NICHOLAS N CHIN

Monday, November 1, 2010

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE IN CACV 75 OF 2010: CHRONOLOGY

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NO.: CACV: 75 OF 2010
COURT OF APPEAL

In the matter of an ex-parte Application made pursuant to subs. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) by the Applicant for Leave to Appeal the Interlocutory Decision of Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) now made inter-partes. This Void judgment (for want of jurisdiction of the judge and of the subject matter) is the subject matter of this appeal dated 17.6.2010 (and is at the second stage or subs. 36(4) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 Proceedings in CIV: 1903 of 2008, cited as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2010] WASC 169, also referred to as the Prerogative Relief Proceedings) is hereafter referred to in this document as the “Security Costs Order Case”.

And

In the matter of a prior concomitant jurisdictional error of the Second Judge (in Mandate Exclusion Case of Thies v Chin [2010] WASC 111I) dated 13.5.2010, which is also the subject matter of this Appeal. It is hereafter referred to as the “Mandate Exclusion Case.”

And

In the matter of the Unanimous Mandate of the court (presided by the First Judge in the subs. 36(1) or the First Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings by His Honour Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009) having been granted to the Applicant for the purpose of allowing him to defend his son, Paul (in his capacity as a lawyer and not as a legal practitioner on a pro-bono basis; thereby detracting from that role his public duty as a court officer; so as to make way, under just circumstances, for his so acting for his son, without conflicting interests). That Mandate is being reasonably seen as not being delimited to the mediation process only (but is referable to the whole of those Prerogative Relief Proceedings including its second stage before the Second Judge). However, that Mandate was unreasonably retracted by the Second Judge without any justifying circumstances (in the Mandate Exclusion Case which is reasonably seen to be a design in a series of judgments and conduct of His Honour, to precede the Security Order Case so as to achieve His Honour’s pre-judgmental decision to stultify those proceedings to the detriment of the Applicant (the Mandate).

And

In the matter of the Mandate having arisen from the issue of the joinder of Paul in the first stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings as the Second Defendant whilst the Respondent and Applicant were similarly joined as the First Defendant and Plaintiff respectively. (The ulterior purpose of the Mandate as intended by court of the First Judge was to prevent Paul’s vulnerabilities from being further exploited by the Respondent with the necessary ramifications: Applicant was given the role to defend primarily his own case as a litigant in person (and secondarily to defend his son’s case, who had been involuntarily drawn into the dispute by the Respondent who had seen it fit to exploit the son instead of the father on a pro-bono basis as a lawyer and not as legal practitioner on condition that Paul would remain inactive. Paul would thereby be absolved from all liabilities for costs orders on account of his being inactive; Paul was to remain non-contactable by the Respondent except through the Applicant so as to prevent any further mental injury/harm to him.) This would give the Applicant the reasonable opportunity to seek the court’s permission for the amalgamation of Civ 1112 of 2007 or the Duress-Cave Case into the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC so as to achieve the public interest of finality in these proceedings (the Amalgamation).

And

In the matter of Justice Newnes having granted the Applicant Leave to Amend the Appellant’s Case on 15.10.2010 within 21 days (such Amended Appellant’s Case should now only confine itself to the Interlocutory Appeal which covers only the relevant areas, namely: the Security Order Case, the Mandate Exclusion Case, the Amalgamation including the repeated oral and written calls for the Second Judge to abdicate himself from hearing the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. The latter having culminated in the Applicant’s Recusal Application for Prerogative Orders in CIV 1981 of 2010 dated 28.6.2010 now pending before the Court of Appeal.)

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN -APPLICANT
V.
TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES - FIRST RESPONDENT
PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN - SECOND RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AS APPROVED BY COURT OF APPEAL REGISTRAR IN HER EMAIL DATED 26.10.2010 AT 10.50 AM.

Date of document: 1st November, 2010.
Date of filing: 1st November, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Applicant
Prepared by:
Nicholas N Chin Phone & Fax: 08 9275 7440
387, Alexander Drive Email: nnchin@msn.com;nnchin1@gmail.com
DIANELLA WA 6059 Mobile: 0421642735

No Date EVENT
1 SYNOPSIS 1. The Applicant sought Prerogative Relief in terms of subs. 36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 before Justice Hasluck through FR944 of 2007 before Magistrate Musk for the purpose of claiming the $6,000.00 that was unlawfully demanded from him personally by the Respondent. This sum was paid together with another sum of $5,500.00 that was demanded from the Applicant’s son, Paul. Both sums were paid by the Applicant himself. Paul remains till today an involuntary participant in the solicitor-client relationship entered into by the Applicant with the Respondent. This Minor Claim Case was dismissed by Magistrate Musk and it became the source of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings begun solely by the Applicant in CIV 1903 of 2008 (the source of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings)
2. The Respondent started the CIV1112 of 2007 to defend the unlawful lodgment of his Caveat on Paul’s home property without the necessary caveatable interests in order to facilitate himself in the process of unlawfully demanding monies from the Applicant for a Zero Sum Debt in FR 417 of 2007.
3. This Caveat case is the “gun” of that unlawful demand and is thus the handmaid of the duress situation because Paul and his parents were frightened that Paul’s home property would be taken away from him.
4. The unlawful demands for the Zero Sum debt was the result of the escalating profits costs of the Respondent which keep rising from a Zero Sum till it reached the astronomical figure of some $25k and anybody faced with that situation from a solicitor who is the Respondent, would be worried that the unsettled Zero Sum Debt would eventually become so burdensome that it would be best to settle it with the sham compromise sum of $11,500.00 (the sham compromise) paid by the Applicant to the Respondent under the guidance of Paul’s psychiatrist and the involuntary Consent Order of Registrar Wilde of the Fremantle Magistrate’s Court (the duress-handmaid Caveat Case).
5. The duress that precipitated that sham compromise resulted Applicant’s fear that was caused by the especial vulnerability of his son Paul and his predisposition to mental injury, that had already occurred twice in the past at the material time, such fear being synergistically engendered by the magical and mysterious ability of the Respondent to escalate a Zero Sum Debt in FR417 of 2010 into some $25k and the fear of Paul losing his home as a result of the uncertainties of the law affecting caveatable interests.
6. As a result of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings being heard before the First Judge, the Appellant was given leave or mandate as a lawyer (but not as a barrister & solicitor or as a legal practitioner as he is without a current practice certificate) by His Honour Justice Hasluck to represent his son Paul in the two stages of those proceedings, the second stage being before His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin (The Mandate).
7. The First Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings was presided by Justice Hasluck and the Second Stage was presided by Justice Kenneth Martin.
8. The function of the Second Judge is to use his discretion to withhold the relief granted by the First Judge if there were any justifying circumstances.
9. The Second Judge is in jurisdictional error when he stultified or stifled the second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings by issuing the Disputed Security Costs Order which is the subject of this Interlocutory Appeal process through His Honour retracting the Mandate without justifying circumstances.

2 24.7.2008 Applicant filed his Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 for the First Stage of Prerogative Relief in 5 pages together with his Affidavit in Support dated 23.7.2008 in 267 pages
3 19.8.2008 The First Stage for Prerogative Relief directions hearing before the First Judge, the transcript of which had the effect of staying the execution of the costs of courts below at Fremantle.
4. 29.8.2008 Applicant filed his First Supplementary Affidavit sworn the same day in support of the First Stage for Prerogative Relief in 98 pages.
5 18.9.2008 Applicant filed his Second Supplementary Affidavit sworn the same day, in Support of the First Stage for Prerogative Relief in 37 pages.
6 15.9.2008 The First Judge provided a copy of the transcript of the proceedings heard on the 19.8.2008 to Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007 thus staying the execution of the costs orders in the Fremantle Magistrates Courts below on 20.9.2008: namely the Costs Orders of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2008 and Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007.
7. 7.11.2008 The Prerogative Relief Proceedings proceeded in an ex-parte fashion as prescribed the s.36, before the First Judge resulting in its transcript in 34 pages and a lengthy judgment cited as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 which include Orders to make to make the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief proceedings inter partes thus paving the way the way for mediation process presided by Registrar Rimmer, which is reasonably perceived to have been botched as a result of the Respondent non-compliance with the requirements of the First Judge as embraced within the transcript of 17.6.2009.
8 11.5.2009 Applicant wrote to the Principal Registrar requesting for the Prerogative Relief Proceedings to be continued as the Orders for service of the necessary documents had been served upon the Respondent’s solicitors on 9.12.2008.
9. 17.6.2009 The transcript of the proceedings in 51 pages shows how the First Judge issued Orders for mediation proceedings in conformity with the Minute of Proposed Orders filed by the Respondent, in terms of the following:
a) The Applicant be made Plaintiff in the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief proceedings;
b) Paul Chung Kiong Chin be made the Second Defendant in those proceedings.
c) The Respondent be similarly made the First Defendant.
d) The Second Defendant remains inactive in all future proceedings including the mediation process and shall not be liable nor be responsible for any future costs orders.
e) The Plaintiff act on behalf of the Second Defendant (in the whole proceedings not limited to the mediation process), who can only be communicated with through the Plaintiff.
f) The First Defendant to file a concise and precise Show-Cause Affidavit that narrows down the dispute to the core issues as defined:
f.1. whether the solicitor-client costs agreement dated 3.11.2004 had been modified by prior email communications between the parties;
f.2. the reasons why legal costs of a relatively uncomplicated matter had been escalated by the Respondent to some $25k in the face of the Respondent’s legal service having been terminated since the 20.2.2005.
g) time for compliance be specifically made the essence of the Order for the Show Cause Affidavit of Respondent be filed within 21 days, in readiness for the mediation process; but this was not complied with by the Respondent as it was delayed until the mediation process had passed.
10 22.6.2009 Letter from Applicant to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court making an Application for Mediation copied to the Associate of Justice Hasluck. This letter requires the Registrar to exercise his discretion to disclose this application to the Respondent as the Applicant gives his consent for the Registrar to do so. In his cover email letter to the Associate of Justice Hasluck, the Applicant noted that he would be away from the jurisdiction and was expressing his fear that his son Paul would be intimidated by the Respondent during his absence for a month and hence the reason for his not sending the Respondent a copy of that letter. But he gave the Registrar to exercise his discretion to inform the Respondent accordingly.
11. 10.8.2009 Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 8.7.2009 requesting for the Appellant’s leave for extension of time till the 24.7.2009 to file the Show-Cause Affidavit: yet Respondent did not file his Show Cause Affidavit by the appointed date but only filed it by 7.10.2009.
12 11.9.2009 Mediation Conference was not helped by the then non-existence of the Show Cause Affidavit as intended by the First Judge. That conference was held before Registrar Rimmer and the Respondent offered to settle the dispute amicably for $3,000.00 provided the Applicant withdrew his Complaint to the LPCC; the offer if accepted by the Applicant, would mean that he had to bear the three-fold consequences of that inapposite settlement, in the following terms:
a) the Applicant is denied the opportunity to win his dispute with the regulator of the legal profession which imposes a restriction on his independent legal practice, which is currently before the Court of Appeal in CACV41 of 2010 which has only three issues:
a.1. The existence of the Pseudo Board ;
a.2. The vindication of Applicant’s rights against Mr. Timothy Robin Thies Solicitor.
a.3. The falsifications of court records by David Taylor Solicitor
b) the denial of the Appellant’s son Paul his right to compensation for Mr. Thies clogging up his equity by his wrongful caveat would be travesty of justice that remains unresolved and it is against the public interests that a court officer should be allowed to get away scot free for exploiting his involuntary client’s vulnerabilities and advancing his own personal interests ahead those of his supposed client, as a result;
b) the denial of the Applicant for the restitution of the sum of $11,500.00 which was taken forcefully from him by way of duress in a sham compromise through the involuntary Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde, effected unconscionably by the Respondent. The public would have conceived that our legal system condones the pillaging and plundering of innocent members of the public by a solicitor who is an officer of the court.
c) The Applicant decided that the mediation conference was unfair to him and he therefore rejected it.
d) The Respondent did not file a Show Cause Affidavit that depicts the essence of justice intended to be done by the First Judge in the Show Cause Affidavit. This document should deal with cores issues and its ramifications on the issue of the sham compromise, which the First Judge indicated is a crucial issue that His Honour’s mind was “open” to, in the transcript.
13 16.9.2009 Email letter from Applicant to the Principal Registrar copied to the Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC informing them of the results of the mediation conference held before Registrar Rimmer on 11.9.2010.
14. 3.10.2009 Applicant wrote to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia copied to the Respondent to achieve the two fold purpose:
a) Requesting for the transcript of the proceedings in duress-handmaid case that was heard before Justice Templeman on 8.2.2007 regarding the unlawful caveat of Mr. Thies on the home property of Paul, when Paul appeared in person.
b) Informing the recipients of that letter that it was the Appellant’s understanding from what transpired before Justice Hasluck in primary case for Prerogative Relief that the Applicant was given the mandate to pursue the removal of the unlawful caveat’s case acting in his capacity as lawyer for his son Paul with appropriate disclaimers to the effect that the Applicant is without a practice certificate but has never been struck off the roll of barristers and solicitors.

15. 6.10.2009 Respondent ultimately filed his Show Cause Affidavit after a delay of 16 weeks as from the date of the Order of the First Judge who specifically made time of the essence whilst refining its quality as indicated in the transcript dated 17.6.2009 in the following terms:
a) a strict compliance of 21 days at pages 45 and 48.
b) it must serve the needs of the mediation process and also for future trials if necessary.
c) it must be concise and precise but what was filed consists of much irrelevant materials spanning over 540 pages.
d) counsel of Respondent was suggesting that the First Judge and the Mediator should read the irrelevant “many foot high” Affidavit materials filed in the courts below which had confused their Honours Magistrates Musk and Michelides in FR417 of 2007 and FR944 of 2008 respectively, but this was not accepted by the First Judge.
e) The exact words of the First Judge affecting the core issues that needed to be addressed by the Respondent at page 41 relates to how the legal costs could escalate in the circumstances are: “whether the contractual relationship with the Respondent was terminated in the way which might have precluded further costs being incurred or as a subsidiary point, whether in some way the costs agreement was qualified by some exchange of emails.”
f) the joinder of Paul Chin as the Second Defendant with the condition that he is to remain inactive and therefore he could not be communicated with except through the Applicant who will be acting for him at all stages of the proceedings as Plaintiff in the Prerogative Relief proceedings represents the mandate given by the Court to the Applicant, which the Second Judge erred by retracting it (the Mandate).
g) The fact that the Mandate is meant not only for the mediation process but is applicable for all stages of the Prerogative Relief proceedings is clear from the transcript.
h) There is no abuse of court process for the Applicant to represent his son Paul in the duress handmaid case as there is a common law principle which allows the Applicant to enter it through the original Civ 1903 of 2008 case or through amalgamating it with the duress-handmaid case.
i) The Applicant expressed his intentions to represent his son Paul in the duress-handmaid case and prepared documents to that effect with the disclaimer that he is still a lawyer-litigant in person though he admitted to his mistakes in using “solicitor” and “barrister” in those documents. (See Column 1 of r. 5a(2) of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009).
j) The Applicant is currently being prosecuted by the regulator for the non-strict liability of the subs. 13(1) representation of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 that he was entitled to be engaged in legal practice whilst he was labouring under a mistake of fact by using his stamp which contains those words “barrister & solicitor” on those documents he had prepared as lawyer litigant in person in the duress-handmaid case. Strangely, there is no prosecution number as that prosecution notice is not lodged with the Magistrates Court at Perth. A telephone call to the Magistrates Court at Perth confirm this anomalous situation.

16 8.10.2009 Applicant filed his Summon in Chambers Application to act as the lawyer for his son Paul under the mistaken belief that he is allowed to used his title as barrister & solicitor as per the mandate of Justice Hasluck given him on 17.6.2009 in the first stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. (See Column 1 of r.5 (2) of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009 which I was not aware of until recently. However, this Application is made with the appropriate disclaimer that the Applicant was acting as a lawyer litigant in person.)
17 22.1.2010 Facsimile and email letter to Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC attaching my letter dated 20.10.2009 copied to the Respondent that I intended to act for my son either as a lawyer-litigant in person or as the lawyer acting for him as “counsel” or “legal practitioner” or “solicitor” or “barrister” with the appropriate disclaimers in CIV 1112 of 2007 for the duress-handmaid caveat case as I have been given the mandate to do so by Justice Hasluck. I also referred to other documents that I sent to the LPCC in 15 pages answering the Respondent’s complaint in 15 pages dated 29.10.2009 pertaining to this and other matters.
18 6.5.2010 Applicant wrote a letter to Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC informing it of the events that transpired during the hearing of both the CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 before His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin in relation to my perceived bias of that Second Judge against him and therefore he was not a suitable judge to hear the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. .
19 6.10.2010 The delayed Show Cause Affidavit confused the minds of the court and caused the injustice to the Applicant and his son Paul and this is indicated in the subsequent errors of the Security Order Decision and the Mandate Exclusion Decision of the Second Judge that are the subject of this current Interlocutory Appeal before Justice Newnes.
20 29.10.2009 The Draft Order before Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009 was extracted by the Applicant.
21 12.5.2010 Applicant was served with a copy of the Respondent’s Summons for Security of Costs, Proposed Variation of First Judge’s Orders in the Respondent’s Minute of Proposed Directions in 27 pages. The Variations Orders sought to revive the Null Costs Orders of the Court below which was not allowed by the Second Judge but there is a veiled threat in that judgment to stultify further the Prerogative Relief Proceedings.
22 12.5.2010 The Applicant complained to the Legal Profession Complaints Committee in 27 pages as indicated above, by way of facsimile to Ms. Caroline Brookes.
23 12.5.2010 Applicant was taken by surprise that the Second Judge showed a personal interests in the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings and was therefore acting in conflict of interests; this is show by the great haste in which the proceedings for the Security Costs Order was being processed by His Honour in the following terms:
a) The Mandate Exclusion Decision was made on 13.5.2010 and published on the 25.5.2010, just one day after the Applicant was served with the Security Order Application by the Respondent.
b) The Second Judge erred in not having adequately considered the Applicant’s Response Affidavit filed and dated on 26.5.2010 to the Security Order Application dated and filed 12.5.2010. This Response Affidavit is in 140 pages crossed the Mandate Exclusion Decision.
c) The Second Judge heard the Security Order Decision on 17.6.2010 and delivered his decision on 8.7.2010 but the Mandate Exclusion Decision was delivered on 13.5.2010 but published on 25.5.2010.
d) The Mandate Exclusion Decision therefore is an index of the error of the Second Judge of his being predisposed with a “prejudging mind” in terms of the following:
d.1. that the Applicant is not entitled to be engaged in protecting his own interests or his son’s interests as a lawyer but not as a barrister & solicitor
d.2. being a lawyer and not a legal practitioner he is not a court officer because he does not hold a current practicing certificate.
d.3. being a lawyer and not a legal practitioner, he owes no public duty to be fair to the Respondent and therefore he is not acting in conflict of interests for his son and he thereby can plead for his son Paul before the Second Judge and as his son’s McKenzie friend.
d.3. that all these proceedings are not primarily for the return of $6,000.00 but for serving the public interests that the Respondent must not be seen to be exploiting the vulnerabilities of his potential clients or his own clients.
d.4. that the case against the Respondent is one of the three core issues in the Applicant’s dispute with the regulator of the legal profession in which he is vindicating his rights in order to seek a return to his position as an independent legal practitioner.

24 28.5.2010 Ms. Caroline Brookes of the LPCC responded to the Applicant to the effect that she had received all documents relating to the Appellant’s email in terms of the following:
a) dated 17.5.2010 commenting on the Mandate Exclusion Decision;
b) dated 19.5.2010 re: Outline of Written Submissions of Paul Chung Kiong Chin dated 10.5.2010 before the Second Judge and his Summons in Chambers dated 30.4.2010 which shows that Paul had resorted to become a litigant in person in the duress-handmaid case when his father was excluded to represent him in the Mandate Exclusion Decision delivered on 13.5.2010.
c) The Second Judge erred in being irrational by denying Paul his natural justice to use the plaint written by his father and his father’s friends as he chose to appear as a litigant in person despite the unanimous mandate given to his lawyer father by the First Judge in the Prerogative Relief Proceedings.
d) 27.5.2010 annexing a copy of the Mandate Exclusion Case.
25. 17.6.2010 The Second Judge heard and delivered his Security Order Decision on 8.7.2010. It is based on the unmet Costs Order of Commissioner Herron in District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008 which the First Judge acknowledged that had no jurisdiction to interfere but the Second Judge does have jurisdiction to order for it to be heard before him under the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in the manner as prescribed by subs. 36(4) of the Act i.e. pursuant to s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969. It must be remembered that a taxing master can go against the original costs order if it is found by him to be unlawful or contravening the law.
26. 28.6.2010 Application for Prerogative Orders filed by Applicant to prohibit the Second Judge from hearing the second stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in 126 pages resulting from his Mandate Exclusion Decision Case and the Security Order Decision.
27 8.7.2010 The Second Judge delivered his Security Order Case in RE MICHELIDES NO.2 [2010] WASC 169 in 11 pages together with the transcript of those proceedings.
28 11.7.2010 Applicant filed Notice of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010 at the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and served it by posting it on the Respondent at his last known address in accordance with the substitute service by the First Judge.
29 16.7.2010 Applicant filed his Appellant’s case in 56 pages with amended indices and amended Orders Wanted.
30 20.7.2010 Paul Chung Kiong Chin was depressed by the injustice meted by the Second Judge and he left Australia for Malaysia as he was feeling unwell because he was deprived of just compensation for the unlawful caveat of the Respondent which was finally removed by the Second Judge and he was denied his natural justice both as a litigant in person and the representation of his lawyer father through the Mandate Exclusion Case.
31. 24.7.2010 The Applicant and his spouse left for Malaysia in an emergency flight upon hearing that their son Paul Chung Kiong Chin had become seriously ill in Malaysia perhaps caused by the further intimidation of the Respondent demanding for another sum of $650.00 upon circumstances where there was no order as to costs given by the Second Judge. They were there for two months and only return to Perth by 27.9.2010.
32 4.8.2010 His Honour Justice Heenan heard the Prerogative Relief Application for the recusal of the Second Judge together with another application for the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal in CIV 1877 of 2010. The latter pertains to the falsification of court records by lawyer David Taylor in CIV1131 of 2006 and the repair of the technical slip of the Court of Appeal in CACV107 of 2008 made pursuant to s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935. These two cases were heard with the Applicant being absent from the jurisdiction for which Justice Heenan delivered a written judgment on 11.8.2010 cited as RE: JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EXPARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212 in 5 pages, explaining the law that a Justice of the General Division having the same rank as Justice Chaney, Justice Ken Martin and Master Sanderson cannot make prerogative orders against another justice of the same rank. This judgment is an indirect admission that Justice Heenan did not have the jurisdiction to dismiss the Applicant’s Application for prerogative Orders in CIV 1019 of 2010 and therefore that dismissal which is now the subject of an appeal in CACV41 of 2010 is therefore void in law. The Registrar of the Court of Appeal had therefore been informed accordingly.
33 7.10.2010 The Applicant was served by the regulator of the legal profession in WA a Court hearing Notice with a Written Plea by Accused in Form 5 together with a Prosecution Notice in Form 3 issued under the Criminal Procedure Act, 2004 and Criminal Procedure Regulations 2005 together with two charges that the Applicant had contravened s. 13(1) of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 in relations to proceedings before the Second Judge in the Mandate Exclusion Case together with the relevant Statements of Material Facts. The time for hearing for these two criminal charges is scheduled to be heard on 26.11.2010 at 10.00 am.
34 11.10.2010 The Applicant wrote to the Chairperson of the Legal Practice Board claiming that he had a defence to those criminal charges of having represented that he was entitled to engage in legal practice in so far as it concerns the mandate given to him by the First Charge on 17.6.2009 to enter into the duress-handmaid case to defend his son Paul under special circumstances that was caused by the difficulties posed by the Respondent in refusing to release the strangle-hold caveat he had held over his son’s property under unjustifiable circumstances.
35 15.10.2010 Applicant appeared in the Court of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010 before a Justice of Appeal, His Honour Justice Newnes who granted leave to the Applicant to amend his Appellant’s Case filed on the 16.7.2010 as indicated above. The Respondent was present and was granted leave to be present although it was an ex-parte Application for Leave to appeal the interlocutory decision of the Security Order Case and the Mandate Exclusion Case of the Second Judge. The Court adjourned the matter till the 23.11.2010 at 10.30 am to re-consider the Amended Appellant’s Case which ought to have been filed by the Applicant by the latest date 5.11.2010. There was no order as to costs as the Applicant made submissions relating to the relevancy of the legislative intention of Parliament when it enacted the Minor Cases Provisions of ss. 25 and 31 of the Magistrates Courts (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004, which negates any liability for costs of any party (no matter at what courts it may be, of any litigation) who had been dragged into court proceedings which had not been commenced within with the provisions of the Minor Cases Provisions and who are thereby cost-disadvantaged as a result.

Footnote:
See Column 1 in the Table of regulation 5(2) of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009 which entitles the Applicant to represent himself as a “lawyer” and not as a barrister & solicitor or legal practitioner since he is without a practice certificate as a result of conditions imposed upon him restricting his independent legal practice by the regulator of the legal profession in WA which currently forms the subject matter of his appeal in CACV 41 of 2010. That restriction disentitles the Applicant to hold himself out as being entitled to be engaged in legal practice contrary to subs. 13(1) of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 WA, which attracts a fine of $20,000.00. The Applicant has since 7.10.2010 been served with a Prosecution Notice for this strict liability subs. 13(1) offence but a diligent inquiry by him found that this Notice, strangely enough, is not lodged with the Magistrates Court at Perth. The Applicant’s defence to this offence is that despite receiving a mandate from the First Judge in these proceedings, he was also labouring under a mistake of fact that although not entitled to practice, he is allowed to act for himself as a litigant in person in all affiliated legal proceedings with the Respondent upon the ground that his son Paul was never a voluntary participant in these proceedings and that the Applicant himself was involved in matters that affected his own personal interests and that his son Paul was the subject of exploitation by Mr. Thies who saw it fit to entice Paul to be so involved so that he could gain from him financially, thus advancing his own personal interests against that of his own client or potential client or unwilling client. This is the professional misconduct of Mr. Thies. Currently, the dispute of the Applicant with the regulator revolves around three issues:
1) The existence of the Pseudo Board which usurps the role of the role of the real Full Board of the regulator to persecute him in its VOID judgment to restrict his independent legal practice.
2) The vindication of his human rights in that he was accused by the regulator of having a proclivity of making false allegations against fellow practitioners, namely Solicitor David Taylor for having falsified court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 and Solicitor Timothy Robin Thies of having extorted monies from him and his son in a sham compromise in the Void Consent Judgment of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2010. Those ensuing judgments of Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007 and Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007 and Commissioner Herron’s Judgment in District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008 are also VOID JUDGMENTS as they are based on the VOID judgment of Registrar Wilde as indicated above and VOID as well on the ground that the Respondent is without justiciable issues before the court as he did not comply with the intentions of the First Judge and the Second Judge was reasonably seen to be accommodating him in his multiplicity of roles thus acting in conflict of interests.

Signed by: ………………………………… ….

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE IN CACV 75 OF 2010: AMENDED SUBMISSIONS

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NO.: CACV: 75 OF 2010
COURT OF APPEAL

In the matter of an ex-parte Application made pursuant to subs. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) by the Applicant for Leave to Appeal the Interlocutory Decision of Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) now made inter-partes. This Void judgment (for want of jurisdiction of the judge and of the subject matter) is the subject matter of this appeal dated 17.6.2010 (and is at the second stage or subs. 36(4) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 Proceedings in CIV: 1903 of 2008, cited as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2010] WASC 169, also referred to as the Prerogative Relief Proceedings) is hereafter referred to in this document as the “Security Costs Order Case”.

And

In the matter of a prior concomitant jurisdictional error of the Second Judge (in Mandate Exclusion Case of Thies v Chin [2010] WASC 111I) dated 13.5.2010, which is also the subject matter of this Appeal. It is hereafter referred to as the “Mandate Exclusion Case.”

And

In the matter of the Unanimous Mandate of the court (presided by the First Judge in the subs. 36(1) or the First Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings by His Honour Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009) having been granted to the Applicant for the purpose of allowing him to defend his son, Paul (in his capacity as a lawyer and not as a legal practitioner on a pro-bono basis; thereby detracting from that role his public duty as a court officer; so as to make way, under just circumstances, for his so acting for his son, without conflicting interests). That Mandate is being reasonably seen as not being delimited to the mediation process only (but is referable to the whole of those Prerogative Relief Proceedings including its second stage before the Second Judge). However, that Mandate was unreasonably retracted by the Second Judge without any justifying circumstances (in the Mandate Exclusion Case which is reasonably seen to be a design in a series of judgments and conduct of His Honour, to precede the Security Order Case so as to achieve His Honour’s pre-judgmental decision to stultify those proceedings to the detriment of the Applicant (the Mandate).

And

In the matter of the Mandate having arisen from the issue of the joinder of Paul in the first stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings as the Second Defendant whilst the Respondent and Applicant were similarly joined as the First Defendant and Plaintiff respectively. (The ulterior purpose of the Mandate as intended by court of the First Judge was to prevent Paul’s vulnerabilities from being further exploited by the Respondent with the necessary ramifications: Applicant was given the role to defend primarily his own case as a litigant in person (and secondarily to defend his son’s case, who had been involuntarily drawn into the dispute by the Respondent who had seen it fit to exploit the son instead of the father on a pro-bono basis as a lawyer and not as legal practitioner on condition that Paul would remain inactive. Paul would thereby be absolved from all liabilities for costs orders on account of his being inactive; Paul was to remain non-contactable by the Respondent except through the Applicant so as to prevent any further mental injury/harm to him.) This would give the Applicant the reasonable opportunity to seek the court’s permission for the amalgamation of Civ 1112 of 2007 or the Duress-Cave Case into the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC so as to achieve the public interest of finality in these proceedings (the Amalgamation).

And

In the matter of Justice Newnes having granted the Applicant Leave to Amend the Appellant’s Case on 15.10.2010 within 21 days (such Amended Appellant’s Case should now only confine itself to the Interlocutory Appeal which covers only the relevant areas, namely: the Security Order Case, the Mandate Exclusion Case, the Amalgamation including the repeated oral and written calls for the Second Judge to abdicate himself from hearing the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings. The latter having culminated in the Applicant’s Recusal Application for Prerogative Orders in CIV 1981 of 2010 dated 28.6.2010 now pending before the Court of Appeal.)

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN - - APPLICANT

V.

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES -FIRST RESPONDENT
PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN -SECOND RESPONDENT

AMENDED OUTLINE OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANT
FOR APPELLANT’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Date of document: 1st November, 2010
Date of filing: 1st November, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Applicant

Prepared by:
Nicholas N Chin Phone: 08 9275 7440
Litigant in person Fax: 08 92757440
387, Alexander Drive Email: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com
DIANELLA WA 6059 Mobile: 0421642735

INDEX PAGE NUMBERS

APPLICANT NOT IN DEFAULT FOR UNMET COSTS ORDERS 4
REPEATED CALLS FOR THE SECOND JUDGE TO RECUSE HIMSELF: 9
DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE BY THE SECOND JUDGE TO THE APPLICANT RESULTS IN HIS VOID JUDGMENTS: 11
THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIV 1112 OF 2007 INTO THE CIV 1903 OF 2008: 12
CONCLUSION: SECURITY ORDER AND MANDATE EXCLUSION ORDER VITIATED 12

Your Honour
APPLICANT NOT IN DEFAULT FOR UNMET COSTS ORDERS

1. The Second Judge relied upon his primary reason for ordering the Security Costs Order against the Applicant and it does not work as that reason is not available to him.
2. In accordance with Order 25 r.2(g) of the RSC the Applicant is not in any default of any costs orders either from District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008, or the Costs Orders FR944 of 2007 and FR 417 of 2007 of the Magistrates Courts below as those judgments are VOID JUDGMENTS as they are based upon the original VOID JUDGMENTS of Registrar Wilde Involuntary Consent Judgment in VR417 of 2007 . The grounds are:
2.1. Commissioner Herron directly admitted in his judgment that he is without jurisdiction to enter into that judgment which he knew would be void for want of jurisdiction on his part. Despite this, he did enter into that judgment and therefore his Costs Orders are of null effect. His Honour, in his good conscience should have remitted the matter to the Supreme Court in accordance with the dictates of s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969, WA. Faced with this situation, His Honour could reasonably have simply washed his hands off the whole matter instead of becoming tainted by it a VOID JUDGMENT and His Honour chose not to do so. Hence the mysterious reason for the disappearance of that judgment from the District Court of WA website. The Applicant invites the Respondent to invoke the powers of the District Court or the powers of the Supreme Court to enforce that costs order as a debt as it can be litigated again (the Herron’s Jurisdictional Error) .
2.2. The Herron’s Jurisdictional Error impinges on the jurisdictional error of the learned Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007 when she summarily dismissed the Application of the Applicant to set aside the Involuntary Registrar Wilde Consent Order affecting the sham compromise . This event happened when $11,500.00 exchanged hands between the oppressed Applicant and the duress-vitiated Magistrate Court action of the Respondent making illegal demands for monies based on a Zero Sum Debt in FR 417 of 2007 in a sham compromise (the Musk Jurisdictional Error).
2.3. The learned Magistrate Michelides is in jurisdictional error when he denied the Applicant natural justice by dismissing his Appeal against the sham compromise of Registrar Wilde’s Involuntary Consent Order in FR417 of 2007. His Honour did this on the purported ground that that Appeal was made out of time although there are reasonable grounds before His Honour for extension of time and this was subsequently vouched for by the First Judge in his Review Judgment (the Michelides Jurisdictional Error) .
2.4. Justice Kenneth Martin treated the Applicant dissimilarly (on the similar issue of an Application for extension of time in the Show Cause Affidavit, this time by the Respondent in CIV 1903 of 2008 instead of by the Applicant in FR417 of 2007 before Magistrate Michelides) to the way the Applicant was treated in the Michelides Jurisdictional Error.
2.5. The delay of the Respondent in failing to file his Show Cause Affidavit on time had caused detriment to the Applicant in that the mediator at the First Stage of the Prerogative Proceedings was without the guidance of the Show Cause Affidavit of the Respondent and he therefore was unsuccessful in achieving an amicable settlement between the parties and this is contrary to the intentions of the First Judge.
2.6. That Show-Cause Affidavit should have been filed on the 8.7.2009 but it was done only on the 7.10.2009 and it was therefore not ready and in time for the mediation process to take place before Registrar Rimmer, which occurred on 11.9.2009 (the Apprehended Bias of both the Second Judge and Magistrate Michelides).
2.7. The Applicant, in contrast utilized the proper procedure of advancing his Minor Claim for $6,000.00 through the Minor Claim Procedure of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 whereas the Respondent advanced his Zero Debt Claim using the General Procedure Claim. This is contrary to the legislative intentions of Parliament when enacting those Minor Cases Provisions .
2.8. If those Costs Orders were not improper or they were not tainted by bias, they are debts properly recoverable by the Respondent like those of ordinary debts. The Respondent has the power to request the Second Judge to make judicial determinations for their recoveries from the Applicant before the Second Judge instead of seeking the Second Judge to make the Mandate Exclusion Case Order and the Security Order Case in sequence as though they were pre-meditatively made to achieve a clandestine purpose. One can see a design in these two Orders as they transpired on 13.5.2010 and 17.6.2009 . It is reasonably observed that the Second Judge is unconscionably and unreasonably deciding to put the cart before the horse.
2.9. The Second Judge does have the same powers to make proper judicial determinations of costs orders in accordance with the law . Until this is done, His Honour should not be taking any steps reasonably seen as biased action in the Prerogative Relief Proceedings to stultify its continuing prosecution at its second stage . These proceeding were initiated by the Applicant and they have already received the sanctions of the First Judge and they should be brought to finality under just circumstances by the Second Judge by adopting the normal approach .
2.10. The Second Judge should know that costs on a party and party basis and costs between solicitor and client (subject to cost agreement provisions of the LP Act) are regulated by the applicable costs determinations and is claimable from the Applicant by the Respondent subject to the common law affecting their contractual rights and obligations, which must first be determined in accordance with the law.
REPEATED CALLS FOR THE SECOND JUDGE TO RECUSE HIMSELF:
3. The judicial disqualification or the recusal of the Second Judge has been made repeatedly by the Applicant in the course of the Second Stage of the Prerogative Relief Proceedings . The Second Judge should have abstained from further participation in those legal proceedings due to his conflict of interest on the ground that he is seen to be palpably biased against the Applicant as evidenced by the transcript and the letter of the Applicant dated 28.5.2010 written by the Applicant to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court.
4. The conflict of interests of the Second Judge occurred because he is involved in multiple interests and one of which could possibly corrupt his motivation for his act of further participating in those legal proceedings.
5. This conflict of interests occurred because the Second Judge is entrusted with some impartiality in his public office and a modicum of trust is necessary to create that public office .
6. The presence of the conflict of interests is independent from the execution of his improper act to stultify the legal proceeding with improper orders of the Mandate Exclusion Case and the Security Order Case.
7. Therefore, it is the duty of the court including the Second Judge himself to voluntarily uncover it and to voluntarily defuse it before any act of corruption occurs.
8. The Second Judge must at all costs be prevented from abusing his public power of office as a Justice of the Supreme Court for personal gain, especially so in the case of the Respondent who had committed grievous wrongs to his clients and he has to conform to the applicable statutes or the canon of ethics which addresses those questions about his conduct that differentiates his intentions, his decisions, and his actions between those that are good (or right) and bad (or wrong) i.e. about concepts as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice and justice.
9. Lastly, it is justice that the Applicant is seeking from this court and justice is concerned with the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, rationality, law, natural law, religion, fairness and equity . The Second Judge said to the Applicant that it is not for him to question his irrationality but it for His Honour to question and interrogate the Applicant .
.
DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE BY THE SECOND JUDGE TO THE APPLICANT RESULTS IN HIS VOID JUDGMENTS:

10. Owen J in Ex parte Fealey (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 282 at 288-289 defines “denial of natural justice” in these terms:

“A decision contrary to natural justice is where the presiding Judge or Magistrate [THE SECOND JUDGE] denies to a litigant[THE APPELLANT] some right or privilege or benefit to which he is entitled in the ordinary course of the proceedings [THE SUBS.36(4) PROCEEDINGS], as for instance where a Magistrate refuses to allow a litigant to address the Court[FOR EXAMPLE: TO BE HEARD IN HIS OWN CAUSE IN THE CAVEAT CASE OR TO CONSOLIDATE THE CAVEAT CASE INTO THESE PROCEEDINGS AND HE REFUSED TO SEE THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT IS CONCISE WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF THE NON-CONSENSUALITY OF THE VARIED SOLICITOR COSTS AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND HIMSLF], or where he refuses to allow a witness to be cross-examined, or cases of that kind. That conduct is said to be contrary to natural justice, and is a ground for the interference of this Court” [EMPHASIS ADDED].
THE CONSOLIDATION OF CIV 1112 OF 2007 INTO THE CIV 1903 OF 2008:
12. There is no basis for the refusal of the Second Judge to refuse to consolidate the Caveat Case into the current proceedings so that they can be dealt with efficaciously because there is only one transaction or event. They revolves around the Zero sum debt claim with its handmaid of extortion, the Caveat case.
13. The consolidation of these two actions CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 into just one case is for simplicity of proceedings and is to enable the Applicant to represent his son Paul in those proceedings on the ground that Paul is never a voluntary participant in those proceedings and that the Respondent is reasonably found to be misusing his position as a court officer to exploit the vulnerabilities of his client Paul.
14. The Applicant being a litigant in person pursuing his own personal interests in those two cases and is not acting in conflict of interests as he does not play his public role as a court officer in standing in for his son Paul .
15. These are all well and in accord with Order 83 of the RSC which has the force of law.
CONCLUSION: SECURITY ORDER AND MANDATE EXCLUSION ORDER VITIATED
16. The question before this court is whether this Interlocutory Appeal is likely to succeed. If the answer is yes, then leave should indeed be granted as the two decisions of the Second Judge aimed at stultifying these proceedings are indeed vitiated by his lack of impartiality in those proceedings. The two decisions of the Second Judge are indeed vitiated by His Honour lack of impartiality in those proceedings.

Signed by: ………………………………… ….

LIST OF AUTHORITIES
Websites or Journals:
1. Blogspot of Nicholas N Chin for information of legal documents filed with the Supreme Court of WA regarding my current proceedings at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/.
2. Konow, James. 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories." Journal of Economic Literature 41, no. 4: page 1188 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice#cite_note-1;
3. Morison, W L --- "Fuller, The Morality of Law" [1965] SydLawRw 14; (1965) 5(1) Sydney Law Review 181, 183 http://www.austlii.com/au/journals/SydLawRw/1965/14.html;
4. CJE OPINION NO. 92-1 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL BRANCH: JUDICIAL ETHICS OPINIONS: Hearing De Novo Retrials of Cases Tried by Judge's Father, an ADA, and Trials Involving The District Attorney's Staff found at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/92-1h.html

REGULATIONS:

1. Legal Profession Regulations, 2009 See: Column 1 in the Table of regulation 5(2);
2. Rules of Supreme Court 1971 WA Order 25 r.2 (g)

STATUTES & BILLS

1) The Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA: Subs. 60(1)(f)(3); 58(1)(a); 59(1), (3), (4) and (6);
2) The Magistrates Court Act, 2004: Subs. 36(1); Subs. 36(4).
3) The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004: subs. 25(9) and 31(1).
4) District Court Act Act, 1969 subs. 64(1) and s. 77.
5) Legal Profession Act 2008 s. 25(2)
6) The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill, 2003: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM: Clause 25(5)
Subclause (5) ensures that where a matter that is within the minor cases jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged.
Subclause (8) is derived from the Litigants In Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 (UK) and allows a person who represents themselves to recover any expenses or losses incurred if they are successful in recovering costs.
Subclause (9) is effectively a penalty clause and relieves a person from some or ‘all of costs if the lawyer involved has improperly incurred them or wasted them due to misconduct or default. The lawyer can also be required to make payments to the party if that party is liable to another party due to the actions or omissions of the lawyer. Under subclause (10) a Court cannot make an order under subclause (9) unless it has informed the lawyer and allowed the lawyer to call evidence and make submission in relation to the proposed order. Subclause (11) provides that if an order is made under proposed subsection (9)© disentitling a lawyer to costs, the lawyer must not charge and cannot recover the costs concerned.
Clause 31 – Costs
It is the intention of the Bill to keep costs payable in relation to minor cases to a
minimum.
Subclause (1) defines “allowable costs” for the purposes of this proposed section to mean court fees and service fees and the costs of enforcing a judgment.
Subclause (2) provides that the successful party in a minor case is entitled to an order in relation to their allowable costs but not in relation to the other party’s costs though under subclause (3) the Court can make an order in relation to the other party’s costs if satisfied that it is reasonable to make such an order.
CASE LAW:

1) ALLCOCK V. ALLCOCK, 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
2) BROWN V. BLANCHARD, 39 Mich 790.
3) CALVIN V CARR[29] [1979] UKPC 1; [1980] AC 574 at 589-590;
4) DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 per Asher J.
5) EBNER V OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY (2000) 205 CLR 337;
6) EX PARTE FEALEY (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 282 at 288-289;
7) FORBES V NEW SOUTH WALES TROTTING CLUB LTD [1979] HCA 27; (1979) 143 CLR 242 at 277 per Aickin J
8) FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97
9) GOETZE DCJ in RODWELL & ANOR -v- HUTCHINSON [2009] WADC 180
10) GUDGEON V BLACK ; EX PARTE GUDGEON (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179);
11) JOHNSON V JOHNSON (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11],
12) JOHNSON V. DISTRICT COURT, 674 P.2d 952 (Colo.1984);
13) KANDA V. GOVERNMENT OF MALAYA (1962) AC 322, at p 337.
14) KOVACHEFF V LANGHART, 147 Colo. 339, 343-44, 363 P.2d 702, 705 (1961);
15) LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. V. HUNT, 39 Mich 469.
16) LIGON V. WILLIAMS, 264 Ill. App 3d 701, 637 N.E. 2d 633 (1st Dist. 1994);
17) LINN V. ROBERTS, 15 Mich 443;
18) LIVESEY V. NEW SOUTH WALES BAR ASSOCIATION [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294;
19) LYNCH V. PEOPLE, 16 Mich 472.
20) MA PRODUCTIONS PTY LTD V AUSTARAMA TELEVISION PTY LTD [1982] 1 ACLC 404,
21) MILLIKEN V. MEYER, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940).
22) MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS V BHARDWAJ [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597; 187 ALR 117; 76 ALJR 598 (14 March 2002) per Gleeson CJ at para. 45:
23) PEOPLE EX REL. BRZICA V. VILLAGE OF LAKE BARRINGTON, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
24) PEOPLE V. BOTHAM, 629 P.2d 589, 595 (Colo. 1981);
25) R V LEICESTER CITY JUSTICES; EX PARTE BARROW [1991] 3 All ER 935.
26) RAYNEY V AW [2009] WASCA 203 [24] - [27] ;
27) RE CAREY; EX PARTE EXCLUDE HOLDING PTY LTD [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527,
28) RE JRL; EX PARTE CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 (30 July 1986) Dawson J said in at para.2.
29) RE MARRIAGE OF MANN, 655 P.2d 814 Colo.1982);
30) RE MICHELIDES, EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256;
31) RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J
32) RE: MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No.2] [2010] WASC 169
33) RODWELL -v- HUTCHINSON [2010] WASCA 197 as per Pullin JA Newnes JA and Murphy JA at para. 20
34) SLAVIN V OWNERS CORPORATION STRATA PLAN 16857 [2006] NSWCA 71.
35) THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111;
36) TUBE CITY MINING & MILLING CO. V. OTTERSON, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914)
37) WAHL V. ROUND VALLEY BANK 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931);
38) WEST’S PROCESS ENGINEERING PTY LTD (ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTED) (ACN 002 498 142) & ORS V WESTRALIAN SANDS LTD (ACN 008 675 016) & ORS [1998] WASC 108 (15 April 1998) per White J at para.2

FOOTNOTES:
All the three judges subsequent to Registrar Wilde knew that the Registrar Wilde Involuntary Consent Order in FR417 of 2007 entered into by the parties of which the Applicant is a non-consenting party notwithstanding that it has the appearance of consent is a Void Order or Judgment. Thereafter any court decisions basing itself upon that VOID CONSENT JUDMENT are also VOID. Any Costs Orders deriving those VOID JUDGMENTS are also similarly of null effect: “Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties, Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz. 305, 146 P. 203 (1914); and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940).
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597; 187 ALR 117; 76 ALJR 598 (14 March 2002) per Gleeson CJ at para. 45:
It is sometimes convenient to ask whether administrative decisions which involve reviewable error are either void or voidable, the former signifying that the decision is "ineffective for all purposes" and the latter that it is "valid and operative unless and until duly challenged but ... deemed to have been void ab initio." Forbes v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd [1979] HCA 27; (1979) 143 CLR 242 at 277 per Aickin J. The tendency to conceptualise erroneous administrative decisions as voidable rather than void may be the result of the need to treat a decision as having at least sufficient effect to ground an "appeal" or other legal proceedings. Thus, it was said by Lord Wilberforce in Calvin v Carr that:
"Their Lordships' opinion would be, if it became necessary to fix upon one or other of [the] expressions ['void' or 'voidable'], that a decision made contrary to natural justice is void, but that, until it is so declared by a competent body or court, it may have some effect, or existence, in law. This condition might be better expressed by saying that the decision is invalid or vitiated. In the present context, where the question is whether an appeal lies, the impugned decision cannot be considered as totally void, in the sense of being legally non-existent."Id. [29] [1979] UKPC 1; [1980] AC 574 at 589-590
77 . District Court may remit to Supreme Court
Where it appears to a District Court judge that any action or matter brought before the Court ought from its nature, or magnitude, or by reason of the question of law involved to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court, he may make an order, remitting the action or matter to the Supreme Court.
See para. 29 of the judgment of GOETZE DCJ in RODWELL & ANOR -v- HUTCHINSON [2009] WADC 180 which refers to the District Court Act Act, 1969 s.64(1) which provides:
“Except as hereinafter provided in this Act, the costs of any action or proceeding shall be in accordance with any costs determination (as defined in the Legal Profession Act 2008) and shall be paid by or apportioned between the parties in such manner as the District Court judge directs and in default of such a direction shall abide the event.
(2) The costs may be recovered in like manner as a debt adjudged by the Court to be paid.
(3) Subject to this Act, a District Court judge has the same power in relation to the payment of costs by any party as a judge of the Supreme Court has."
Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock, 437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
A "void judgment" as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken there under, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been. 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97. On certiorari this Court may not review questions of fact. Brown v. Blanchard, 39 Mich 790. It is not at liberty to determine disputed facts (Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich 353), nor to review the weight of the evidence. Linn v. Roberts, 15 Mich 443; Lynch v. People, 16 Mich 472. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to get rid of a void judgment, one which there is no evidence to sustain. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Hunt, 39 Mich 469.
“Subclause 25(5) of the Explanatory Memoranda to the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings)Bill2003 provides:
Subclause (5) ensures that where a matter that is within the minor cases jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged.”
Reference made by White J to the case of MA Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd [1982] 1 ACLC 404, where court listed some matters which go to the proper exercise of proper discretions:
5.3.1. The strength and bona fides of the Plaintiff’s case as attested to by the First Judge.
5.3.2. Whether the opposite party is being oppressive to deny the impecunious his right to litigate;
5.3.3. No money was owing to the First Defendant or there is Zero Sum False debt being claimed by the First Defendant.
5.3.4. The security of costs order is stultifying the Appellant’s action that was confirmed by the First Judge in the s.36 proceedings to have a strong case as opposed to the Second Judge’s view that it is an inherently weak case.
THIES -v- CHIN [2010] WASC 111
RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2010] WASC 169
The Second Judge knows that the Respondent has no justiciable issue before him and has not presented his justiciable issues. He knows that those judgments below are void because no justiciable issue is presented to the court through proper pleadings, Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App 3d 701, 637 N.E. 2d 633 (1st Dist. 1994) as those pleadings are red herrings that serve to confuse the courts below. They do not go to the point of the issue of the consensus ad idem of the parties to ground liability for profit costs claimed by the Respondent against the Applicant.
The law with regard to Security Costs Orders is found in the case of: West’s Process Engineering Pty Ltd (Administrator Appointed) (ACN 002 498 142) & Ors v Westralian Sands Ltd (ACN 008 675 016) & Ors [1998] WASC 108 (15 April 1998) per White J at para.2 – question of whether the court could exercise its discretion to Order for Security of Costs.
RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 (7 November 2008)
White J further quoted the case of Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 - Court of Appeal held that there is a general rule that the Court does not require security for costs to be given by a plaintiff … even where he is in insolvent circumstances. Bagallay LJ said, at 37: “But the rule is that any one may sue without giving security, in any but certain excepted cases. Until lately, security was never required in Chancery unless the plaintiff was abroad, and if there were two co-plaintiffs, one of whom only was abroad, security was not ordered.”
RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J
“58 However, I do not accept the respondent’s submission that an applicant for prerogative relief who has demonstrated a jurisdictional error must then satisfy the court that the circumstances call for a favourable exercise of discretion. In my opinion, the position is to the contrary. In the setting of an application for prerogative relief, the discretion may be said to be a discretion to withhold relief, rather than a discretion to grant it. So, for example, in Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black ; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179) that an appropriate starting point in the consideration of the exercise of the discretion to grant prerogative relief is that once it is found that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction the court will normally exercise its discretion in the applicant’s favour. Thus, it will normally be for those opposing the grant of relief to point to factors which justify a departure from that approach.”
See the judgment of the Court of Appeal by PULLIN JA NEWNES and JA MURPHY JA at para. 20 in RODWELL -v- HUTCHINSON [2010] WASCA 197 which states:
“20 I should say that there is, in my view, no inconsistency between [s. 280(2) of the Legal Profession Act, 2008] and s 25(8) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act. Section 280(2) provides, in effect, that costs, both on a party and party basis and (subject to the costs agreement provisions) as between solicitor and client, are regulated by the applicable costs determination. Section 25(8) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act provides, in effect, that in the Magistrates Court party and party costs are regulated by the applicable costs determination.”
I quote the American case of Johnson v. District Court, 674 P.2d 952 (Colo.1984) which says when the Second Judge should have recused himself from the legal proceedings before him :
“Ordinarily, the question of whether a judge should be disqualified in a civil case is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. In re Marriage of Mann, 655 P.2d 814 Colo.1982). However, where an attorney for one of the litigants signs a verified affidavit alleging conduct and statements on the part of a trial judge which, if true, show bias or prejudice or the appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, it is an abuse of discretion if that judge does not withdraw from the case, even though he or she believes the statements are false or that the meaning attributed to them by the party seeking recusal is erroneous. In such a case, the judge should not pass upon the truth or falsity of the facts alleged in the affidavit, but only upon the adequacy of the motion as a matter of law.
‘The motion and supporting affidavit speak for themselves and the only question involved is whether the facts alleged are sufficient to compel the judge to disqualify himself.’Kovacheff v Langhart, 147 Colo. 339, 343-44, 363 P.2d 702, 705 (1961).
The motion and affidavits are legally adequate if they ‘state facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that the judge has bias or prejudice that will prevent him from dealing fairly’with the party seeking recusal. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589, 595 (Colo. 1981).”
The law in Australia for the recusal of the Second Judge is found in the case of : Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11], affirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; see also Slavin v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 16857 [2006] NSWCA 71 where it is stated:
”The test for determining whether a judge should disqualify himself or herself by reason of apprehended bias is “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”
See the judgment of Asher J in the case of: DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 as indicted below:
[122] A conflict of interest arises when a person carries out a particular function with two or more interests in conflict. In administrative law, a conflict of interest exists when a person has a private interest in a decision where that person also has a public role. In such a case the person's public role and private interest are in conflict. The result can be a poor decision because private concerns that have nothing to do with the public duty have influenced the decision.
[123] The concept of a conflict of interest is well known in the common law. It has developed particularly in the context of professional and fiduciary duties, the classic example being a solicitor's duty not to be in a conflict of interest with a client. It is also well understood in public law where its usual expression is under the heading of bias or apparent bias.
CJE Opinion No. 92-1 of The Massachusetts Judicial Branch: Judicial Ethics Opinions: Hearing De Novo Retrials of Cases Tried by Judge's Father, an ADA, and Trials Involving The District Attorney's Staff found at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/92-1h.html quoting the relevant text as follows:
The relevant Canons of Judicial Ethics are Canons 3(C)(1) and (3)(D), which provide in relevant part: (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where: . . (d) . . . a person within the third degree of relationship …(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . .
Konow, James. 2003. "Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories." Journal of Economic Literature 41, no. 4: page 1188.
Morison, W L --- "Fuller, The Morality of Law" [1965] SydLawRw 14; (1965) 5(1) Sydney Law Review 181.
At Page: 183: “The ethos of the judge's office demands that he should remain neutral regarding the substantive aims of a statute he is called on to apply, but with regard to the law's "internal morality"-the morality that makes law possible-he must not remain neutral.”
In Rayney v AW [2009] WASCA 203 [24] - [27] Mc Lure JA said that the Supreme Court’s Power under s 36 of the Magistrates Court Act is a judicial review power, as distinct from an appeal or review on the merits. The Second Judge therefore has a duty to test the jurisdictional errors of the judges in the courts below to ensure that they are indeed abuses of process or on some grounds might have justified an order for Certiorari. However, His Honour decided not to delve into those cases to exercise his duties but merely stay within its peripheries by making interlocutory decisions stultifying the proceedings thereby causing a travesty of justice to the Applicant.
The English Court of Appeal in R v Leicester City Justices; Ex parte Barrow [1991] 3 All ER 935. confirmed the right of every party to litigation to have a 'friend' present in court to assist by prompting, making notes or quietly giving advice on the conduct of the case. The court held that this sort of assistance should only be restricted where it is unreasonable in nature or degree, or not bona fide or is inimical to the proper and efficient administration of justice.
I quote what Dawson J said in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 (30 July 1986) at para.2 said the following: “See Kanda v. Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322, at p 337. It is the latter possibility which is important in this case because it is not suggested that the parties did not, in the events which transpired, have an opportunity to be heard. What is suggested by the husband is that he is reasonably entitled to entertain an apprehension of lack of impartiality on the part of the judge. If that is so, then it is enough to vitiate the proceedings because it is established that a judge ought not to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he or she might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions involved in it: Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294”

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE: CACV 75 OF 2010: AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Thursday, October 21, 2010

SUBS.13(1) OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT, 2008 IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENCE

My ref: CIV1981 of 2010 & CACV41 of 2010.

October 20, 2010

The Chairperson
The Legal Practice Board
Atten:
Mr. Shung Kee Neoh, Legal Officer.
5th Floor, Kings Building, 533 Hay Street
PERTH WA 6000
Telephone: (08) 6211 3600; Facsimile: (08) 9325 2743

Dear Sir FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TWO CRIMINAL CHARGES UNDER SECTION 13(1) OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT, 2008

I refer to the above matter and to my facsimile letter to you dated 11.10.2010. I would now like to clarify the following:

a) Upon my study of the relevant sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 and the Table of r. 5(2) of the Legal Profession Regulations 2009, my mind is now clearer as to my past mistakes in representing myself as a “barrister and solicitor” in my court documents and correspondence through using my stamp which has these words.
b) I was always arguing the point that I would be entitled to use as my title “barrister and solicitor” because I am an Australian lawyer who had been so admitted by the Supreme Court of Western Australia and my name has not been struck off the roll for any professional misconduct or unprofessional conduct.
c) I now realize that although I am still an Australian Lawyer who has not applied for a current practicing certificate due to the conditions restraining my status as an independent legal practitioner; I am only entitled to use the title “Lawyer” to my name.
d) When I spoke last to your legal officer Mr. Shung Kee Neoh on 11.10.2010, I found that he is a kindly person and as a result I asked for his help to clarify this confusing matter of my being prosecuted for my having allegedly representing that I was entitled to be engaged in legal practice pursuant to subs.13(1) of the Act. I would now like to retract my earlier statement that Mr. Shung said that the Board would resile from prosecuting me further as it is not quite accurate.
e) What I intended to say in that letter was that Mr. Shung said that he agreed to try and help me to seek and persuade the Board to re-consider its position to prosecute me further provided I write a written confirmation to the effect that I will refrain from the subs 13(1) representation in future.
f) I must say that I have a genuine belief that I was entitled to represent my son as his counsel in the duress-handmaid case of CIV1112 of 2007 due to the mandate that I received from the learned Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009 to the effect that I could protect my son in all the Prerogative Relief Proceedings to its final conclusion in my capacity as a lawyer with my son being inactive and being absolved from appearing in court and his bearing no responsibility even though his name is included as the Second Defendant.
g) I take it to mean that the Prerogative Relief Proceedings instituted by me include the duress-handmaid case instituted by Mr. Thies to intimidate my son and to facilitate the sham compromise which only has my son as a party because it affects my son’s home that was being unlawfully caveated by Mr. Thies who had no caveatable interests.
h) The difficulties of removing the caveat were exacerbated by Mr. Thies refusing to loosen his grip on this strangle-hold clogging of Paul’s equity for a very long time. This finally led to the Second Judge ordering its removal without a consequential costs order in June, 2010 and despite this, Mr. Thies continue to threaten my son for his legal costs for the removal of that Caveat and this caused my son to become ill again when he returned to Malaysia sometime in July, 2010.
i) Before I embarked on preparing the Chamber Summons in my name purporting to act for my son Paul in that duress-handmaid case, I wrote to both the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia as well as the LPCC informing it of my decisions to so act and I should have received a reprimand if I was not so entitled. I am sorry for all the mistakes that have occurred so far.

j) My defence to the subs.13(1) representation is that I was labouring under a mistake to a non-strict liability offence by virtue of the existence of the words “rebuttal presumption” in subs.14(1) of the Act.

k) I have since appeared before Justice Newnes of the Court of Appeal in my CACV 75 of 2010 and have been granted leave to amend my Appellant’s Case so that it is confined to the issues of the Security Orders Judgment dated 17.6.2010 and the Mandate Exclusion Decision Judgment of the duress handmaid case dated 13.5.2010 by His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin.

l) His Honour is the second judge in the s.36(4) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 proceedings under circumstances when the First Judge, His Honour Justice Hasluck had already granted his Review Order in the Prerogative Relief Proceedings in subs.36(1) of the Act. As such, the Second Judge should have adopted a normal approach by exercising his discretion to withhold the Prerogative Relief only if there are justifying circumstances and His Honour erred in his jurisdictional excess in that he was reasonably apprehended to be biased against me in the second stage of the Prerogative Proceedings for which I had to make repeated oral and written calls for his recusal which was noted by the Court of Appeal.

m) Further the Second Judge erred by taking into account irrelevant considerations and ignored the pointed given by the First Judge as to how the future proceedings should have been proceeded with having regard to the fact that Mr. Thies did not obey Justice Hasluck wishes that that Show –Cause Affidavit should have been complied with timeously so as to enable the mediator Registrar Rimmer to perform his job satisfactorily. It so transpired that the Show Cause Affidavit did not comply with the requirements of Justice Hasluck, particularly it did not confine itself to the core issues of why the legal costs had been found to be unreasonably escalated disproportionately in terms of the solicitor cost agreement having been terminated timeously and in terms of the pre-contractual emails that have passed between the parties. Instead a lot of red herrings had been introduced in the Show-Cause that was intended to mislead the Second Judge and it did mislead His Honour.

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

Sunday, October 10, 2010

MANDATE GIVEN TO ME BY SUPREME COURT TO DEFEND MY SON'S CAVEAT CASE IN CIV 1112 OF 2007 THROUGH CIV 1903 OF 2008

My ref: CIV1981 of 2010 & CACV41 of 2010.

October 11, 2010

The Chairperson
The Legal Practice Board
Atten:
Mr. Shung Kee Neoh, Legal Officer.
5th Floor, Kings Building, 533 Hay Street
PERTH WA 6000
Telephone: (08) 6211 3600; Facsimile: (08) 9325 2743

Dear Sir FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TWO CRIMINAL CHARGES UNDER SECTION 13(1) OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT, 2008

I refer to the above matter and the Statements of Material Facts (in Forms 5 and Form 3 of the Criminal Procedure Regulations, 2005 in 7 pages dated 7.10.2010), which was served on me on the 8.10.2010. I was pleasantly surprised and shocked at this seeming wrongful persecution. This promptly caused me to call and I spoke to the legal officer who signed these documents, one Mr. Shung Kee Neoh. After a brief conversation with him, he told me that based on what he heard from me, he would consult Counsel with regard to the withdrawal of these two charges. He told me that he would call me to confirm this matter by the latest Wednesday 13th day of October, 2010. Under the circumstances as explained above, I would like to state the following:

a) The Statements of Material Facts pertains to the Summons in Chambers in CIV 1112 of 2007 prepared by me dated 8.10.2009 together with my Affidavit in Support of it dated 12.10.2009 for the purpose of amalgamating it with CIV 1903 of 2008 in which I was made Plaintiff by Justice Hasluck (the First Judge) under Order 83 of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 WA (the Amalgamation).
b) For the purpose of the Amalgamation, I stated that I was a Barrister & Solicitor acting as counsel for my son Paul Chin Chung Kiong pursuant to ss.13 and 14 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 (the Act) and r.5 of the Legal Profession Regulations, 2009 (the Regulations) under the mandate given to me by the First Judge in His Orders dated 17.6.2009 to be read together with the transcript of those proceedings.
c) It was on the ground that the mandate requires my son to remain inactive in these proceedings that I had to resort to act for my son as his counsel and in my capacity as barrister and solicitor because that is only way I could enter into the Caveat Case to defend my son’s human rights because that Caveat-duress case employed by lawyer Thies was without my name as defendant but it contains only my son’s name and my son was required to remain inactive, as there would be deleterious health consequences for him if he were not to remain so.
d) The difficulty for me to enter into the Caveat-duress case as counsel for Paul was caused by the difficulties posed by lawyer Thies himself as was being explained to him and the Chief Registrar in my letter to them dated 3.10.2010. (See copy attached). In this letter, I had similarly put in disclaimers as I did subsequently (in the Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Civ 1112 of 2007) in that I was entitled to be engaged in legal practice as a litigant in person whilst acting for my son Paul as his counsel pursuant to s.13(1) of the Act, knowing that I was not transgressing the law and that it would be an offence of strict liability if I were to do so (the s.13 representation).
e) The s.13 representation did invite the complaint of Lawyer Thies which came through the Legal Profession Complaints Committee’s letter to me dated 27.10.2009 to which I had responded by way of my facsimile letter dated 29.10.2009 at paragraph 3 at page 3 contained in my CIV 1981 Application.
f) As soon as I realized that the second judge in CIV 1903 of 2008 His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin sometime in May, 2010 was refusing to think along the same lines as the First Judge, my son, Paul with the help of myself and some friends sought to rectify the situation by presenting his own set of documents as a litigant in person instead of my s.13 representation thus violating the Order of the First Judge that Paul is to remain inactive (Paul’s documents). Unfortunately, the Second Judge did not accept these documents giving as his excuse that it was unsigned as indicated in his written judgment. This is not the truth as Paul’s documents were signed by himself and filed by me.
g) I had pleaded with the Second Judge to cease and desist from hearing the second stage of the s.36 Magistrate Court Act, 2004 proceedings on the ground of his apprehended bias as he should have adopted the common law by using the normal approach as is in the case of Ex-parte Brecker but it was otherwise. I therefore made an Application for judicial review for prerogative orders in CIV 1981 of 2010 on 28.6.2010 in 126 pages.
h) The Second Judge, with due respect to him, however, went on with the case by ordering the unlawful caveat of lawyer Thies to be removed anyway without any costs orders but lawyer Thies is in contempt of court when he disobeyed the First Judge Orders by contacting my son and demanding him for another $650.00 for the costs of the removal of the caveats.
i) I have in the meantime appealed the decision of the Second Judge who gave judgment against me in favour of lawyer Thies by granting him security for costs orders thus stultifying my s.36 proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008 all in the name of the null costs orders of the courts below that had been stopped by the First Judge except for the District Court Appeal No.6 of 2008 judgment of Commissioner Herron, which as I understand it, is also unenforceable.
j) Even if I had acted for my son Paul in the duress-Caveat Case which I did not, I would not have played the public role of a solicitor for my son as I was acting for myself as a litigant in person pursuing my own case against Lawyer Thies as my son was never in a client-solicitor relationship with him as Paul had acted under coercion and was under my undue influence. That client solicitor-relationship was in reality with me and was subject to those pre-contractual terms which he reneged and therefore that relationship had been terminated. There was therefore no debt for him to sue and in the process he had extorted monies from me and my son on a sham compromise.
k) In view of the foregoing paragraphs, it is apparent that I knowingly had evinced no intention to represent that I could be engaged in legal practice other than as a litigant in person. I filed the first set of those documents with disclaimers and my son Paul had it exchanged for the second set of those documents with Paul’s name as a litigant in person as soon as the Second Judge objected to it. If I had ever stated publicly that I am a Barrister & Solicitor, I have always qualified it with the words “non-certificated”. As from today, I shall cease to apply the title “Barrister and Solicitor” to any documents that I shall prepare so as to stop confusing the minds of the public that I am entitled to be engaged in legal practice until my dispute with the Legal Practice Board of Western Australia is settled or until I assume supervised practice.
l) Assuming that s.13 of the Act pertains to a strict liability offence; I could have been labouring under a mistake of fact as to the nature of the mandate given to me by the First Judge until it was objected to by the Second Judge, and the situation would have been retrieved if the Second Judge had given his reasons for so objecting. The mandate by the First Judge would have qualified me under column 6 of r. 5(2) of the Regulations; consequently, I would have realized that unless I worked under the mandate of the First Judge or under other circumstances, I should not use the name Barrister & Solicitor. Despite this, I had taken remedial action to remove myself from this mistake. In the premises, I have not committed any offence under subs. 13(1) of the Act that warrants this prosecution.

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

Monday, October 4, 2010

Gmail - AustralianPlanet.com: about Nicholas N Chin: Fair Justice For All Australians And Better Governance For Australia - nnchin1@gmail.com

Saturday, October 2, 2010

FACSIMILE LETTER TO CHIEF REGISTRAR OF SUPREME COURT RE: APPLICATION FOR A COURT OF APPEAL JUSTICE TO HEAR JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PREROGATIVE ORDERS IN CIV 1981 & 1887 OF 2010

Your ref: CIV 1877 of 2010 & CIV1981 of 2010.

Thursday, 30 September 2010

The Principal Registrar

Mr. Keith Frederick Chapman

Supreme Court of WA Stirling Gardens,

Barrack Street

PERTH WA 6000

Associate:

Tel: 08 9421 5302 & 9421 5333

Fax: 08 92218350

ATTEN: RACQUEL

Dear Sir

FILING OF NOTICE OF MOTION IN CIV 1981 AND 1877 BOTH OF 2010 AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT

I refer to the above matter and my attendance at the Central Office of the Supreme Court of Western Australia at Perth this morning when I was serviced by Racquel. Further, I would like to state the following:

a) I am presenting my NOTICE OF MOTION dated 30.9.2010 in 2 pages applicable to both the cases and my Affidavit in Support of it sworn the day in 22 pages.

b) Racquel retained a set of those documents for CIV 1981 of 2010 but requested me to file by faxing a similar set of those documents for filing in CIV 1877 of 2010 to Fax No. 08-9221 8350.

c) Racquel requires this procedure for filing those two sets of documents in those two cases on the ground that although the judgment of Justice EM Heenan in RE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EX PARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212 heard on 4.8.2010 and delivered on 11.8.2010 is a consolidated judgment of those two cases, in fact these two cases have not yet been consolidated into one case. Therefore two sets of these documents would have to be filed for each of the two cases into their respective files kept at the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

d) The procedure for filing this Notice of Motion dated 30.9.2010 together with my Supporting Affidavit is prescribed for by Registrar Eldred in her letter to me dated 29.7.2010 as contained in page 16 of the my Affidavit sworn 30.9.2010.

e) The prescription affects CIV 1877 of 2010 but should similarly affect CIV 1981 of 2010 in so far as its purpose is to enable me to make an Application for a Court of Appeal Justice to hear both the judicial review cases for prerogative remedies instead of Justice Heenan hearing them because His Honour is of the same rank as Justice Kenneth Martin and Justice Chaney of SAT.

f) Therefore there is an admission by Justice Heenan that he had no authority to dismiss a similar application for judicial review for prerogative orders in CIV 1019 of 2010 which has now been appealed to the Court of Appeal in CACV41 of 2010.

Please therefore find the following documents attached for the purpose of fax filing CIV1877 of 2010 as the documents

for CIV1981 of 2010 have already been accepted for filing by Racquel:

i) Application in CACV 107 of 2008 which contains bullet point No.2 as requested for by Racquel in one page.

ii) Form 2 Application by me for waiver of fees for CIV 1877 of 2010 in 5 pages.

iii) NOTICE OF MOTION dated 30.9.2010 in 2 pages.

iv) My Affidavit in Support of the NOTICE OF MOTION sworn 30.9.2010 in 22 pages.

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

c.c.

Registrar Eldred, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of WA Fax: 9421 5471

This letter only is sent to you for you to take note of sub-para.(f) above. His Honour Justice Heenan had admitted in his judgment delivered on 11.8.2010 that he had no jurisdiction to deal with CIV 1019 of 2010 which became my current Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010.

NICHOLAS N CHIN

Monday, November 1, 2010

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE IN CACV 75 OF 2010: CHRONOLOGY

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE IN CACV 75 OF 2010: AMENDED SUBMISSIONS

AMENDED APPELLANT'S CASE: CACV 75 OF 2010: AMENDED GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Thursday, October 21, 2010

SUBS.13(1) OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT, 2008 IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY OFFENCE

Sunday, October 10, 2010

MANDATE GIVEN TO ME BY SUPREME COURT TO DEFEND MY SON'S CAVEAT CASE IN CIV 1112 OF 2007 THROUGH CIV 1903 OF 2008

Monday, October 4, 2010

Gmail - AustralianPlanet.com: about Nicholas N Chin: Fair Justice For All Australians And Better Governance For Australia - nnchin1@gmail.com

Saturday, October 2, 2010

FACSIMILE LETTER TO CHIEF REGISTRAR OF SUPREME COURT RE: APPLICATION FOR A COURT OF APPEAL JUSTICE TO HEAR JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR PREROGATIVE ORDERS IN CIV 1981 & 1887 OF 2010

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