SPEECH OF GORON TURIFF Q.C. AND PRESIDENT OF THE BRITISH COMLUMBIA BAR OF CANADA

Speech by Gordon Turriff, President, Law Society of British Columbia, at the Conference of Regulatory Officers, Perth, Australia, in September 2009 Wednesday, 11 August 2010 09:56am
This publication is used with permission from the Law Society of British Columbia. The Law Society of British Columbia’s President, Gordon Turriff, QC, shared his thoughts on self-governance of the legal profession as a necessary condition of lawyer independence in many forums and venues during the 125th anniversary year of the Law Society of British Columbia.
The address reproduced here, entitled “Self-Governance as a Necessary Condition of Constitutionally Mandated Lawyer Independence in British Columbia” , was presented at the Conference of Regulatory Officers in Perth, Australia.
 Introduction
 My wife and I have three children. In May this year, our younger daughter was a volunteer in Uganda. When she returned home, she brought with her an English language Ugandan newspaper. There, under the road traffic news, was an advertisement placed by an organisation called the African Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims. It read: “Are you a victim of torture by security agents or rebels?” What an astonishing thing to see in 2009 in a newspaper from any country. And particularly a country which is another former British colony. But there it was. As if it were the most ordinary thing in the world.
Please click here to read the entire article. CLICK ON THIS LINK: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/speeches/speech_by_gordon_turriff_president_law_society_of_british_columbia_at_the_conference_of_regulatory_officers_perth_australia_in_september_2009.html

UNITY PARTY WA WROTE TO LPCCC ETC ABOUT GORDON TURRIFF Q.C. VISIT TO PERTH IN SEPTEMBER, 2009

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nicholas N Chin Date: Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 9:15 AM 
Subject: Re: GORDON TURRIFF ARTICLE -SCOFFING AT WA REGULATOR FOR NOT ABIDING BY THE RULE OF LAW IN DISCIPLINING LAWYHERS 
To: Unity WA He came to Perth on 17th September, 2009 
Eddie. On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 8:00 AM, Unity WA wrote: 
Mr. Christian Porter, 
WA Attorney General Minister.
Porter@dpc.wa.gov.au 
 Dear Attorney General, 
 We refer to the attachment above and comment below for your information. As a law officer of the WA State Government, would you like to comment, please? 
 We look forward to hearing from you in the not too distant future. 
 Yours respectfully, 
 Eddie Hwang
 President 
Unity Party WA 
unitywa@westnet.com.au 
http://twitter.com/unitypartywa 
http://unitypartywa.blogspot.com/ www.unitywa.org 
Phone/Fax: 61893681884 
Date: 05-Dec-2011. 
Environmental Friendly - Save the Trees/use email. 
From: Nicholas N Chin
To: Legal Profession Complaints Committee , 
info@justice.wa.gov.au, "associate.justice.murray" , 
k.loh@sso.wa.gov.au, 
 Unity Party WA , 
 "minister.porter" , 
info@ccc.wa.gov.au, 
piccc@piccc.wa.gov.au, 
 mail@ombudsman.wa.gov.au 
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=000e0cdfd9006c84ab04b2c1fdfe 
 1) The Legal Profession Complaints Committee of Western Australia 
Atten: Mr. R I FLETCHER 
2) The Associate to Judge Sharp 
Ms, C Campbell of the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia, 
3) The Associate to Justice Murray in respect of the reserved decision in CIV 1689 of 2011,
4) The State Solicitor of WA in respect of the reserved decision in CIV 1689 of 2011 for the attention of Ms. K. Loh. 
5) The President of Unity Party WA Mr, Eddie Hwang; 
6) The Attorney General of WA, 
the Honourable Minister Christian Porter; 
7) The Corruption Crime Commissioner of WA Mr. MackNay; 
8) The Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption Crime Commissioner; 
9) The State Ombudsman of WA; 


Dear Sirs 
I have just discovered that the President of the British Columbia GORDON TURRIFF QC came to Perth in November, 2011 and he made a findings that the regulators of lawyers in Australia is substandard in that they did not abide by the principle of the Rule of Law. 
 The consequence is that lawyers in Australia is less efficient than they should be. 
 I therefore do express the hope that members of the judiciary in Perth including SAT do rectify this anomalous situation. 
The article can be obtained at the Malaysian Bar Council website as indicated below. 
 If you need a copy of this article, please let me know. 
Cheers 
NICHOLAS N CHIN 
Phone: +6065529459 or Mobile: +60129037779
 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- 
From: Nicholas N Chin Date: Sun, Nov 27, 2011 at 10:33 PM 
Subject: Re: PRESIDENT OF LAW SOCIETY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA GORDON TURRIFF QC VIEW ON THE REGULATOR OF LEGAL PROFESSION IN AUSTRALIA. CIV 1689 OF 2011
 To: "associate.justice.murray" , 
k.loh@sso.wa.gov.au 
The Attorney General of WA 
Unity Party President' 


Dear Sirs 


SOME FOOD FOR THOUGHT ABOUT LAW REFORM IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA SO THAT LAWYERS CAN PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AS A LEGAL PROFESSIONAL TO PROMOTE THE

UNITY PARTY WA WROTE TO THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL LAMENTING ON THE MISSING RULE OF LAW IN THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN WA

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Unity WA
Date: Tue, Nov 29, 2011 at 3:39 PM 
Subject: FW: Inquiry from Lawyers.com 
To: Nicholas N Chin From: 
Sent from Lawyers.com [mailto:noreply@lawyers.com] 
On Behalf Of eddie hwang 
Sent: Tuesday, 29 November 2011 2:14 PM 
To: eddie hwang Subject: 
Inquiry from Lawyers.com Thank you for using Lawyers.comSM. 
Please retain a copy of this email for your records. 
 The following Lawyers and Firms have been emailed: 
 Gordon Turriff 
First Name: eddie 
Last Name: hwang 
Phone: (61) 08 - 9368 
City: Como Country: Australia Postal Code: 6152 
Email Address: unitywa@westnet.com.au 
Practice Area: Other 
Your Message: Mr. Christian Porter, 
WA Attorney General Christian.
porter@mp.wa.gov.au 
Dear Attorney General 
While we are waiting for the Law Reform Commission of WA’s Report as indicated by us in our email to you dated 9th June 2011, we are surprised to find that the President of the British Columbia Bar the Honourable GORDON TURRIFF Q.C. had already criticized the failings of our Australian regulators of the legal profession as early as September, 2009. 
There is no denying that he had made a serious study of our irregular regulatory system and found something amiss..... The flaw of our system that is adjusted to cater for the endemic cronyism and corruption in our Barnett government that has already been criticized by our beloved former WA Labour Premier Professor Geoff Gallop that has been highlighted by the Western Australian on the 18th day of November, 2011. That criticism is impliedly focussed on the aspect of the WA Regulator in particular, which does not preserve the independence of lawyers as in the case of Mr. Nicholas N Chin just as any member of the judiciary needs its independence to be preserved in order to be able to deliver justice to the common people. The learned President indicates to that Lawyer's Independence is a sine qua non to Judiciary Independence and any repression upon the BAR by the BENCH speaks of corruption of the latter at its core. The repression of the BAR can only be achieved by the BENCH failing to protect the most fundamental and sacrosanct principle of a true democracy like Australia in the RULE OF LAW.
 We look forward to hearing from you in the not too distant future. 
Yours respectfully, 
Eddie Hwang 
President Unity Party WA 
unitywa@westnet.com.au 
http://twitter.com/unitypartywa 
http://unitypartywa.blogspot.com/ www.unitywa.org 
Phone/Fax: 61893681884 Date: 30-Nov-2011.
 Environmental Friendly - Save the Trees/use email. 
Martindale-Hubbell Lawyers.com® is the most complete, trusted source for identifying qualified legal counsel. 
 Disclaimer: The information provided on Lawyers.comSM is not legal advice, Lawyers.comSM is not a lawyer referral service, and no attorney-client or confidential relationship is or should be formed by use of the site. The attorney listings on Lawyers.comSM are paid attorney advertisements and do not in any way constitute a referral or endorsement by Lawyers.comSM or any approved or authorized lawyer referral service. 
Your access to and use of this site is subject to additional Terms and Conditions. 
 NOTE: Due to the inherent anonymity of the Internet, the identity of all individuals should be confirmed prior to entering into any business arrangement.

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF SAT HIS HONOUR JUSTICE CHANEY IN VR158 OF 2011 IN FAVOUR OF MAURICE LAW SUBPOENA HEARD ON 15.11.2011.

PROFESSOR GEOFF GALLOPS ATTACKS BID TO REDIRECT CCC - PUBLIC SECTOR MISCONDUCT

Gallop attacks bid to redirect CCC

DANIEL EMERSON, The West Australian Updated November 18, 2011, 3:30 am

tweet
Email
Print
Former premier Geoff Gallop yesterday attacked the Barnett Government's plan to shift the Corruption and Crime Commission's focus away from public sector misconduct.

In a rare foray into local politics since his retirement in 2006, Professor Gallop - one of the architects of the CCC - told an international audience of law enforcement experts that the proposed move ran counter to the intentions of the WA Parliament, which passed the CCC legislation in 2003.

He told 517 delegates from across Australia and countries including South Africa, New Zealand and Britain that public sector integrity was one of the "foundation stones of good government". The CCC had only been in existence a short time and "now is hardly the time to take our eye off the ball", Professor Gallop, now director of the graduate school of government at the University of Sydney, said.

"There's too much at stake," he told the Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference at Fremantle's Esplanade Hotel.

The Barnett Government plans to introduce legislation refocusing the CCC to tackle organised crime in co-operation with WA Police, while leaving public sector misconduct to the Public Sector Commission.

Professor Gallop's speech added to high-level criticism of the move from figures including CCC parliamentary inspector Christopher Steytler and Parliament's CCC oversight committee. Outside the conference, Professor Gallop said the proposal was "a serious mistake and it goes against all of the advice that we as politicians have got in WA from major inquiries in the past 20 years".

"It's a real concern because the royal commission back in the 1990s made it absolutely clear what we needed and we acted on their advice," he said.

Professor Gallop said other agencies were specifically devoted to dealing with organised crime and the PSC did not have the investigative powers to deal with serious misconduct and corruption in and around government.

Views on both sides of the debate over the CCC's future were aired at the three-day conference, which ended yesterday

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF MAURICE LAW IN VR158 OF 2011 PURSUANT TO ORDRER NO.2 OF JUJDGE SHARP, TO WHICH LPCC DID NOT MAKE RESPONSIVE SUBMISSIONS

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF MAURICE LAW IN VR158 OF 2011 PURSUANT TO ORDRER NO.2 OF JUJDGE SHARP, TO WHICH LPCC DID NOT MAKE RESPONSIVE SUBMISSIONS

SUBMISSION OF SOLICITOR DAVID TAYLOR RESPONSIVE TO SUBMISSION OF MAURICE LAW IN VR 158 OF 2011

LETTER FROM MAURICE LAW TO SAT, LPCC AND DAVID TAYLOR REQUESTING THE SUBPOENA OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE CRUCIAL ISSUE AND NOT TO RUN AWAY FROM THE ISSUE

SUBPOENA OF MAURICE LAW ISSUED BY THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL IN VR 158 OF 2011

FURTHER SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT IN VR87 OF 2009 BEFORE SAT ON 11.10.2011

THE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

VR87 OF 2009

IN THE MATTER of an application under the Legal Profession Act, 2008 s. 428(1): Referral of matter to SAT by the Legal Profession Complaints Committee

Legal Profession Complaints Committee …………………………………Applicant

And

Ni Kok Chin (Nicholas) ………………………………………………….Respondent

Further written submission by the Respondent for hearing before His Honour Judge Sharp on 11^th day of October, 2011 at 10.00 am

Your Honour

1. I have received at 3.42 pm on 10.10.2011 the written communication from the LPCC by Mr. R.I Fletcher in 15 pages.  Their contents are an abuse of process[1], intended to cause delay and are frivolous and vexatious and consist of trivialities that does not cause any harm to any of the parties involved.  Neither are they characterized by any elements of dishonesty or misconduct or of a fraudulent nature of deceit where pecuniary advantage has been taken of any party involved.  I have thus not been given 48 hours notice and have been taken by surprise in accordance to Rule 22 of the Consolidated Practice Directions of the Supreme Court of WA 2009.  These rules are law and must be obeyed.  The court may therefore proceed without reference to these late documents. Therefore they must be impugned from the court records.
2. The current proceedings in VR 87 of 2009 is also an abuse of process as it is therefore  barred by the extended principle of the doctrine of res judicata derived from Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 and recognised by the High Court in Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (No 2) (1981) 147 CLR 589[2].
3. The policy underlying res judicata and compromise is that there should be finality in the litigation[3]
4. I am seeking to strike out VR87 of 2009 because there already exists a compromise on 26.9.2007 before His Honour Steytler J in CACV 43 of 2007 on 25.9.2007.  The basis for doing this is the law of Compromise quoted by Corboy J in Rajanasaroj (supra) where His Honour said at para. 37 the following:

The effect of a compromise

37 A compromise represents the end of the disputes from which it arose and the court will not permit the compromised issues to be raised afresh in a new action. The disputes are disposed of by the compromise: The Law and Practice of Compromise at 601 and 602.

5. I am calling for the proper administration of justice and for preventing abuse of process by the LPCC just as Corboy J said at para 39:

…That is because the principle recognised in Henderson v Henderson and Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun is concerned with preventing abuses of the court's processes. It is not a principle that operates by creating a true estoppel; that is, it is a principle of procedure concerning the proper administration of justice and not a matter of substantive law….”

6.      My claim against the LPB and the LPCC merges in the compromise in the same way that my cause of action merges in the consent judgment of CACV43 of 2007. The compromise consist of the setting aside Judge Eckert Judgment in VR137 of 2006.  This judgment makes a finding that the effect of a breach of that compromise by the LPB is explained in The Law and Practice of Compromise at 803 and 804 at para. 41:

... the usual consideration furnished in the context of a compromise is the promised or actual forbearance of one party to pursue a claim against another in return for some promised or actual act by the other. If the promised or actual forbearance to pursue the claim is construed as being in return for the promised performance of some act by the other party, such agreement will be regarded as one involving the immediate discharge of the claim. Where, however, the promised or actual forbearance is construed as being in return for the actual performance of some act by the other party, the claim foreborne will not be discharged until such performance takes place ...

Where there is a clear and unconditional discharge, abandonment or release of a claim by one party in return for the promised performance by the other of a series of acts, that original claim can never be revived. Where the agreement involves merely the suspension of the claim pending the carrying out of the acts by the other party then the claim may not be lost forever. (emphasis added)

 

Beech J said in STEWART -v- BIODIESEL PRODUCERS LTD [2009] WASC 145 (28 May 2009) at para.52:  

52 Anshun estoppel rests on the principle that parties to litigation should bring forward their whole case, so that the court will not permit a party to reserve a claim and make it later when it could and should have been made in the earlier proceedings. The starting point for the principle is the often cited statement of Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson  [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115; [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 67 ER 313, 319 as follows:

 [W]here a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.

53 This principle was approved by the High Court in Anshun's Case (598).

54 Different views have been expressed on whether the principle in Henderson should be seen as relating to the scope of cause of action estoppel, or as espousing a separate principle. Handley JA (with whom the other members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal have agreed) has applied the statement in Henderson to cause of action estoppel: Zavodnyik [24]; Lee [22]. However, in Chamberlain (509) Deane, Toohey & Gaudron JJ stated that Henderson was not concerned with res judicata in its strict sense but rather with its implications when an issue is sought to be raised 'which could and should have been litigated in the earlier proceedings'. Their Honours referred to Anshun's Case (598); see also Chamberlain (512) (Dawson J). Unless and until the High Court states otherwise, I propose to characterise an Anshun estoppel in the way stated in Chamberlain.

55 Anshun's Case considered the principle in Henderson in the context of a failure to plead a defence in an earlier action. The High Court rejected the proposition that it was an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. Gibbs CJ, Mason & Aickin JJ said:

In this situation we would prefer to say that there will be no estoppel unless it appears that the matter relied upon as a defence in the second action was so relevant to the subject matter of the first action that it would have been unreasonable not to rely on it. Generally speaking, it would be unreasonable not to plead a defence if, having regard to the nature of the plaintiff's claim, and its subject matter it would be expected that the defendant would raise the defence and thereby enable the relevant issues to be determined in the one proceeding. In this respect, we need to recall that there are a variety of circumstances, some referred to in the earlier cases, why a party may justifiably refrain from litigating an issue in one proceeding yet wish to litigate the issue in other proceedings eg expense, importance of the particular issue, motives extraneous to the actual litigation, to mention but a few (602 - 603).

56 Their Honours emphasised the significance of the potential for conflicting judgments as an important factor in this context. They said as follows:

The likelihood that the omission to plead a defence will contribute to the existence of conflicting judgments is obviously an important factor to be taken into account in deciding whether the omission to plead can found an estoppel against the assertion of the same matter as a foundation for a cause of action in a second proceeding. By 'conflicting' judgments we include judgments which are contradictory, though they may not be pronounced on the same cause of action. It is enough that they appear to declare rights which are inconsistent in respect of the same transaction.

It is for this reason that we regard the judgment that the Authority seeks to obtain as one which would conflict with the existing judgment, though the new judgment would be based on a different cause of action, a contractual indemnity (603 - 604).

Conclusion:

7.      The LPB abused the process of court and that is the reason why the Eckert Judgment is set aside.

8.      The Pseudo Board, the Consent Judgment, Timothy Robin Thies and David Taylor are the four issues where the LPCC abused the process of court.

9.      Why the LPCC refused to answer my questions regarding the abuse of process by LPB and LPCC on 8.4.2011 at the directions hearing before His HOnour Judge Sharp.  Is this inability to answer a confirmation that they have abused the process of court?

Signature of Respondent

Dated 11^th October, 2011.

---

[1] In ROJANASAROJ -v- RACHAN [No 2] [2011] WASC 271 (30 September 2011) Corboy J quoted the Plaintiff in stating at para.25:

It was an abuse of process for the defendant to attempt to ventilate again assertions that had merged in the agreement to settle and dismiss the First Action, reference being made to Running Pigmy Productions Pty Ltd v AMP General Insurance Co Ltd [2001] NSWSC 431. In particular, Palmer J stated at [36] that the category of abuse of process represented by 'Anshun estoppel', in so far as it is applicable to a plaintiff, is concerned with the situation which arises when that plaintiff prosecutes a cause of action to its conclusion by judgment or settlement and later that plaintiff ... seeks to prosecute against the same defendant another cause of action which should reasonably have been prosecuted in the first proceedings.

[2] Ibid: at  para. 27 His Honour again said at para 30:

An odd aspect of the application is that it is the plaintiff who asserts that the defendant is estopped from now raising his claims notwithstanding that it was her action that was dismissed by the consent order made in the First Action. That does not necessarily mean that res judicata and its related doctrines do not apply. In Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 the High Court observed that:

The fact that a judgment is entered by consent may on occasion make it hard to say what was necessarily decided by the judgment, especially where it is the defendant who wishes to bring an action at a later date ... but the principle of res judicata holds good in such a case (508).

[3] 35 Ibid: Corboy J at para. 35 said:

In Minero Pty Ltd v Redero Pty Ltd (Unreported, NSWSC, 29 July 1998) Santow J observed that the overlapping doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel, Anshun estoppel and abuse of process reflect three related policy concerns: finality and litigation, the unfairness of being harassed twice for the same cause and the 'scandal' of conflicting judgments (and see D'OrtaEkenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 223 CLR 1 on the significance of finality to the administration of justice. Those policy concerns are also reflected in the law relating to compromise: see Foskett D, The Law and Practice of Compromise (6th ed, 2005) 6-02; Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1, 31 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).

HIS HONOUR JUDGE SHARP REQUEST FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT A SOLICITOR FATHER AS A LITIGANT IN PERSON ACTING PROBONO FOR HIS SON DOES NOT OWE PUBLIC DUTIES AS A LAWYER

SAT VR87 OF 2009 LPCC V CHIN - CASE LAW REQUEST BY MEMBERS OF THE SAT TRIBUNAL ON 13.10.2011 AS ATTACHED

1 message

---

Nicholas N Chin	Thu, Oct 13, 2011 at 6:03 PM
To: Legal Profession Complaints Committee
Ms Associate Campell to His Honour Judge Sharp State Administrative Tribunal 12 St. Georges Terrace PERTH WA 6000   Ph: 08 9219 3111                                           BY FACSIMILE: Fax:(08) 9325 5099 The Legal Profession Complaints Committee  Perth WA  Atten: Ms. Folonie and Mr. Fletcher    BY EMAIL Dear Ms. Associate and Counsels for the LPCC:  I refer to the above matter.   His Honour Judge Sharp had requested for the Case Law I mentioned today to be sent to him by email to the SAT Panel. I am not able to to that so I am faxing it through. That case law is found at the first Foot Note No.1 below indicated as DIAGNOSTIC............ I though the two excepts of my submissions below which I prepared for my other case and which touches on the topic A: Centenary Lunch Bar would illustrate my point in my submission today to the SAT Panel.   Cheers NICHOLAS N CHIN:   387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6059 Phone: 09 92757440 Mobile: 0421642735 Emails: nnchin@msn.com.   NO PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND SON  1. There is no professional relationship of client and solicitor between myself as the father and Paul as my son and it has always been so in all our mutual dealings except for our relationship with Mr. Thies who is our common solicitor.  There is therefore no conflict of interests existing between me and my son Paul because I do not play the public role of a solicitor between a father and a son but only the private role of safeguarding my son’s own interests just as though it was my own interests[1].   2. My own interests as a father of Paul merged into the interests of my son Paul in our common capacity as the owner, his being legal and mine being equitable of Paul’s own home at 29, O’Dell Street, Thornlie in the State of Western Australia which is the caveat property being the subject of Mr. Thies’ unlawful caveat.  His unlawful caveat is devoid of any caveatable interests with its concomitant equitable interests.  To qualify for an equitable interests in the Caveat Property, Mr. Thies no doubt has to be able to prove that we are ad idem with him in so far as the Caveat Property has been properly identified in the disputed costs agreement we had both entered into with him for his legal services which came to an abrupt stop as soon as he was seen to be reneging on the terms of that contract.  3. The evidentiary materials are before this Court is that Mr. Thies had been engaged in unconscionable conduct against me and my son by abusing his powers as a fiduciary to exploit the vulnerabilities of Paul and to threaten us with fantastic costs escalation procedures, yet unheard of for the purpose of intimidating fear into our hearts such that we both did succumb to his duress; they were unconscionably inflicted upon Paul on account of his ignorance and myself on account of my fear that my son might suffer illness of a specified kind as a result of stress.  These fears are real as they had occurred in the past caused by Mr. Thies and were and are still likely to recur.     [1]See the judgment of Asher J in the case of:  DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 as indicted below: [122] A conflict of interest arises when a person carries out a particular function with two or more interests in conflict.  In administrative law, a conflict of interest exists when a person has a private interest in a decision where that person also has a public role. In such a case the person's public role and private interest are in conflict. The result can be a poor decision because private concerns that have nothing to do with the public duty have influenced the decision. [123] The concept of a conflict of interest is well known in the common law. It has developed particularly in the context of professional and fiduciary duties, the classic example being a solicitor's duty not to be in a conflict of interest with a client. It is also well understood in public law where its usual expression is under the heading of bias or apparent bias.  Also please find the attached document entitled:  A SOLICITOR FATHER ACTING IN SELF INTEREST NOT TO BE CONFUSED AS A SOLICITOR ACTING IN PERSON:  1. I refer to the Directions Hearing in both the Review Order Case (of CIV 1903 of 2008 cited as RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 made by me in accordance with my Application pursuant to s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004) and the Caveat Case in CIV 1112 of 2007, both cases coming before Your Honour on 30.4.2010.  Whence both parties were persuaded by Your Honour to study the transcript of that directions hearing before re-appearing for another directions hearing on 13.5.2010.   2. After serious consideration of the events that have transpired in that proceedings, I have today reached the irrefutable conclusion that it is a fact that Your Honour will need to recuse yourself from hearing both the Review Order Case and the Caveat Case in the interests of justice.   Your Honour should reach Your Honour’s own decisions with respect to recusal without calling on counsel to consent because a consent request of this nature would be "fraught with potential coercive elements which make this practice undesirable[1]." 3. This is based on the ground that having regard to the circumstances which I will take pains to outline below, there remains the fact that it would be impossible for Your Honour to bring an impartial mind[2] to the proceedings of these two cases as a judge.   4. As Your Honour should know that I am being made the Plaintiff of the further proceedings of the Review Order Case by His Honour Justice Hasluck on 17.6.2009 for obvious reasons; the fact that I have been appearing in this matter as a litigant in person for my own affairs with my son Paul C K Chin remaining in the background, right from the start.  There was never any requirement imposed upon me as an officer of the court to be impartial in these proceedings[3].  If there was, I would indeed be disqualified, just as any judge would be disqualified if he is indeed less than impartial.   5. I am the protagonist in this matter by virtue of my own rights as a litigant in person having a personal claim against the Respondent.  Consequently there are no issues of my being“hopelessly conflicted[4]” at all material times as I am my own boss looking after my own personal affairs as a litigant in person with my son appearing as the boss in legal terms remaining in the background under legally permissible circumstances.  5. At all material times, the interests of my son Paul as the legal owner coincides with my own interests as the equitable owner of his interests, just as any father would undoubtedly have equitable ownership over his son’s property.  I have never been my son’s solicitor although I am his solicitor father but I am entitled to use my label “barrister & solicitor” to indicate my social status although I have not applied for a current practice certificate, which I am entitled to with conditions imposed.  6. I have all the characteristics of a solicitor but at all material times, I am the father of Paul and have the natural inclinations just as any other natural father would have, to protect the interests of his own son. 7. This Honourable Court must divest my personality as a solicitor serving the interests of a member of a public who happens to chose me as his or her solicitor from that of a natural father who unlike most others, happens to be possessed of a legal mind.  The father can be working for a member of the public to earn his living or he can be working on a pro bono basis for his own son to protect his own or his son’s interest or their mutual interests, which invariably merge or coincide to form some collective interests belonging together to both the father and son but mutually divestible from each other, in the legal sense. 7. The only criteria for the concept of conflict of interests[5] to exist is to prevent the father from becoming impartial[6] in the execution of his duties as an officer of the court when advocating for his son.  Here, he is advocating for his own interests and hence that supposed conflict of interests is non-existent.    [1] CJE Opinion No. 92-1 of The Massachusetts Judicial Branch: Judicial Ethics Opinions: Hearing De Novo Retrials of Cases Tried by Judge's Father,an ADA, and Trials Involving The District Attorney's Staff found at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/92-1h.html quoting the relevant text as follows:   The relevant Canons of Judicial Ethics are Canons 3(C)(1) and (3)(D), which provide in relevant part: (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including, but not limited to instances where: . . (d) . . . a person within the third degree of relationship …(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding . . . . [2] Dawson J, in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 (30 July 1986) at para.2 said the following: “ See Kanda v. Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322, at p 337. It is the latter possibility which is important in this case because it is not suggested that the parties did not, in the events which transpired, have an opportunity to be heard. What is suggested by the husband is that he is reasonably entitled to entertain an apprehension of lack of impartiality on the part of the judge. If that is so, then it is enough to vitiate the proceedings because it is established that a judge ought not to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he or she might not bring an impartial mind  to the resolution of the questions involved in it: Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294” [3] Id. [4] This is the word of Mr. Thies himself when he informed me that Ms. C. Coombs of the LPCC was telling him so in the context of my trying to act for my son in the proceedings in the District Court matter in relation to the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar with whom I had acted as the common settlement agent for both Vendors and Purchaser who is my son with written informed consent from both parties.  In order to avoid the potential conflict of interests, I engaged Mr. Thies as our solicitors and it was like jumping from the frying pan into the fire for us.  Further, it must be understood that I am never “hopelessly conflicted” whenever I act for my son in both the Review Order Case and the Caveat Case.  See Footnote 8 below for an explanation of the meanings of “conflicts of interests” in administrative law as opposed to public law. [5]  Justice X cannot be correct when he said that I have a conflict of interests even if I have applied for a practice certificate which I have not.  I can still have my name as a barrister and solicitor because I am what I am irrespective of whether I am practicing law or not. There is a conflict of interests if: (a)  I owe separate duties to act in the best interests of my son Paul Chin if I were to be practicing law and if I were to be paid by my son Paul for my legal services rendered to him.  But to have a conflict of interests in relation to Mr. Thies, I must have agreed to act for  Mr. Thies in his best interests in relation to the same or related matters and he must have paid me. Then only such circumstance can I be said to be acting in conflict of duties or  those duties conflict, or there is a significant risk that those duties may conflict; or (b) My duty to act in the best interests of my son Paul as His Mc Kenzie friend does not  conflicts with the interests of Mr. Thies, nor there is a significant risk that it may conflict, with Mr. Thies’ interests in relation to the Review Order Case or the Caveat Case. (c) But we have been Mr. Thies clients or we have been his former clients and he owes us a duty to work in our best interests not to mislead this Honourable Court or tell lies to this Honourable Court and he must do so to protect  interests in relation to Paul’s interests and not to pillage and plunder Paul or to harass him or to harm him further. (d) If I have not applied for a practice certificate I am still not a judge in both the Review Order Case and the Caveat Case and I do not owe a duty to the public to be fair, but I still want to be fair to Mr. Thies when I pursuing justice for both myself and for my son’s own interests.  (d) As long as I did my work on a pro-bono basis as a MeKenzie friend for my son Paul in his Caveat Case, I cannot be faulted for practicing as a lawyer without a practice certificate.  [6] Id.

EMAIL LETTER BY RESPONDENT TO LPCC FAXED TO SAT CALLING OFF THE SCHEDULED HEARING OF VR87 OF 23011 IF LPCC DO NOT GIVE AN UNDERTAKING THAT IT IS GOING TO BE FAIR TO RESPONDENT

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nicholas N Chin <nnchin1@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Aug 22, 2011 at 7:20 PM
Subject: VR 87 OF 2010 - APPLICATION TO CALL OFF THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - AN ABUSE OF PROCESS - IN EXCHANGE FOR PERSONAL GAIN
To: Legal Profession Complaints Committee <lpcc@lpbwa.com>

The Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee for the attention of Ms. Le Miere

(I am sending this whole document to the LPCC by way of email only).

The Associate to the Deputy President or SAT His Honour Judge Sharp

(I am sending this letter as a facsimile to SAT as the email was sent by way of facsimile earlier today).

Dear Sirs

I refer to the above matter and wish to call off the scheduled hearing before the Deputy President of the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia His Honour Judge Sharp on the 11th day of October, 2011.  My reason for doing so is that the LPCC has continued to show no serious intention to provide me with a level playing field in respect of the David Taylor matter as indicated in the complaint letter below sent by the Unity Party of WA to the State Ombudsman.  This complaint requires the State Ombudsman to perform his statutory duty to put the LPCC aright.  I shall await for the outcome and if there is no favourable outcome, I shall expect a reeasoned statement of reason that does not evade the issue that touches on the issue that that there is no credible evidence that David Taylor and Registrar Powell falsified the court records in CIv 1131 of 2006. 

I have also made two separate applications in respect of the Errors of Law apparent on he face of the court records in CACV 107 of 2008 in respect of the David Taylor matter and in CACV75 OF 20010 in respect of the Timothy Robin Thies matter.  These applications were lodged with the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia dated 15.7.2011.  I shall await for the outcome of these proceedings. 

I have a very clear cut case before the State Administrative Tribunal and I do not believe there should be a trial of the malicous prosecution  of me touching on the res judicata matters as contained in the VR 87 of 2009.  I am required by His Honour Judge Sharp to provide the Tribunal with a written submission before that date and this email letter which is being faxed to the State Administrative Tribunal serves as that written submission.   

Unless I have it in writing from both the LPCC and the State Administrative Tribunal that the VR 87 of 2009 proceedings are going to be settled in the manner indicated above, I do not see any point of my attending the hearing scheduled on the 11th day of October, 2011.  I do not want to be taken by surprise or to be ambushed again or to be to be found guilty of professional misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct when there are no justifications for doing so. 

If you the LPCC do have a valid contention that I can be validly prosecuted in VR87 of 2009, I would like to receive it in writing from you before the scheduled date of the hearing. You have so far evinced no seriousness in your intention that you are going to comply with the law and that you are going to be dealing with me honestly as you have already dealt with me dishonestly in the past.  You do not even know what you are charging me as indicated by what your Le Miere was stating before the tribunal on 26.11.2010 as recorded in the transcript.  You were obsessed with the idea of putting me me into trouble first so as to protect your cronies and you will do whatever later on when you can to seek out your reasons for doing so and thereby misleading the tribunal and the courts to the effect. How can you prosecute me for a wrong which has not been committed yet and thereafter researched for that fault aftere the event. When your Ms. Le Miere is before Judge Sharp on a few occassions in the past, she does not know what she was doing and was reasonably found to be misquoting the facts of the case.  Your Ms. Le Miere have been leading me on a wild goose chase and she had not been able to answer my charges as required of her before State Adminsitratative Tribunal and she was found to be evading the issues. You, the LPCC have no sincerity in your professed committment to do justice and to help the regulator of the legal profession in an indepenedent manner. You do not wish to charge other solicitors for doingng the wrong things and and you were reasonably found to be protecting them continuously and unrelentingly and on the other hand you were reasonably found to be chasing after shadows and is trying to get me, an innocent lawyer convicted for no wrongs. You have taken away my human rights as an independent lawyer and you still do not want to admit to the facts. .... You may get more details from my blotspot by Googling NICHOLASNCHIN.   I shall hold you liable for all the damages you have caused me so far for continuing this malicous prosecution of me since the date it was first started by Mr. Pino Monaco acting through the Law Society of Western Australia.

You have been trained to receive reason and logic but you are not using these wares to provide your statement of reason for your decision.  I understand that you have many cases to deal with but you should not have dealt with my cases cursorily and depending on advice from people you know and thought you can trust but who have an axe to grind to against me and allow these people to use you against me to achieve their own ulterior purpose. You should not be protecting people who have done wrongs and thinking that legal prowess can transcend everything.  Providence has provided us with reason and we shall not dominate and bully and put a person down for no rhyme nor reason.  At least you may look at the reasoned judgment of Commissioner Sleight in CIV 1877 of 2010 who at least is willing to stand to reason.

I would like you to become aware that I shall not be available for three months or more as from mid November, 2011.  

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN  

Phone: 08 92757440  Mobile: 0421642735

Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com