REQUEST JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN - THE JUST CONSOLIDATION CIV1112OF2007 INTO CIV1903OF2008 SUCH THAT I COULD BE LITIGANT IN PERSON IN TWO CASES

IN THE SURPEME COURT OF CIV 1903 OF 2008
WESTERN AUSTRALIA
HELD AT PERTH
COMMERCIAL AND MANAGED LIST


In the matter of an application under section
36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 against
His Honour Magistrate Michelides SM in
Proceedings Magistrates Court Proceedings
FR 417 OF 2008, Her Honour Magistrate
Musk, SM in Magistrates Court Proceedings
FR944 of 2007 and Mr. Commissioner
Herron in District Court Appeal 6 of 2008

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN PLAINTIFF

TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES FIRST DEFENDANT

PAUL CHUNG KONG CHIN SECOND DEFENDANT


AFFIDAVIT OF NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN IN RESPONSE TO FIRST DEFENDANT’S AFFIDAVIT SWORN 12TH DAY OF MAY, 2010.


Case Manager: The Hon Justice Kenneth Martin
Date of Document: 26th May, 2010
Filed on behalf of: The Plaintiff
Date of Filing: 26 May, 2010

Prepared by:
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin
387, Alexander Drive
DIANELLA WA 6059
Phone: 08 927567440
Mobile: 0421642735


INDEX
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-1 AS EVIDENCE: 4
PROCEDURE UNDER S.36 OF THE MCCP ACT 5
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-2 AS EVIDENCE: 7
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFF TO BE INCLUDED AS SECOND DEFENDANT IN CIV 1112 OF 2007: 7
REASONS WHY CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007 NEED TO BE CONSOLIDATED: 8
REGISTRAR WILDE’S BASAL CONSENT ORDER IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION, AN ABUSE OF POWER AND A NULLITY: 10
ZERO DEBT CLAIM DOES NOT ENTITLE THE FIRST DEFENDANT TO PROFITS COSTS 10
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MINOR CASE PROVISIONS 11
PRECONTRACTUAL CORRESPONDENCE – REINFORCES THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAWFUL TERMINATION OF FIRST DEFENDANT’S LEGAL SERVICES ON 21.2.2005 13
PLAINTIFF NEVER IN CONFLICT OF INTERESTS SITUATION AS SETTLEMENT AGENT FOR VENDORS OF CENTENARY LUNCH BAR WITH INFORMED CONSENT: 15
THE UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT: 16
CONCLUSION 18
REASONS WHY NO SECURITY OF COSTS TO BE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF: 19


Annexure Description Page No.
NNC-1 Summons in Chambers and Affidavit in Support thereof by the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 dated and sworn 8.5.2010 and filed 10.5.2010 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence for these proceedings 60
NNC-1A Section 36 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 1
NNC-2A Outline of Written Submissions of the Plaintiff dated and filed 10.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence in these proceedings. 12
NNC-2 Outline of Written Submissions of the Second Defendant dated and filed 10.5.2010 in CIV 1112 of 2007 adopted by Plaintiff as evidence in these proceedings. 14
NNC-3 Minute of Proposed Order by the Plaintiff dated and filed the 3.6.2010 for the Plaintiff to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC, 1971. 2
NNC-4 Email letter from the Second Defendant to the First Defendant dated 24.3.2007 requiring the latter to release the unlawful Caveat as there was a zero sum debt. 1
NNC-4A-1 NNC-4A-2 Letter dated 2.6.2005 from Ms. Somerville Brown as Legal Officer of the LPCC to the Plaintiff in respect of the Plaintiff having acted as the settlement agent with the informed consent of the purchasers and vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar. 2
NNC-4B-1 to NNC-4B-2 Response Letter dated 3.6.2005 from the Plaintiff to Ms. Somerville Brown of LPCC indicating that the Plaintiff was in effect never the solicitor for his son Paul the Second Defendant in the sale and purchase settlement for the Centenary Lunch Bar as it was then a misconception that I had acted in conflict of conflicts under circumstances where no such situation of conflict of interests ever exist. 2
NNC-5 Facsimile letter from the Plaintiff to Registrar Wilde explaining to her the misapprehension about Justice Templeman’s Order and urgent need for the Second Defendant to enter into a coerced settlement with the First Defendant. 1
NNC-6 Email letter dated 10.4.2007 by the Plaintiff to the First Defendant indicating that he was non-consensual as regards the duress-vitiated compromise that was made known to Registrar Wilde before the consent judgment was entered into between the parties on 7.6.2007. 1
NNC-7-1 to NNC-7-2 Email dated 12.4.2005 of the Plaintiff indicating the involuntariness of the Plaintiff to pay him the coerced settlement sum, receipt of which was acknowledged by the First Defendant. 2
NNC-7A Page 5 of the Affidavit of Plaintiff filed and sworn on 23.7.2008 in CIV 1903 of 2008 which explains how the First Defendant was creating fictitious bills of costs after the disagreement as to the pre-contractual terms arose on 10.11.2007 arose.
NNC-8-1 to NNC-8-5 Facsimile letters dated 11.4.2007, 12.4.2007 and 17.4.2007 to the LPCC depicting the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant in exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Second Defendant by advancing his own interests to achieve the coerced settlement. 5
NNC-9 Email letter dated 24.4.2007 from Plaintiff to Mr. James Woodford as the Associate of Justice Templeman regarding only one example of the lack of integrity of the coerced settlement as the First Defendant never intended to honour his coerced settlement terms. 1
NNC-10 Facsimile letter from the Plaintiff to all parties involved, inter alia Registrar Sue Wilde informing her again of the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant and the nature of coerced settlement that was before her as a Consent Judgment was pending to be delivered by her on 7.6.2007. 3
NNC-11 Email correspondence between the First Defendant and Plaintiff in the aftermath of the coerced Consent Order. 3
NNC-12 Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008 filed by the Plaintiff that came before Justice Hasluck who granted the review Orders pursuant to s.36 of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 on 7.11.2008. 5
NNC-13 Further Outline of Submissions by Plaintiff in respect of CIV 1903 of 2008 dated and filed 13.5.2010 to be adopted by the Plaintiff as evidence in this Affidavit. 4

I, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin, of No. 387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA, WA 6059, Western Australia, Barrister & Solicitor (currently not certificated), being duly sworn make oath and say as follows:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled proceedings and swear this Affidavit in response to the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 12.5.2010 in support of his Application for security for costs and associated orders and further to his Affidavit dated 6th October, 2010.
2. The facts herein are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Where I identify the source of facts stated as other than from my own personal knowledge, I believe such facts to be true and correct.
3. When I read the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 6.10.2010 and filed 7.10.2010, I do sense that my learned friend the First Defendant who is the deponent of that Affidavit is reasonably found to be putting words into mine or the Second Defendant’s mouth; he is doing this in order to portray an incorrect impression to this Honourable Court with regard to all matters affecting how the client-solicitor relationship between himself and us had been established according to his view.
4. In fact, what actually transpired indicates that there is no consensus ad idem ever reached between him and us and if there is, he had refused to recognize it. Unless proven otherwise, I would like to caution this Honourable Court that those “impersonating” words should be filtered and scrutinized carefully by this court before accepting them to be the truths.
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-1 AS EVIDENCE:
5. I adopt the contents of the Affidavit of the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 dated 30.4.2010 and sworn 8.5.2010 containing 60 pages, which has not been accepted by His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin on 13.5.2010 in those proceedings perhaps on the premise that the Second Defendant wishes to remain inactive as previously promised by the court before Justice Hasluck (See Annexure: NNC-1).
6. I humbly seek this Honourable Court to review this ruling of His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin as I had objected to it immediately and therefore I should be entitled to a review of it by the learned Justice himself in accordance with the principles of law as enunciated by Le Miere J in the case of Townsend & Ors v Collava & Ors [2005] WASC 4(S) relating to the Power and discretion of a trial judge , failing which I hope to receive reasons for what I honestly believe to be an incorrect and an unjust ruling.
7. My adoption of the Annexure NNC-1 is for the purpose of providing the evidentiary materials which ought to be some of the relevant considerations for this Honourable Court to imbibe in these proceedings.

PROCEDURE UNDER S.36 OF THE MCCP ACT
8. I am the person aggrieved by the Null Consent Orders of Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007, the abuse of powers and jurisdictional excesses Orders and Directions of Magistrates Musk in FR944 of 2007, of Commissioner Herron of the District Court in Appeal No.6 of 2008 and of Magistrate Michelides in FR417 of 2007 respectively.
9. Consequently, I applied under Order 56A of the Rules of Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and s.36(1)(c ) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004 (WA) (the MCCP Act) to the Supreme Court of WA before Justice Hasluck in CIV 1903 of 2008 for Review Orders that might have justified Orders for the prerogative Writ of Certiorari (See NNC-12).
10. On 7.11.2008, the learned Justice Hasluck granted me the Review Orders for the prerogative Writ of Certiorari Orders as requested for by me.
11. Justice Kenneth Martin is now hearing the second part of the Review Orders for the Prerogative Writ of Certiorari Orders under subs. 36(4) of the MCCP Act.
11. If Justice Kenneth Martin is satisfied with the review Orders of Justice Hasluck granted under s.36(1) of the MCCP Act, His Honour Justice Martin, if he thinks it just to do so, may order that those the acts, orders or directions of the lower courts not be done or to set them aside as the case requires, or he may issue the necessary consequential orders under subs. 36(4)(c ) of the MCCP Act which need to follow a prior substantial order and the reference here is particularly with regard to Commissioner Herron’s Order in Appeal No.6 of 2008 as per Pera v Pera [2008] FamCAFC 87; (2008) 218 FLR 222 [61] .

12. Their Honour Magistrates Musk and Magistrate Michelides respectively with the advice of the State Solicitor of WA had already agreed to comply with the Review Orders of Justice Hasluck issued under s.36(1); Justice Kenneth Martin now would have to finalize this issue by having his consequential orders made under subs.36(4)(c ) served upon them to make all things complete and perfect in accordance with the law as is extant in Western Australia.
13. The Jurisdictional Excesses Orders and Directions of the District Court, being the abuse of powers of Commissioner Herron in District Appeal No.6 of 2008 is to be revoked by the proposed consequential orders of Justice Kenneth which ought to be made in accordance with subs.36(4)( c) of the MCCP Act.
14. His Honour Commissioner Herron when dealing with an appeal under the MCCP Act ought not to have decided the matter but he did so without jurisdiction as was admitted by Mr. Commissioner in his judgment; he or his representative in the District Court should now remit that appeal if it was at all possible, or remit his Commissioner Herron’s (as an after the event action on the part of the District Court ) to the Supreme Court directed towards Justice Kenneth Martin in accordance with subs.36(7)(a) of the MCCP Act and s.77 of the District Court of Western Australia Act, 1969(WA).
15. S.36 of the MCCP Act is a judicial review power. Its purpose is to replace, and provide a statutory alternative to, the common law relating to judicial review of the acts or omissions of officers of the Court. The intention is to permit judicial review in those situations in which the specified prerogative writs would have been available but also to free the courts from the technical requirements associated with those ancient remedies. It takes away the Supreme Court’s Power issue a prerogative writ in the form of a writ of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari and substitutes the remedies in subs.36(4) of the MCCP Act. The s.36(1) review Order by Justice Hasluck is an order to the First Defendant to show cause why the relief in subs.36(4) should not be granted by Justice Kenneth Martin in favour of the Plaintiff .
16. Judicial review is a supervisory function that is distinct from an appeal or other review on the merits. Judicial review concerns itself solely with the legality of decisions. The focus is on jurisdictional errors. At common law, the scope of judicial review is determined by the availability of the prerogative writs, which include mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. For all intents and purposes, the right and remedy are indistinguishable at common law.
17. The grounds for the setting aside the Orders of Magistrate Musk, Magistrate Michelides and Commissioner Herron include misconstruing or misapplying the statutory source of the relevant power, failing to take into account a relevant consideration, taking into account an irrelevant consideration, improper purpose, unreasonableness or irrationality and breach of the rules of procedural fairness. For the purpose of Certiorari Orders, it is the non-jurisdictional error of the lower courts in the face of the record that is important and relevant. Registrar Wilde Null Orders, Magistrate Musk summary dismissal of FR944 of 2007, Magistrate Michelides dismissal of my Appeal from Registrar Wilde’s Null Orders are all non-jurisdictional errors on the face of the record .
ADOPTION OF ANNEXURE NNC-2 AS EVIDENCE:

18. Similarly, I also adopt the contents of the Outline of Written Submission of the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 containing 14 pages although I believe they are not evidence strictly but they just portray the state of affairs pertaining to the legal position of the Second Defendant and his frame of mind in these proceedings.
19. This document unfortunately had not been accepted by Justice Kenneth Martin on 13.5.2010 on the ground that it is without the signature of Paul but it has now been signed by the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008. His Honour is in error when he ruled that I am not entitled to advocate on behalf of the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007. In order to solve this anomalous situation, I am applying for the two cases to be consolidated for the reasons which I shall be indicating below.
20. Therefore, I humbly pray for the learned Justice Martin to review this ruling made in error on the ground that being an admitted barrister and solicitor does not mean that I must always be acting in that capacity for my son Paul whenever I was doing work for him on a pro-bono basis in accordance with s.12 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 or the similar antecedent provisions of the former LP Act, 2003. I can always be acting for him divested of my professional capacity as a next friend, an amicus curiae of this Honourable Court or as his free agent or even as his father (See Annexure: NNC-2).
21. By virtue of subs.36(1) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2008 (the Act) in CIV 1903 of 2008 through the review orders granted to me 7.11.2008 by Justice Hasluck, I am now the Plaintiff in these proceedings before Justice Kenneth Martin pursuant to the powers granted to him in subs.36(4) of the Act.
APPLICATION BY PLAINTIFF TO BE INCLUDED AS SECOND DEFENDANT IN CIV 1112 OF 2007:

22. As all those matters in CIV 1112 of 2007 concerns the same matters that are to be dealt with in these proceedings to be heard under subs.36(4) of the Act, I am applying for an Order from His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin to consolidate the proceedings in CIV112 of 2007 and CIV 1903 of 2008 into one proceedings known only as CIV 1903 of 2008 (the consolidated matters).
23. I make this Application in the interests of the mutual conservations of the courts and the parties resources pursuant to Sub-rule 83(1) of Order 83 the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 (WA) which provides as follows:
“Whenever any issues between the same parties can be conveniently tried together, or whenever it appears desirable notwithstanding that the parties are not identical and that the evidence necessary to prove the issues is not identical, the Court may consolidate any number of causes or matters in order to quiet all claims relating to one subject matter, transaction or event, or to substantially similar subject matters, transactions or events.”
REASONS WHY CIV 1903 OF 2008 AND CIV 1112 OF 2007 NEED TO BE CONSOLIDATED:

24. Sub-rule 83(3) of the said Rules provides that this Honourable Court shall make all necessary directions for the pre trial procedure, and for the trial or determination of such consolidated causes or matters to be heard together on the following grounds:

24.1. I was the party involved with the First Defendant at all material times.
24.2. I was the party who introduced the First Defendant to the Second Defendant.
24.3. I was the party who through my inadvertence caused my undue influence to be exerted upon my son the Second Defendant to enter into the varied solicitor costs agreement with the First Defendant, thereby inadvertently allowing the First Defendant to exploit the vulnerabilities of my son.
24.4. It was I who caused the solicitor cost agreement to be varied by initially adding to it the pre-contractual terms as contained in my email to the First Defendant dated 25.10.2004 and by insisting that the First Defendant do provide to me in writing his agreement that all costs charges will have to be approved by me, as the fundamental terms of that contract (the fundamental terms).
24.5. It was I who signed the Varied Solicitors Costs Agreement first and showed it to the Second Defendant for his approval.
24.6. It was I who told the Second Defendant that he would not have to worry about having his property mortgaged to the First Defendant because they could not be so mortgaged or charged to the First Defendant on the ground that whatever property real or personal belonging to the Second Defendant cannot be the subject of such contemplated charge or mortgage by virtue of the fact that if they were to be so, they would have to be specifically mentioned in written form in the varied solicitor costs agreement.
24.7. It was I who allayed the fears of the Second Defendant that he would not be subject to any frivolous or vexatious billings by the First Defendant in that I will have to approve every piece of work to be done by the First Defendant.
24.8. It was I who signed the varied solicitor costs agreement with the First Defendant on an earlier date and it was the Second Defendant who mirrored the signing of that similar varied costs agreement on a later date.
24.9. It was I who informed both the First and Second Defendants that the former cannot have caveatable interests over the 29, O’Dell Street, Thornlie property (the caveat property) of the latter on the ground that the former never have or had an equitable interests over the caveat property; that equitable interests must have been brought about by the enforcement of a either a contractual right or by devolution of law through the enforcement of a personal right by the former over the latter as limited by s.137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA).
24.10. It was I who was the party who tried to solve the legal problem of my son but was entangled in this unending problem of disentangling my son as the Second Defendant from the First Defendant.
24.11. I was at all material times acting as the free agent on a pro bono basis as just like father would do for his son, or as the McKenzie friend of the Second Defendant in his dispute with the First Defendant in court, or as a friend of the court as its amicus curiae.
24.12. The Second Defendant is not the party who had entered into a legal relationship of solicitor and client on a voluntary basis with the First Defendant.
24.13. I as the Plaintiff was voluntarily incorporated into the impugned varied solicitor-client costs agreement as a party by all parties concerned (the impugned agreement).
24.14. The impugned agreement is subject to the fundamental term of the contract that I as the Plaintiff shall have the sole authority to approve all costs or charges for works to be performed by the First Defendant for and on behalf of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant and such works shall only be performed at the behest of the Plaintiff.
24.15. It was I who initiated the Second Defendant to make that election to terminate the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement on the ground that the First Defendant is found to be breaching the fundamental terms of that Agreement; the Second Defendant being the party who suffers the detriment occasioned by that breach of the First Defendant is entitled by law to make that election NOT TO KEEP THAT AGREEMENT ON FOOT but to sue the First Defendant later for damages of the breach.
24.16. The issues between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant of the one part and the First Defendant of the other part in the first case of CIV1903 of 2008 are common with the issues existing between the same parties in the second case of CIV1112 of 2007; except that the Plaintiff of the former case had inadvertently not been included in the latter case which I term is a misadventure which I am seeking the permission of this Honourable Court to rectify (The common issues).
24.17. The common issues of both cases can be conveniently tried together in one consolidated proceeding in CIV 1903 of 2008.
24.18. Before both cases are consolidated into one proceeding, the Plaintiff does seek an Order from this Honourable Court for the Plaintiff to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 (in exchange for the Plaintiff having formerly agreed to allow his son Paul C K Chin to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008 before Justice Hasluck). This is to be done as per the Minute of Proposed Orders prepared by the Plaintiff to be included in the current proceedings of the First Defendant Application dated 12.5.2010 (See Annexure NNC-3).
24.19. Although the Plaintiff is a qualified barrister and solicitor, he has at all material times never acted as the solicitor for the Second Defendant on the simple ground that worked on a pro-bono basis for his son as any father would naturally do given the circumstances.
24.20. The parties and the issues of both cases are identical and the purpose of the consolidated matters is to quiet all claims relating to one transaction, event or matter and to conserve all the resources of all parties including this Honourable Court, and in the interests of justice such that these matter may be expeditiously settled.

REGISTRAR WILDE’S BASAL CONSENT ORDER IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION, AN ABUSE OF POWER AND A NULLITY:

25) The Consent Judgment Order by Registrar Sue Wilde of the Fremantle Magistrates Court in FR417 of 2007 dated 7.6.2007 referred to in paragraph 2 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit are null orders.
26) The Null Orders stem from the will of the court being deflected by the duress situation created by the First Defendant, which the learned Registrar was apprised of at all material times in relation to FR417 of 2007.
27) The court which create the Null Orders, is constituted by the following members:
• The Second Defendant in FR417 of 2007 who is also the current Plaintiff in CIV 1903 of 2008 (the Plaintiff). This Plaintiff is currently applying to be joined as the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 to correct the anomaly.
• The Plaintiff in FR417 of 2007 who is currently the First Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008.
• The First Defendant in FR417 of 2007 who is currently the Second Defendant in CIV 1903 of 2008 and the First Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007;
• Registrar Sue Wilde being the then Registrar of the Fremantle Magistrates Court who was continually being apprised of the then prevailing duress situation created by the First Defendant deliberated from delivering her Null Orders as from the 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007 because she knew she would be acting out of jurisdiction or abusing her powers in doing so.
28) Registrar Sue Wilde knew at all material times that the First Defendant was trying to crystallize a coerced and illegal settlement or compromise arising from the false claims of the First Defendant of a zero sum debt.
29) Registrar Sue Wilde would not have delivered her Null Orders on the 7.6.2007 had she not been “importunated” by the Plaintiff to do so in the interest of justice in order to avoid calamities befalling the family of the Plaintiff.
30) Registrar Sue Wilde at all material times that the coerced settlement sum of $11,500.00 paid to the First Defendant is illegal and was paid involuntarily by the Plaintiff to the First Defendant.
31) The Null Orders of Registrar of Registrar has no legal basis and cannot be enforced by any court of law in Western Australia on the following grounds:
32) They are being vitiated by duress;
33) They are an involuntary abuse of process by Registrar Wilde.
34) They are made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by Registrar Wilde.
ZERO DEBT CLAIM DOES NOT ENTITLE THE FIRST DEFENDANT TO PROFITS COSTS
35) I refer to pages 13 to 17 of NNC-1 which is a list of documents appended to my Statement of Claim in FR944 of 2007.
36) This is a Minor Claim Case made by the Plaintiff against the First Defendant for a claim of $7,500.00 which is within the jurisdictional limit of the Minor Claim Case Provisions of the MCCP Act.
37) They pertain to evidence before the Registrar Sue Wilde that there is a zero sum debt which had been wrongfully escalated by the First Defendant unconscionably to some $25,000.00 and it therefore constitutes an abuse of the process of court.
38) They explain the reason why there is a delay from 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007 on the part of the learned Registrar Wilde to enter into the Consent Judgment Orders ostentatiously being claimed by the First Defendant exerting the duress upon the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in unison (See NNC-5).
39) The zero-sum debt of the First Defendant does not entitle the First Defendant to any profit costs because it is an abuse of the process of court and even if the zero sum debt can be argued to become the disputed $3,500.00 debt, then and only then will it a Minor Claim which will then require the First Defendant to commence proceedings that comply with Minor Claim Provisions of the MCCP Act.
40) The First Defendant never complied with the Minor Case Provisions of the MCCP Act when he commenced the FR417 of 2007.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MINOR CASE PROVISIONS
41) Sub-clause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill 2003 reflects the legislative intent of Parliament when enacting the Minor Cases Provisions, states as follows:
“Subclause (5) ensures that where a matter that is within the minor cases jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged
42) There is no debt ever owing to the First Defendant by the Plaintiff or the Second Defendant or at best there is the disputed debt of $3,500.00.
43) The First Defendant by commencing FR417 of 2007 as a General Procedure Claim instead of a Minor Claim is cost-disadvantaging himself instead of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant.
44) All costs improperly incurred by the First Defendant himself therefore have to be borne by the First Defendant himself.
45) The First Defendant will have to pay for all the costs and expenses properly incurred by the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant in defending FR417 of 2007 under the following circumstances:
46) 31.1. No matter which forum it has gone to, provided it was caused by the First Defendant, in accordance with the provisions of s.25(9) of the MCCP Act which provides:
47) (9) If the Court orders the costs of a self-represented party to be paid by another party, the Court may order that the whole or a part of the expenses or losses incurred by the self-represented party in or in connection with conducting the case be included in the costs.
48) If the court is satisfied under s. 25(10) of the MCCP Act that due to the acts or omissions of the First Defendant whether personally or through his agent i.e. his solicitors Western Legal or his barrister Mr. Scott Ellis:
• costs have been incurred improperly or without reasonable cause; or
• costs have been wasted by undue delay or by any misconduct or default,
• the Court may order all or any of the following —
• The First Defendant to be wholly or partially disentitled to costs from the legal practitioner’s client;
• The First Defendant to repay to the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant (the client) the whole or a part of any costs that the First Defendant has been paid by the client for items other than disbursements;
• The First Defendant to pay to the client the whole or a part of any costs that the client is ordered to pay to another party;
• the First Defendant personally to indemnify any party other than the client against the whole or a part of the costs payable by the indemnified party.
49) If this Honourable Court were to make the order under s.25(10(c ) of the MCCP Act disentitling the First Defendant either wholly or partially to any costs from the Plaintiff or the Second Defendant, the First Defendant is precluded from charging this costs or recovering this costs from the them under subs.25(12) of the MCCP Act.
50) This Honourable Court must not make an order under subs. 25(10) unless it has informed the First Defendant of its proposed order and allowed the First Defendant to call evidence and make submissions in relation to the proposed order.
51) This Honourable Court can only make a costs order under s. subs. 25(1) of the MCCP Act for the successful party only for allowable costs as defined by subs. 31(1)(a)and (b) and subs.31(2) as court fees and service fees paid by the successful party and the costs of enforcing a judgment and not in relation to the party’s other costs in the case.
52) Therefore, it is the duty of the First Defendant to have started the FR 417 of 2007 as a Minor Case under the Minor Cases Provisions so as to ensure that the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant who are the First and Second Defendants in FR417 of 2007 are never thereby cost disadvantaged.
53) Once the First Defendant has been found guilty by this Honourable Court of cost-disadvantaging the First Defendant by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the Second Defendant in the FR417 of 2007, the incident of costs would fall on himself. This means that the First Defendant will have to become personally liable for all the improperly incurred costs. These costs could either be improperly incurred or negligently incurred by the First Defendant himself, perhaps in the hope of recovering them from his opponents at a later stage out of malice. They could also be the properly incurred costs of the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant which are incidentally incurred as a result of having to set aright a travesty of injustice or defend and to seek justice from the First Defendant arising out of his wrongs in commencing FR 417 of 2007.
54) On the other hand the Plaintiff started FR944 of 2007 within the Minor Case Provisions and as a result he did not thereby cause the First Defendant any cost disadvantage.
55) Each party would therefore have to bear the costs of their own follies or dishonestly anticipating that this Honourable Court would rather do an injustice and each party become disappointed as a result because our justice system is geared to do the right things by the law irrespective of race or creed of the litigating parties. Each party must therefore beware of their peril occasioned by their greed or by their propensity to do injustice.
PRECONTRACTUAL CORRESPONDENCE – REINFORCES THE INTEGRITY OF THE LAWFUL TERMINATION OF FIRST DEFENDANT’S LEGAL SERVICES ON 21.2.2005
56) The pre-contractual correspondence contains the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor-cost agreement.
57) The Solicitor cost agreement as proposed by the First Defendant initially is varied because of the special insistence of the Plaintiff as contained in the email dated 25.10.2004 requiring the First Defendant do give to him in writing that he had agreed to those fundamental terms.
58) The piece of writing insisted upon by the Plaintiff consist of that signed document by the First Defendant that the Plaintiff must approve all billing/costing given at the time when the Solicitor Cost Agreement is varied.
59) The varied terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement is found in Annexure: H, I and J at pages 93 to 95 of Volume One of the Affidavit of the First Defendant sworn 6th October, 2009 and they are being mirrored in pages 11 to 13 of the Affidavit of the Plaintiff sworn and filed 23.7.2008; both documents are filed in these proceedings.
60) A breach of the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement by the First Defendant entitles the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant to make an election: the Second Defendant made that election by terminate the retainer of the First Defendant lawfully as from the 21.2.2005. Thus the annoying retaining of the First Defendant had been lawfully removed or the Second Defendant had chosen not to have the Varied Solicitors Agreement to be on foot. The party who is entitled to make this election is the Second Defendant because he is the party who had suffered the detriment of the continuing breach of the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement.
61) I the Plaintiff repeat what I said earlier by referring to page 109 of Vol.1 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit and state that at all material times, my own interests is never in conflict with the interests of the Second Defendant because I was never his solicitor. I was never paid any legal fees in accordance with s.12 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 or other antecedent provisions of the former Legal Practice Act, 2003. In fact our interests have been coinciding and are continuing to coincide irrespective of whether I am a certificated legal practitioner or not a certificated legal practitioner. To construe otherwise, I would require solid reasoning from the First Defendant and not from the arbiter of this dispute, that is Your Honour Justice Kenneth Martin.
62) I was always acting as my son’s free agent. I agree that I was not the solicitor but the settlement agent only for the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and only with their written informed consent and only for the specific purpose of the settlement of the purchase and sale of Centenary Lunch Bar. To infer otherwise would be misleading this Honourable Court.
63) The First Defendant knows this all along and cannot be seen to be misleading this Honourable Court as well as the Second Defendant on this point.
64) In order to avoid any confusion about conflicting interests and their misconstruction, I therefore sought the services of another independent solicitor to deal with the litigation aspects of the subsequent dispute with the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar and the lot fell on my unfortunate choice that we made in the First Defendant who not caused the loss of the Second Defendant’s legitimate claim for fraud against the Vendors, but has to contend in this endless dispute with the First Defendant who does not want to go away.
65) That DC 2065 of 2007lawsuit being lost because it fell into incompetent hands, but as the father of the Second Defendant, I had wanted to salvage the situation before it got worse by extricating ourselves out of the clutches, with due respect to him, the First Defendant.
66) The parties have been ad idem at the outset but were seemingly not ad idem as from the 10.11.2004 as indicated in pages 116 to 119 of the First Defendant Affidavit Vol.1.
67) The apprehension of this non-ad idem would have alerted the First Defendant to stop further work as he knew very well that he is not going to be paid because he had a change of mind and was refusing to follow the pre-contractual terms as indicated earlier. At that time the First Defendant would have realized there was an agreed sum of $157.00 to be paid to him only after the trial of the case and it was made clear to him that there was no more money to be paid, and he could exercise his choice either to take it or to leave it. Any excuse that he has been working on the case is simply not tenable as he knew from the start that those were the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement dated 25.10.2004.
68) The First Defendant also acknowledged on this date that if any further payment were to be made to him, it will have to be approved by me, failing which he will not be paid. At the time of termination of this retair, all parties were aware that the last disputed Invoice 5023 dated 7.11.2007 delivered 10.11.2007 amounting to $243.00 would make a total debts of $400.00 that was only approved by the Plaintiff at $207.00 for which $50.00 was paid and leaving the balance of $157.00 payable only if the case were to go to trial.
69) The Plaintiff never intended to exploit the First Defendant nor utilize him to do work for no compensable rewards as he was being promised the payment in accordance with the scale costs determinations once the DC 2065 of 2007 came to trial and achieved an outcome that does not depend on the success or the failure of the case.
70) The issue of whether the Plaintiff had entered into a champertous agreement with the First Defendant had been taken up by the First Defendant through the watch dog body the LPCC for which the Plaintiff had satisfy the latter to its utter satisfaction.
71) The Plaintiff was willing to compensate fully for the efforts of the First Defendant but he was in the meantime taking all precautionary efforts to stop the rorting which inevitably occurs if you are not careful with legal practitioners who are not merely the guardians of the law but who can break the law with impunity. One can be frugal but not at the expense of the First Defendant.
72) Since the case never reached the trial stage, so that amount is not payable. Hence there is only a ZERO SUM DEBT as at 21.2.2007 (See: Annexure NNC-4). Despite this, the Plaintiff was willing to give and take and was willing to settle the whole dispute for $1,000.00 in the aftermath of 3.3.2005.
73) The Plaintiff in order to avoid further trouble with the First Defendant decided to settle the dispute with the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar in DC 2065 of 2007 for only $1,000.00. This is a big sacrifice of some $23,000.00 made by the Plaintiff and the First Defendant in order to get away from the clutches of the First Defendant. The First Defendant is forestalling the action and is refusing to return the documents that were handed to him for which he had no lien because he did not create them, and this hindrance effectively prevented the Plaintiff from continuing with the action in DC2065 of 2007. One can see how much the Plaintiff gave him to the First Defendant to avoid any skirmishes with him and he does not realize this.

PLAINTIFF NEVER IN CONFLICT OF INTERESTS SITUATION AS SETTLEMENT AGENT FOR VENDORS OF CENTENARY LUNCH BAR WITH INFORMED CONSENT:
74) On 2.6.2005, the Legal Officer Ms. Somerville Brown of the LPCC wrote to me as a result of my Complaint to it with regard to the conduct of the First Defendant regarding my employing him in DC 2065 of 2005, from which the current dispute arises (See Annexure: NNC-41-1 to NNC-4A-2).
75) Para. 2 of that letter refers to the fact that I had acted only as settlement agent and not as solicitor for the Vendors of the Centenary Lunch Bar of which my son Paul the Second Defendant was the purchaser.
76) There was a misconception then that I had acted for both parties’ vendors and purchaser in conflict of interests as a solicitor.
77) This is not the case, as I have only acted as settlement agent only for the Vendors for the particular purpose of that sale and purchase not as solicitor with their written informed consent.
78) It is not the case that I have acted as solicitor for my son Paul who is the purchaser, with his written informed consent but only as his free agent because I have never received any legal fees from him as provided for in s.12 of the LP Act 2008 or its antecedent provisions in the LP Act 2003.
79) On the 3.6.2005, I have responded satisfactorily to Ms. Somerville Brown that I was not acting under any conflict of interests as I was acting as solicitor for the Vendors and Purchaser with written informed consent and that role by me was only limited to the role as a solicitor-settlement agent.
80) That is my correct role as I was then a restricted practitioner with the legal firm of V. Ozich & Co.
81) Upon hindsight, I would like to repeat that I played a pro-bono role with regard to my son’s interests in the matter and therefore there can never be any allegations of my having acted in conflict of interests in relation to my son’s interests. Further, I have not used any information which I have acquired as the free agent for my son which conflicts with the interests of the Vendors in my role as their settlement agent for them. (See Annexure: NNC-4B-1 to NNC-4B-2).

THE UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT:
82) It is a fundamental term of the contracting parties from the email dated 25.10.2004 that each new work which attracts a bill of costs must be done at the written instruction of the Plaintiff and the parties must know what is coming for it to be approved, failing which there would have been no debts owing.
83) It is reasonable to infer from the conduct of the Plaintiff that if there were consensus ad idem as to the modus operandi of the First Defendant, the Plaintiff would not have objected as he did on 10.11.2007 as indicated at page 118 of the First Defendant’s Affidavit (See Annexure: NNC-6).
84) Invoices 5024, 5025, 5026, 5027 and 5028 are therefore unapproved bills of costs that were drawn up as an after-thought after the First Defendant’s legal services was lawfully terminated on 21.2.2010. However, the First Defendant crystallized the disputed debt as owing as at 3.3.2005 to be $3,500.00 in invoice 5028 as is indicated at page 177.
85) The First Defendant was drawing up fictitious bills after his services was terminated on 21.2.2005 and by 12.4.2007 when he was on the point of receiving the coerced settlement money, he was made aware of the involuntariness of the Plaintiff to settle with him as indicated by the email he received which he sent back from his machine to the Plaintiff (See Annexure: NNC-7).
85.1. See also Annexure NNC-7A for the explanations on how the disagreement as to bills of costs arose and when the services of the First Defendant were lawfully terminated.
85.2. The First Defendant breached the terms of the Varied Solicitors Agreement which entitles the Second Defendant the right to elect as to whether to allow the contract to be on foot and sue for damages or to terminate the contract.
85.3. The Plaintiff and the Second Defendant who suffered the detriment of the breach chose not to allow the contract to be on foot.
85.4. The First Defendant on the hand wanted very much to have the contract on foot… such that he could manipulate the Second Defendant and was trying to poison his mind against his father and was continuing to do work and charging for them thereby escalating the unknown factor which frightens the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant into oblivion.
85.5. Contemporaneous letters were sent by the Plaintiff to the LPCC to seek redress of the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant in refusing to honour the terms of his coerced settlement effected on 13.4.2007 (See Annexure: NNC-8-1 to NNC8-5).
85.6. After the coerced settlement monies were paid to the First Defendant he recalcitrantly refused to remove his strangle-hold caveat but was fishing for more monies to be paid to him. This was communicated to the Associate of Justice Templeman Mr. James Woodford (See Annexure: NNC-9).
85.7. Registrar Wilde was aware at the time of duress vitiated compromise that both the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were labouring under a misapprehension as to the Order of Justice Templeman and this caused an urgent need for a coerced settlement. The First Defendant took advantage of this situation to maintain that strangle-hold caveat which the First Defendant is not legally entitled to do on the ground that he did not have an equitable interests over the caveat property so as to enable him to hold an caveatable interests under circumstances when there was a zero sum debt and nowhere is it written in the Varied Solicitors Agreement that the caveat property had been properly defined.
85.8. The Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were taken by surprise as he had just come home from Malaysia and was thinking as to why the First Defendant had by that time not complied with Justice Templeman’s Order to commence the action but suddenly FR417 of 2007 was commenced. The unlawful caveat coupled with the misapprehension expedited the coerced compromise. (See Annexure: NNC-4).
85.9. Registrar Wilde delivered her judgment for coerced consent order on the 7.6.2007. Before that happened, the learned Registrar was made aware of the involuntariness of that coerced settlement by the Plaintiff as is evidenced in his facsimile letter to her dated 6.6.2007. (See Annexure: NNC-10-1 to NNC-10-3).
85.10. Registrar Wilde deliberated in delivering her consent judgment as from the 13.4.2007 till the 7.6.2007. She had delayed in delivering the much wanted consent judgment by the Plaintiff knowing that it is illegal for her to do so and that it would be of null effect in order, but she did so in order to placate the unending escalation costs of the First Defendant. This action is sending shivers into the spinal column of the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff and other family members. (See NNC-10-1 to NNC-10-3).
85.11. After the Consent Judgment was delivered, one can still see the recalcitrance of the First Defendant in not obeying the law of reason that is implanted in every human mind. He is still refusing to remove the caveat strangle-hold he is exerting over the Second Defendant and the Plaintiff. He wants more money to no ends and this happening till today. (See Annexure: NNC-11-1 to NNC-11-3).
85.12. As a Christian, I would like to turn as many cheeks as possible for the First Defendant to slap on and I prayed to God each time for him to have compassion upon me, but all is in vain.
85.13. I am a migrant who come into this country and do experience tremendous difficulty in finding permanent employment in the area of my expertise despite my qualifications. This explains why I am frugal in my ways so as to get by through economic hardships but this does not mean I would like to exploit the First Defendant.
85.14. I always believe there is the sanctity of contract and the freedom to contract. But I am disappointed that whilst I am being disciplined by the Legal Practice Board through the intervention and usurpation of a false full Board, the standards applied to me are never being applied to others and this amazes me.
86) Magistrate Musk summarily dismissed my claim in FR944 of 2007 by denying the Plaintiff natural justice because she based her decision of Registrar Wilde’s Nuyll Consent Orders which she knew all along was made without jurisdiction and is an abuse of process of court deliberately achieved to curtail the unconscionable conduct of the First Defendant.
87) All the concomitant costs orders arising from the decision of Registrar Wilde Null Costs Orders is similarly tainted and of null effect including the decision of Magistrate Michelides in hearing the appeal of FR417 of 2007.
88) His Honour refused to grant me extension of time for the delay of the Appeal against Registrar Wilde Null Costs Orders because the Plaintiff had no choice but to access DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 first through Commissioner Herron in sequence first. (See: Notice of Originating Motion in CIV 1903 of 2008).
89) Commissioner Herron heard the Appeal No.6 of 2008 from the decision of Magistrate Musk. He decided that he has no jurisdiction to intrude into Magistrate Musk’s Decision in FR 944 of 2008. Despite this he still insisted in making a legal determination that there was no coerced settlement in Registrar’s Wilde Null Orders. Therefore, His Honour it seems to me is wanting to the cake and yet he wanted to eat it as well. There is therefore no doubt that Mr. Commissioner Herron made a prejudgment and therefore his Orders are made without jurisdiction and are an abuse of the process of court which renders them unenforceable. Incidentally, the solicitor of the First Defendant of Western Legal forewarned me at the commencement of the FR417 of 2007 case that the Magistrates Court at Fremantle does not decide a case in accordance with the law. In effect, he warned me that knowledge of the law is not as important as who you know. I have recorded this statement.

CONCLUSION
90) None of the costs orders made by the courts below are therefore enforceable or are of any legal effect. This Honourable Court has to make a decision in accordance with s.36(4) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004 to set aside the judgments of the learned Registrar Wilde in FR417 of 2007, the judgment of the learned Magistrate Musk in FR944 of 2007 and also to set aside the decision of the learned Magistrate Michelides which the appeal decision against Registrar Wilde’s Null Orders in FR417 of 2007. This Court does not have jurisdiction to set aside the Order of Commissioner Herron of the District Court but s.36(4)© does allow this Honourable Court to make consequential Orders for the District Court to remit Appeal No.6 of 2008 to the Supreme Court under subs 36(7) of the Act and s.77 of the District Court Act, 1969 (WA).
91) The argument remains if the originating coerced Consent Order of Registrar Wilde is set aside, Commissioner Herron Decision will collapse into a rubble.
92) There is therefore no reason for me to give security orders for costs as the original ZERO SUM CLAIM would not attract any costs order in the first place.
93) If it is not a zero sum claim, then only it is possible to become a $3,500.00 claim. If it were so, then it would still come under the Minor Claim provisions and this Honourable Court would have to abide by the legislative intent of Sub clause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill 2003 in order to ensure that both the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant is not being cost-disadvantaged by the wrongs of the First Defendant.
94) Since it is the First Defendant who started an action in the General Procedure Claim in FR417 of 2007 instead of using the Minor Claim Provisions to make a claim of a zero sum debt or a $3,500.00 debt, he is thereby merely seen to be cost-disadvantaging himself and he has only himself to blame if he had incurred unnecessary costs.
95) The Plaintiff started his claim in FR944 of 2007 in compliance with the Minor Claim Provisions and he is thereby not cost-disadvantaging the First Defendant and he is not to be blameworthy in this respect.
96) I undertake to pay a proper costs order that does not impinge on profit costs claim by the First Defendant if he were to win these two cases. This is an undertaking by a legal practitioner and he would suffer the detriment of professional misconduct if he were to resile from this undertaking.
REASONS WHY NO SECURITY OF COSTS TO BE OFFERED BY PLAINTIFF:
97) It is reasonable for this Honourable Court to make the findings from the facts and history of this case that the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant have been all but bona-fides and had acted reasonably. The same epithet cannot be applied to the First Defendant as his conduct smirks with unethical conduct and streaks of uncanny unconscionability.
98) Having regard to the circumstances and the history of the two cases that are being sought by the Plaintiff to be consolidated, the First Defendant can reasonably be found to be using high-handed and oppressive methods to deny the impecunious Plaintiff, a right to litigate by seeking to a frivolous and vexatious claim for security costs where there are no costs debts due nor payable if the right principles of law have been applied conscientiously without abuse of powers or within their jurisdictional limits.
99) Both Their Honours Magistrates Michelides and Musk have agreed to comply with the review Orders Nisi granted by Justice Hasluck with the advice of the State Solicitor and they would have to be present in these proceedings to upset the Review Orders Nisi granted by Justice Hasluck. The question is whether they will do it and whether they are allowed to approbate or reprobate.
100) Although the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the Commissioner Herron’s decision in Appeal No.6 of 2008, the learned Commissioner’s decision crumbles just as the Magistrates Court decisions crumble. That’s the way the cookie crumbles or that is the expected result without the Plaintiff having to go through the rigmarole of an appeal process again.
101) The First Defendant had caused the Plaintiff’s family members a lot of heart-aches and a lot of resources had been wasted. But for the strenuous efforts of the Plaintiff to seek justice, he would be forever condemned to a life of misery and “unforgivingness” and many lives would have been affected forever.
102) If the Order for security costs applied for by the First Defendant were to be granted by this Honourable Court, a travesty of justice would occur as the Plaintiff’s efforts at seeking fair justice in Advance Australia Fair as a democratic institution in this world would be condemned to the scrap yard and the book shelves.
103) There are no exceptional circumstances for security of costs to be granted because the Plaintiff is not living abroad and is having his abode in Western Australia. Although the Plaintiff is in impecunious circumstances because of the adversity he had undergone by experiencing Australian racism at its worst, yet he is prepared to forgive and let bygones be bygones.
104) There are no profit costs Orders to be ordered against the Plaintiff in favour of the First Defendant even if the former were to lose this case due to the legislative intent of the Parliament of WA when they enacted the MCCP Act as embodied in subclause 25(5) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill, 2003 which does not cost-disadvantage the Plaintiff who did not abuse the process of court to sue the Defendant without complying with the Minor Claim Provisions.
105) Subs. 36(3) when read with subs. 26(1) of the Act provides the source and scope of this Hourable Court’s Power to make the Review Orders of Justice Hasluck Absolute. That subs.36(3) says that this Honourable Court is duty bound to make those Review Orders of Justice Hasluck Absolute or any other Review Orders to be determined at its discretion subject to the condition that they are just and whether or not they have been applied for by the Plaintiff or not.
106) My last words are:
It is my humble persuasion to this Honourable Court that the grounds in s.36(1)( c) for the grant of Certiorari Orders Absolute has now been established. Having regard to the language and purpose of s.36 of the Act in its broader statutory context, they therefore compels the inevitable conclusion that the Learned Justice Kenneth Martin, as humbly prayed for by the Plaintiff: to pay due regard to His Honour’s need to perform the duties of his oath of office to grant the relief sought for by the Plaintiff as is contained in the powers of subs.36(4) of the Act because they have now been enlivened as a result of the aforesaid grounds having been established. Let it be a lesson to humanity that we do not use our wit to outwit any human for the sake of a few dollars. We must be honest as lawyers and when clients are willing only can we receive.


SWORN by the Deponent at Perth ]
In the State of Western Australia ]
This 26th day of May, 2010 ]……………………………………………..
Before me:
…………………………..
Justice of Peace/ Commissioner of the Supreme Court for Taking Affidavit