS: It may assist your Honour - when I
prepared the references - to use the aide-memoire as well to see the document
that you're referred to, say for example in paragraph 14. In fact there's one slightly obscure thing in
paragraph 14. I refer to
page 414 and that reference is to guide your Honour to look at the
documents and oral submissions being made in the State Administrative Tribunal
and as you go on to that following document you will see that there are a
number of documents that are annexed or put in this bundle of documents for the
State Administrative Tribunal which are in fact documents from other
proceedings.
So he has in there affidavits from other
proceedings and originating motions from other proceedings, so the point there
was relying on material in other proceedings in the State Administrative
Tribunal; not that those proceedings in themselves were really to get anything,
it's his tendency to include all these other documents.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: The others are more
patently - if one has regard using the aide-memoire to showing you where these
are proceedings that are relitigating already determined matters and that you
can look at the litigation and the way that it's phrased if you look at those
references and you will see then effectively supporting the aide-memoire, those
references.
In 15, they're all references to decisions
where the court has found no reasonable ground, manifestly hopeless, that sort
of thing.
MURRAY J: But the references to
particular documentation in your outline, for example the reference to
page 414, does not directly cross-reference itself to the aide‑memoire,
although much of that I noticed does.
EDDY, MS: I think 414, I just pointed
that one out because that's the only unusual one that I had put in there merely
to show the types of documents that were being filed.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: The other ones should
cross-reference with the aide-memoire.
Basically that's the evidence to show how
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 15
the aide-memoire
works.
MURRAY J: Yes, I follow.
EDDY, MS: So for example, the reference to 702(a) to
799 is in fact the CIV 1604 of 10, which on the aide-memoire 1604 of 10
was an application for mandamus in relation to the SAT decision in VR 107 of
2008 and CIV 109 of 2010, and of course VR 107 of 2008 has already
been the subject of proceedings at least two other times.
MURRAY J: Yes, right.
EDDY, MS: So it's intended to be read
that way. Paragraph 15 is at times
pinpointing statements by courts as to the fact there is no reasonable grounds
when they have decided - making decisions, but in some of them I have just
referred to the whole of the decision and I can give your Honour in fact
the pinpoint now, because I think that would assist, of where the comments are.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: If your Honour would
give me that liberty.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: I have referred to 413,
676. There should be a reference to 677
as well.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: 678, 700. That reference to 2190 and 2205, the relevant
part is at 2202 to 03.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: The next reference, the
relevant part is 2884 to 5.
MURRAY J: I follow.
EDDY, MS: The next reference, there's
a single page, 3168.
MURRAY J: Thank you.
EDDY, MS: The next one it's 3281 and
3282.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: The last one, 3412.
MURRAY J: Yes.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 16
EDDY, MS: Then paragraph 16 was
attempting to show
your Honour
this confusing, incomprehensible willingness to make offensive, scandalous and
serious allegations; so there are some pinpoint references to where courts are
commenting on that, and there are also some references to the material itself
so that your Honour can review that for yourself.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: There should be two further
references, I apologise, following the last one there, 3281. There should be 3279 and 3281.
MURRAY J: And 328?
EDDY, MS: 1.
MURRAY J: You have got 3281 there.
EDDY, MS: Have I? There you are. Sorry, your Honour.
MURRAY J: So there's just one
additional one, a reference to 3279?
EDDY, MS: Yes. There are then only a number of pinpoint
references at paragraphs 25 and 26.
25, that's a reference to that transcript I mentioned before where the
respondent states in making submissions what it is submitted is express, an
implicit intention to never stop until he achieves what he considers is the
correct outcome; and at 26, that's a reference to the respondent's willingness
to blatantly ignore orders of the court, it is submitted.
MURRAY J: Yes, thank you.
EDDY, MS: That it seemed to me was
the most helpful material. Of course,
one gets a flavour by simply flicking through the documents both as to the way
the documents are worded and as to the themes coming up time and time and time
again.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: Unless I can assist you
further, those are the submissions for the applicant, your Honour.
MURRAY J: I think I have come to
grips with it. Thank you very much,
Ms Eddy. Yes, Mr Chin, what
would you like to tell me? Yes,
Mr Chin?
CHIN, MR: Sir, it pains me very much to cast
aspersions on the character of any of the judges that have gone through my
case, but, your Honour, there is only one version of the truth. There cannot be two versions of the
truth.
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 17
I would like to delve slightly into the
philosophy of what is truth and what is untruth, what is real and what is
unreal. Something which is real is good;
something that is untrue, is false, is evil, is bad. Someone who is brave is good; someone who is
a coward is bad, your Honour.
I have been admitted as a barrister and
solicitor. I have tried to defend the
truth. I have tried to become a good
person, but I have been destroyed and the destruction is continuing because the
judges are not willing to see the truth.
They are not willing to let me speak the truth. They want me to distort the truth. Your Honour, if you can tell me how to
distort the truth so that I can defend myself, I'm willing to do so so that I
wouldn't have to offend anyone, your Honour. It pains me very much to offend someone and I
would not do it, I wouldn't do it but I have to speak the truth.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 18
The epitome of justice is a fair trial,
which I know your Honour is giving me, and for the presiding judge to do
justice according to law. I must have a
fair trial and justice must be done in accordance with the law. If justice is not done in accordance with the
law, then I do not have a fair trial. I
do not have justice.
These are the twin pillars of
justice. One would never tire of
stressing this point. This is what the
rule of law is all about and if a justice were not to upheld (sic) the
epitome of justice by giving me a fair trial and do justice in accordance with
the law, then he is not a judge but he's a transgressor. I'm sorry to say this, your Honour. For there to be a fair trial the presiding
judge must be fair-minded and he must administer justice according to law. If the judge does not do that, then justice
has failed. There will be injustice.
The judge must be impartial himself and in
his court and he must manifest an appearance of impartiality for justice must
not only be done, it must be seen to be done.
As Lord Galvin observed:
The
judge who gives the right judgment while appearing not to do so, maybe tries -
blessed in heaven but on earth he is no use at all -
Patrick Galvin,
The Judge, at page 3. The judge who does
not appear to be fair, who does not appear to be impartial is useless to the
judicial process. Even though he has
given the right judgment, the judge who does not appear to be fair at the
hearing lives behind a sense of injustice to the losing party who will feel
that he has been singled out by the judge's show of impartiality, such a
judge's useless prejudicial process and gives a bad name to the courts of his
country.
Martin
Luther once said, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere." This means that
although we may come from..........empowerment for others, we reaffirm and
protect our own.
This is quoted form the former president
of the Bar Council Ms Ambiga Sreenevasan when she was awarded the Secretary
of State award for International Women of Courage on 11 March 2009 by the first
lady, Michelle Obama, and the USA
secretary of state, Hillary Clinton.
Your Honour, the crux of the issue of
all my litigation has never solved at all.
The crux has never been decided by any justices so far. They were good justices. They were justices that was willing to do
justice but they came and gone before they are able to do justice. They were at the initial stage and I think
they
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 19
11.18
were shooed
away; examples are like Barker J; examples are like Hasluck J.
These people I (indistinct) with the
failings to do real justice but a widow, a doctor from Malaysia, educated in England, daughter of a millionaire,
who was (indistinct) in her younger days by her millionaire father, Chan
Nguyen, whose home is the present king's place - she is Dr Chan Kheng
Su.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 20
She is a doctor who was married to her
husband who is a doctor and who has got two sons and she broke up with her
husband, she had a successful practice in Malaysia. She came over to Australia, migrated here and
married a Jewish man, the old man, 90‑year‑old, a billionaire, and she, when
the husband died, they put her in prison.
They put her in prison and she was bailed
out and she came out. She was
successfully defended and then begin a series of plundering and pillaging of
her wealth and I was unfortunate at the time when I just came out as a lawyer
and she approached me and asked me to help her, and she was in the midst of
being plundered by a former president of the WA Law Society and that's how it
all began. That's how I was restricted
in my freedom to practise as a lawyer by an initiative to the law society and I
fought this case, I won this case. I got
- I achieve a consent judgment by Steytler J.
Steytler J is now the parliamentary
inspector and he said, "I have no power to do anything." He knows his consent judgment was to set
aside the decision of Judge Eckert, the first decision of the tribunal, of
the State Administrative Tribunal which made a finding that I was guilty, not
of professional misconduct, not of unsatisfactory conduct but of a deficiency
in my professional knowledge.
As a result a restriction was imposed upon
me, preventing me from practising, getting me to work somewhere else but I
couldn't find a place where I can work, because they were restricting me and
that's why I was fighting. That's why I
discovered that there was a pseudo board.
The regulator has got 52 members.
After 52 members, four members can at any time seek to and
make a decision and the four members must be appointed by minutes of the
majority members, but my barrister was not able to get the minute validating
the four members who sat and imposed restriction on me.
The LPCC is acting at the behest of
someone. The LPCC is making decisions
which it has got no right to make. The
LPCC is making decision that it has got no reason to make and as a result this
decision, the dispute about the pseudo board, that issue has been closed; that
issue is never raised in a judgment, that issue has never been decided, no
action is ever taken.
The pseudo board has done the wrong thing
to me and the pseudo board, after I've got my consent judgment to set aside the
decision of Judge Eckert that was decided on 12 June 2006, the
consent judgment was decided on 26 September 2007, the pseudo board keep coming
and the pseudo board keep restraining me and I have no way to go. I keep
on
fighting. No-one dare to decide the
decision.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 21
11.24
MURRAY J: Mr Chin, I have
listened carefully to your general remarks and you're starting to now give it
some specific focus. Is it your view
that the decision of the board you refer to as a "pseudo board" is a
decision although by a quorum with power to act, should never have been made
and you have been seeking to have the wider board look again at it? Is that what you're saying to me?
CHIN, MR: I am saying, your Honour, all my
proceedings in court I have never - is never based on unreasonable
grounds. I have never been found
frivolous and as a frivolous and vexatious litigant by any judges. In fact, Magistrate Musk on 9 January
2008, or 7; 8, she decided that I am not a frivolous and vexatious litigant in
FR 944 of 2007 and that is in the transcript. I have never made any claim based on
unreasonable grounds.
After all these years, after all these
years all the issues have been narrowed, all the issues have been decided. There are only four issues that have never
been decided. If those issues are never
decided, they are never contained in any written judgment, they have been
brought up before the courts but there have been avoided and evaded and they
are never in the written judgment and therefore only those four issues and the
four issues is now very focused.
I can pinpoint only one aspect, one fact
for each case, for each of the four issues.
Point number 1 is David Taylor case, CACV 107 of 2008. It is also CIV 1775 of 2008, that is the
decision of Master Sanderson. That
decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 and the
three judges, their Honours of the Court of Appeal has made a perfect decision.
There is only
one glaring point of error; that is, it is contained - this error is contained
in these few pages and I explain and cited all the judgment, all the word what
was said by each of the judges. I have
appeal and have been to the High Court and it has come back and they have tried
to enforce the judgment against me. And
I have been through Pullin JA and Newnes JA. Every word that they have said that is
related to this point, there's only one point.
That point is Owen J said the fresh
evidence of Registrar Powell in his letter dated 11 June 2009 found at
page 136 of the yellow appeal book, that fresh evidence cannot be received
by the Court of Appeal unless it has a reversal effect on the outcome of the
Court of Appeal decision. That evidence,
that fresh evidence need to be accepted and I have made an application under CACV 107
of 2008 on 15 July 2011. It has not been
registered with the Court of Appeal, it is still pending registration.
That application is to efface the error of
law apparent on the court records and, your Honour, this is the
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 22
proof, the
latest receipt from the registry of the Supreme Court. David Powell (sic) never file CIV 1131 of
2006 on the 10th day of February, because he never pay the fees for
CIV 1131 of 2006 on the 10th day of February 2006 but only three years later,
29 May 2009 when I wrote to inquire from the learned Registrar Powell
and he falsified the court records.
This matter is the subject of the police
investigation and the police, the fraud squad has decided that the chief
justice must answer it first before the fraud squad moves in, according to
protocol. I have made this application
for the effacement of the error apparent on the court records because this
error, this error of law must be eradicated from the court records because
200 years later our students of law will still be studying and they will
find an error in the court records that has been committed in the year 2008 and
that has not been removed.
The other point,
shall I submit this to - just for your Honour?
MURRAY J: If you wish to, Mr Chin,
yes. Thank you, Mr Orderly. Thank you.
CHIN, MR: The next point is Timothy Robin Thies. It is not the $6000, your Honour, that
I'm fighting for. It is the public
interest that I'm fighting for. The
public interest of me, my son, my wife and all other members of the public have
been intimidated, have been bullied and have been asked to pay money that is
never owed to Mr Timothy Robin Thies and the money and the demand keep on
increasing by the week: "If you
don't pay, you increase by $3000; if you don't pay from zero it became
$24,000."
This $24,000, anybody in my position would
have settled it, your Honour, and will rush to settle it, but when we rush
to settle it we make sure we inform Registrar Wilde of FR 417 of
2008. Registrar Wilde is the court
official who register the consent order achieved under duress between me and my
son and Timothy Robin Thies, and the duress situation is known to
Registrar Wilde because Registrar Wilde refused to attend to that
consent judgment.
There was a delay of a few months and I
keep pressing her and I keep writing letters to her and because of the duress
settlement, that duress settlement is now involved and I went before Magistrate
Musk. Magistrate Musk was aware of
everything and she says this is not a frivolous and vexatious litigation but my
application was dismissed before Magistrate Musk. I appealed to the District Court. It was
dismissed by Herron C. I went before
Hasluck J. Hasluck J saw
everything and did justice to me and Hasluck J take the first step of the
review process.
The second stage of the review process was
supposed
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 23
to be continued by
his Honour Wayne Martin CJ.
Wayne Martin CJ, instead of doing justice placed a stultifying
cross-order - a security costs order that I pay $20,000 otherwise the case
cannot go on. I went to appeal to the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal
refused to give me leave and that is the bar, and the reason for the Court of
Appeal to give me leave cannot be understood.
I went to the High Court. It is natural for the High Court to refuse
leave but the High Court gives a reason.
The High Court says that you must not put the cart before the horse; if
you apply for a security costs order, you must apply before Hasluck J make
the review decision. Hasluck J has
ordered that the matter be reviewed and it is up to Ken Martin J to
implement it and Ken Martin J refused to implement it but stop it
with a security costs order by putting the security costs order as the cart
before the horse; we should have come earlier, but came later.
So what happened was that the appeal
court, when I appealed to the District Court before Herron C I have to pay
$100. So Registrar Wallace sent me an
order out of the blue to tell me, "That hundred dollars that you pay when
you appeal against Magistrate Musk's decision, that money is security
costs."
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 24
So they are trying to put the cart before
the horse back again. So I refuse to do
that, so I lodge a complaint with Martino J; because the payment of the
hundred dollars, at that time when I pay it there was no law requiring me to
pay. The law that requires me to pay
security costs order before I appeal to the District Court was - has been
repealed at that time, so is no more there, so there was - so it is not right
that the hundred dollars that I paid inevitably, for whatever reason I was
asked to pay, cannot be regarded as a security cost in order to regularise the
whole procedure by putting the horse before the cart.
So on 15 April I make an application to
the Court of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010.
So that application is awaiting approval and I have a copy of it,
your Honour. Do you want it?
MURRAY J: Yes. I think that's already before me.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: Yes, that's already before
me, isn't it?
CHIN, MR: You have it?
MURRAY J: Yes. It's an annexure to the affidavit.
CHIN, MR: No.
That is a different one. That one
was CACV 107.
MURRAY J: No. That's CACV ‑ ‑ ‑
CHIN, MR: 107.
MURRAY J: - - - 75 of ‑ ‑ ‑
CHIN, MR: CACV 75 is the Timothy Thies case.
MURRAY J: 75 of 2010?
CHIN, MR: Yes.
You have a copy of my application; to erase the error apparent on the
court records.
MURRAY J: I believe so; 3192 to
3282.
CHIN, MR: This, your Honour, happens only on 15
July 2011 and all these documents are prepared well before that time. This application contains 90 pages,
your Honour. I just gave you the
first few pages.
MURRAY J: I will get Mr Orderly
to make copies of that, Mr Chin.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 25
11.44
CHIN, MR: Your Honour, you want to make the whole
set - I have got the whole set here, 90 pages.
MURRAY J: No. That's all right. Thank you.
The documents that you have shown me were - yes; yes, we will get him to
make a copy of that. Yes, you go on?
CHIN, MR: 90 pages.
MURRAY J: I don't need the 90
pages. I just need your application and
your affidavit. That's what you are
relying upon. You don't need all the
supporting material.
CHIN, MR: No. These are filed with the court but there is no
numbering yet. It has not been
registered yet, but this application for the Timothy Robin Thies case consists
of 90 pages. Those pages are only the
beginning pages.
MURRAY J: Yes, all right. It's impossible for me to copy 90 pages,
Mr Chin. If you had wanted me to
have access to those - have you filed them or not?
CHIN, MR: I have.
MURRAY J: You have. All right. I will get my associate to dig them out in
due course.
CHIN, MR: Okay.
The next point is the consent order, your Honour. The third point is the consent order.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: The consent order of Steytler J in CACV 43
of 2007. The regulator surrendered to me
in that case and therefore will reach a consent order. The terms of the consent order is that Judge
Eckert's decision that I'm deficient in my professional knowledge be set
aside.
That didn't happen because the pseudo
board came again and the pseudo board again reinforced the condition on
me. The pseudo board - and I was with
counsel; and the pseudo board was again unable to prove that it has got the
majority consent of the full board. The
pseudo board acted improperly, without authority and I appeal against that
decision before Chaney J in VR 107 of 2008.
If that case was heard by Barker J
everything will be okay but Chaney J heard the case and Chaney J refused to
decide on the pseudo board issue. Chaney
J again reinforced the condition on me, restrict my independent practice, and
that keeps me fighting. I appeal against
Chaney J's decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal refused to give me
leave. I went to the High Court. The High Court refused leave but the High
Court said it depends on the credibility of Chaney J.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 26
So I decided to use prerogative writs and
I came before Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010. I thought Heenan J was going to be - was
doing very well, very fine. Heenan J
ordered for the LPCC to respond, to reply within 10 days when I served the documents
on the LPCC, but again the regulator contacted Heenan J secretly and
Heenan J made an about-turn. So instead
of having the LPCC respond, the LPCC never have to respond, and my case was
dismissed by Heenan J.
MURRAY J: So what was the prerogative
relief that you were seeking?
CHIN, MR: Your Honour?
MURRAY J: What was the prerogative
relief that you were seeking?
CHIN, MR: I was seeking for two orders, one is
the VR 107 of 2008 decision of Chaney J to be abolished, the
other ‑ ‑ ‑
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 27
MURRAY J: But I'm sorry, you had
already had that tested on the appeals and you said that you didn't get leave.
CHIN, MR: I appealed that but the leave to appeal was
not granted. So I went to the High
Court, the High Court say it's dependent on the credibility of Chaney J.
MURRAY J: And they dismissed your
appeal.
CHIN, MR: So I went before Heenan J, CIV
1019.
MURRAY J: Let me see if I have
understood it. You appealed against the
order made in the tribunal by Chaney J.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
It was ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: Your appeals were
dismissed.
CHIN, MR: Leave to appeal was refused.
MURRAY J: Okay. Then you took an application for prerogative
relief.
CHIN, MR: I took prerogative writs.
MURRAY J: What sort of prerogative
relief did you want?
CHIN, MR: On two case.
One is - then the LPCC started on 30 June 2009 to sue me on the
same matter that has been decided by Judge Eckert, using the same matter to sue
me for professional misconduct and unsatisfactory conduct in VR 87 of 2009
and then I made an application to abolish it because it is res judicata
and that decision was dismissed by - what's the name?
MURRAY J: Take your time.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: Did you go back before the
tribunal?
CHIN, MR: Say again?
MURRAY J: Did you go back before the
tribunal?
CHIN, MR: I appeared before the tribunal, before - I
can't remember that name now. We were
talking about him.
MURRAY J: You were talking about
Chaney J before.
CHIN, MR: Justice?
MURRAY J: You were talking about
Chaney J before.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 28
11.56
CHIN, MR: Yes, Chaney J. I went before Heenan J on
two grounds.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: One is to abolish the VR 107 by
Chaney J, of 2008. The other one is
to abolish the VR 87, res judicata, poor in judgment by
Chaney J.
MURRAY J: Okay. So what sort of prerogative relief were you
seeking?
CHIN, MR: I was seeking mandamus and certiorari.
MURRAY J: You were seeking mandamus
and certiorari.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: All right, and that was to
achieve the result which you had sought to achieve by the appeals which had
been dismissed.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: That was dismissed because a brother judge -
a court of the same rank do not have the power, prerogative powers over another
judge of the same rank.
MURRAY J: Yes. That's right.
CHIN, MR: So then I was also invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of the court, so Heenan J did not decide that.
MURRAY J: Sorry, you were invoking
the inherent jurisdiction of the court?
CHIN, MR: Yes, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to review its own decision.
MURRAY J: So if the Supreme Court -
if Heenan J took the view that he could not grant prerogative relief, you
invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant relief on that
basis. Is that right?
CHIN, MR: Yes, then I have got an exhaustive
explanation of my rights in Sleight C's decision in CIV 87 of
2010. After Sleight C's decision,
then I know what sort of relief I can get from the Supreme Court. So Heenan J was right, so I could not -
then before I appeal again Heenan J's decision I went before
Le Miere J in CIV 1604 of 2009 and Le Miere J say that
he has got no power.
Le Miere J says ‑ ‑ ‑
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 29
MURRAY J: What proceedings did you
take before
Le Miere J?
CHIN, MR: Say again?
MURRAY J: What proceedings did you
take before Le Miere J?
CHIN, MR: Mandamus.
Mandamus against Chaney J and mandamus against Heenan J.
MURRAY J: So you made applications
before Le Miere J to set aside the decisions made by Heenan J
who declined to set aside the decision made by Chaney J.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: And so you wanted Le
Miere J to set aside the decision made by Chaney J.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: Mr Chin, did it occur
to you that these were a series of proceedings that had already been decided to
deal with the point upon which you had already lost?
CHIN, MR: Your Honour, the issue of the pseudo
board was never decided by Heenan J.
MURRAY J: I see. Yes, I see.
All right. What did
Sleight C ‑ ‑ ‑
CHIN, MR: Sleight C ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: How did he get into
it?
CHIN, MR: Sleight C, then they want to -
Sleight's case is the CIV 87 of 2010.
That is the decision after I got from the High Court about CACV 107 of
2008 about Owen J's decision.
MURRAY J: And the CIV number with
Sleight C was 87 of 2010?
CHIN, MR: CIV 87 of 2010.
MURRAY J: I see. We don't think that's right, but anyway go
on.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
So that decision, Sleight C dismissed my application but
Sleight C is right because Sleight C for the first time explain that
you cannot have prerogative orders against your brother judge of the same rank
and also Sleight C also refers to Heenan J's decision but
Sleight C says I have, I have got a right under the inherent jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. And Sleight C
says
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 30
that ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: Yes, Ms Eddy?
EDDY, MS: If I could assist the
court. I believe that the respondent
might be referring to CIV 1878 of 2010.
I'm not sure if I'm correct.
MURRAY J: Is it 1877? Is it 1877 of 2010?
29/8/11 31
CHIN, MR: Yes, 1877.
I'm sorry, your Honour.
MURRAY J: 1877?
CHIN, MR: 1877.
MURRAY J: Okay. Yes, thank you.
CHIN, MR: 1877.
So Sleight C opens up the whole story, "Now I can see clearly,
where do I go?" So Sleight C
says I can start a separate action against David Taylor which Maurice Law is
going to start or which - because I and Maurice Law make a joint application or
make a separate application to remove the errors of law apparent on the court
records in CACV 107 of 2008.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: So after reading Sleight C's judgment I am
thoroughly happy because he decided on the issues that was before him. He never evaded the issues, your Honour,
and he is an honest judge.
MURRAY J: Did you say that Sleight C
gave a decision in that matter?
CHIN, MR: He gave a decision in relation to CACV 107 -
in relation to CACV 107 ‑ ‑ ‑
MURRAY J: So this goes past your
affidavit, Ms Eddy, does it? Yes,
thank you?
CHIN, MR: Your Honour, if you read Sleight C's
judgment he says on the same point - admission of the fresh evidence, he
dismissed it. He dismissed it but he
says he has no power over his fellow brothers, judges. That's why he dismissed it, he has got no
power, and that gives me the idea that I use the error of law apparent on the
court records to remove the error of Owen J in CACV 107 of 2008, rather than
filing a separate action.
MURRAY J: Yes. What else do you want to tell me?
CHIN, MR: That was the consent judgment. The last point is: Chaney J was trying to help the LPCC to
change the decision of Eckert J in VR 137 of 2006 regarding my deficiency in my
professional knowledge which does not merit a bar on my independent
practice. That's what I have been
fighting for.
Chaney J wanted
to help LPCC to change that by converting that into both professional
misconduct and unsatisfactory conduct.
That is the application that was made by LPCC on 30 June 2009 and that
is my dispute with Chaney J, because Chaney J was biased against me and I
have
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 32
12.06
served upon him 30
questions asking him to explain to me why he is not biased against me. Chaney J was not able to explain that and
that results in Chaney J recusing himself from hearing the case.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 33
MURRAY J: I'm sorry, did you say that
Chaney J recused himself from hearing the case?
CHIN, MR: 87.
VR 87 of 2009.
MURRAY J: Yes?
CHIN, MR: So when Chaney J recused himself, then
Judge Pritchard was there for a little while and Judge Pritchard was
doing good. Then Judge Pritchard was
promoted to become a justice here in the Supreme Court and then the State
Solicitor, then Timothy Sharp became the vice president and he was handling my
matter. He was handling my matter before
the LPCC and the LPCC was not able to answer my questions, why they are doing
the wrong thing to me. I make it a point
that the LPCC answers those questions before Judge Sharp and LPCC was not
able to answer until today.
Judge Sharp has on several occasions told
the LPCC, "You pull up your socks and get his licence - give back his
licence to him quickly," but the most interesting thing is that the LPCC
on 4 August made a decision upon the complaint of Maurice Law against David
Taylor and the LPCC says that there is no credible evidence against David
Taylor and the credible evidence is those documents I have just given to your Honour,
why there is no credible evidence, why the LPCC is again helping David Taylor
and Registrar Powell.
This is happening again and again because
LPCC does not want to give up. They just
want to do the wrong thing all the time and I have just written a letter to
LPCC and to Judge Sharp. I don't want to
go on with the case because LPCC is not sincere and is not honest, because the
case before Judge Sharp is on 11 October and I have got this letter here,
your Honour.
MURRAY J: Yes, thank you. Yes, go on, Mr Chin.
CHIN, MR: Your Honour, if you look at the
submission of the principal registrar on the last two pages where you have got
the eight memo. I can go through each
one of them. The first one is I lodge a
caveat over the properties to protect solicitor's lien; that is entirely
perfect, there is no unreasonable ground.
The FR 417 of 2007, that is the
consent judgment, consent order judgment of Registrar Wilde, under duress,
and I have got all copies of documentations that has been communicated with
Registrar Wilde and the counsel for Timothy Robin Thies, he told
Ken Martin J there is no evidence that Registrar Wilde was aware of
the duress and was under duress to enter into that consent judgment.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 34
12.12
That became the subject matter of my claim
in FR 944
of 2007 and that
became appeal number 6 of 2008 at the District Court before Herron C. That became CIV 1903 of the Supreme
Court, of 2008, before Hasluck J.
Number 3 is my claim against Thies seeking to recover part settlement
sum in FR 417, is in FR 944.
Magistrate Musk herself said in the transcript that I have never
been guilty of any frivolous or vexatious claim. That is the remark of Magistrate Musk
herself, that there is no frivolous claim by Mr Chin against
Mr Thies.
The appeal to the District Court, the next
one is appeal number 6 to the District Court that Registrar Wallace most
recently in 2011 delivered an order that the hundred dollars paid was the
security costs and I have complained against that and that is the subject
matter of my application in CACV 75 of 2010, to efface the error of law
apparent on the court records.
The next one is the VR 107 of 2008,
that is Chaney's decision and that is contained in volume 1 and 2. The previous one, the appeal of the District
Court is contained in volume 9 and 10 and the FR 944 is contained in
volume 9. The next page we have the
FR 147, my application to appeal decision of registrar in relation to consent
orders; that is in volume 8.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: The next one, 30 June, is the
CIV 1775. That is my caveat. CIV 1775 was the decision of
Master Sanderson to remove my caveat, subject to condition that $20,000
was set aside by Pullin JA to pay me for my solicitor's fees for Nancy
Hall and this money was never paid to me.
Master Sanderson did not remove the caveat, did not remove my caveat and
did not remove Law's caveat, Maurice Law caveat or Spunter's caveat on
28 October 2008 but the Spunter caveat was removed by me on the 10th day
of February 2006 when David Taylor did not comply with Jenkins J's order
in CIV 1142 of 2005 where I was the solicitor for Nancy Hall.
So that caveat was removed, the Spunter's
caveat was removed by me and not by Master Sanderson and not by Anthony Pride
and therefore the wrongful past orders against me by Master Sanderson still
stands, has not been taken away because my appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 has not
been decided yet. That is in volume 15
and 16 and the CIV 1903 of 2008 is in volume 10, 11, 12 and 13 and
the CACV 105, that is my appeal against Chaney's decision to the Court of
Appeal is in volume 3 and 4.
6 November 2008, my application for
leave to appeal the decision of the master, that application for leave was
granted, volume 16; and on
30 June 09, that
is the VR 87 where I am being persecuted by the LPCC, is in volume 4.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 35
MURRAY J: Mr Chin, I can readily
pick these up. There's a cross-referencing process to the affidavit
that gives me ready capacity to pick these up.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
Yes, your Honour. Do you
want me to continue?
MURRAY J: I don't think you need
to. I can readily pick up the chain of
documents and locate the decisions by the cross-referencing that goes between
that document and the index.
CHIN, MR: So I don’t have to tell you.
MURRAY J: No. That's fine, thank you.
CHIN, MR: Okay.
All right.
MURRAY J: All right? Thank you very much.
CHIN, MR: Yes, that's right, your Honour. Thank you.
MURRAY J: Thank you,
Mr Chin.
CHIN, MR: Sir, do you want a continuation or do we
finish it today? It is finished
today?
MURRAY J: I'm sorry? Tell me that again?
CHIN, MR: Is this finished today. This case is finished today?
MURRAY J: Today? Yes, in the next few minutes I would
think. You have been going through ‑ ‑ ‑
CHIN, MR: Okay.
MURRAY J: ‑ ‑ ‑ methodically.
CHIN, MR: Do you want me to make further submission on
why, on why I am never guilty of any of the thing that is in here?
MURRAY J: I thought you had been
doing that. I thought you had been doing
that and explaining your situation. Was
there something else that you wanted to tell me about the case?
CHIN, MR: Yes.
If I just take you to the submission, to the plaintiff's submission.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: Number
1, okay, whether or not the court is satisfied the plaintiff has instituted or
conducted vexatious proceeding or is likely to institute or conduct
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 36
vexatious
proceedings. My answer is no, I have
never conducted one vexatious proceeding and I am not likely to conduct any
future vexatious proceeding. (b):
If
the court is satisfied of those matters, then it will be necessary for the
court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to make order under this
act.
There is no need for this court to make
any order under this act, but this court can help me to make sure that my two
cases, my two applications are registered and be heard.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: Right, and that the issue of the
pseudo board be settled by a written judgment. The issue of the pseudo board has never - is
a taboo subject. It has never been
decided by any judge.
MURRAY J: I think you have told me
all about that, haven't you?
CHIN, MR: Yes; yes.
Number (c):
If
the court is satisfied it is an appropriate case to exercise its discretion,
the court will then need to consider the appropriate terms of any order it
makes under this act.
There is no need
to.
MURRAY J: Yes.
CHIN, MR: Then number 2:
Before
making an order under section 4, the court must be satisfied the plaintiff
has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding, whether before or after its
commencement of this act.
My answer is I
have never. (b):
Is
it likely that a plaintiff will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings
under section 4 of the act.
My answer is it is not likely at all,
because I am not like Dr Michael.
Dr Michael is a doctorate holder but he is not a professionally
trained lawyer. That's the difference
between him and me, your Honour.
For every action that I have done, I have done it correctly. I may be wrong procedurally in some cases and
it is only human nature for me to make mistakes. But I am a trained lawyer, I have been through the mill. I have been trained as an
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 37
articled clerk and
I have been trained as a restricted practitioner.
If I have not committed any unsatisfactory
conduct or any misconduct, then there is no law that I can be restricted in my
independent practice. That is the most
important thing to me, your Honour.
I need your help on this point, because otherwise I'll keep going and
going and going and going and I never stop because no judge wants to decide on
this issue.
I have put everything down on paper,
everything is there. Everything is
there. There is no room for doubt. Everything is there. You can question - your Honour, the
other party can question me on anything.
I'm prepared to answer; and I'm not prepared to tell lies, I'm prepared
to tell the truth. What we are here is
to get justice. We are here not to
defeat justice. I know your Honour
is a very honest judge and I kneel down to your Honour for being such a
good judge.
The same thing happens to
Judge Sharp. Judge Sharp, he knows
and understood everything and he knows that they are wrong, but I am afraid
that he is not strong enough to stand up if they all go against him. This legal profession is not a monopoly of a
few people who wants to rob and plunder the ordinary common people and get away
with it. I'm sorry to say that,
your Honour. Number 3:
The
fact that a person has in the past instituted or conducted vexatious proceeding
alone is sufficient to allow the court to make an order under section 4 of
the act.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 38
MURRAY J: Mr Chin, I think it's
not going to be helpful for you to go through each one of these
paragraphs.
CHIN, MR: Yes.
MURRAY J: I have been noting what you
have said about the various issues and the points that you have been making
about that.
CHIN, MR: Yes, your Honour.
MURRAY J: As I have understood what
you have been doing, you have been seeking to demonstrate your reasoning and
why you have engaged in the processes and what you hope to achieve and what you
have learned about the processes that are available in the course of the
various pieces of litigation to which you have referred. That is useful material. Have you completed your review of those
matters?
CHIN, MR: Yes, I have completed my review. All my matters are - now focus on only the
four issues and that is in my written submission.
MURRAY J: Yes, and I have noted what
you had to say about those in the course of your oral submissions.
CHIN, MR: I hope that my two applications in the Court
of Appeal, CACV 107 of 2008 and CACV 75 of 2010, those two applications will be
heard and also my application CIV 1981, I seek Ken Martin J's decision
that he made against me about the stultifying security costs order; I want that
removed because Ken Martin J made a void decision, because he was biased
against me and Ken Martin J did not provide me the 20 reasons or so that I have
ask him to respond to me. He
cannot.
MURRAY J: You see, the point I'm
making, Mr Chin, is that by my count that's the third time you have told
me that. You don't need to keep
repeating it.
CHIN, MR: Yes, sir.
MURRAY J: You tell me once and if I
don't understand, I will ask you a question.
CHIN, MR: Yes, sir, okay.
MURRAY J: So I think if you have told
me all that you wanted to say to me, now is the time to resume your seat.
CHIN, MR: I have not mentioned about CIV 1981 of 2010,
your Honour. The purpose of this
exercise today is to take away that case that I filed in the Supreme Court. That case was never heard.
29/8/11 CHIN, MR 39
12.32
MURRAY J: Yes; yes, you have
mentioned that.
CHIN, MR: I want to go before Judge Sharp on
11 October but I'm just frightened because the LPCC has not done the right
thing and is dishonest, and I hope the LPCC will respond to me and tell me that
it is honest enough so that I can go and face Judge Sharp before the tribunal
on 11 October.
MURRAY J: Yes; yes, you have spoken
about that.
CHIN, MR: Thank you very much, your Honour.
MURRAY J: Thank you,
Mr Chin. Is there anything in
reply, Ms Eddy?
EDDY, MS: Only one brief point,
your Honour.
MURRAY J: Yes.
EDDY, MS: The material provided to you by the
respondent, your Honour, it's submitted that if there was ever any doubt
that there's a need for an order ongoing, that the respondent, as he said, will
continue and continue without any sense of pause or that he doesn't understand
that he is relitigating the same issues.
He has made those points himself very clear it's submitted.
The decision of Sleight C that was
referred to is a conclusive decision about the concept that certiorari against
a Supreme Court judge cannot be considered by a Supreme Court judge but also,
quite fairly, goes on to consider the idea of whether a decision of the Supreme
Court, if infected by fraud, could be referred to the Court of Appeal, accepts
that it can be but then canvasses comprehensively why he should not do that
based on the lack of any evidence of fraud - and this is this idea that
Registrar Powell somehow commits some fraud; based on the fact that the alleged
fraud raises no substantial new issue and that it would be inappropriate in all
the circumstances, then dismisses the application on both bases. Somehow this gives the respondent some sort
of enthusiasm to commence another proceeding which is called - and he has
handed up an application in CACV 75 of 2010.
This is an
appeal that has been dismissed already.
So since the time that these proceedings
have been put in place, the respondent's insight into his behaviour is so poor,
knowing that he is at risk of these orders, he continues and he has happily
handed up to you an application in an appeal that has been dismissed, to
relitigate the issue the subject of the appeal; somewhat incomprehensible but,
nonetheless, the applicant only says that the submissions made by the
respondent and the material handed up by the respondent does nothing but
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 40
reaffirm the
necessity to make the orders sought by the applicant in this case.
MURRAY J: Thank you,
Ms Eddy. In view of the extensive
submissions that have been made by both sides, I propose not to give reasons
extempore. I think it's appropriate in
the circumstances of this case to reserve my decision and I do so.
AT 12.39 PM THE
MATTER WAS ADJOURNED ACCORDINGLY
29/8/11 EDDY, MS 41
