I WANT THE JUSTICE SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH ME FAIRLY: I SHOULD NOT BE PERSECUTED FOR NO PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT. I WANT TO UPHOLD THE PUBLIC INTERESTS THAT THE COMMON PEOPLE GET FAIR LEGAL SERVICES
Monday, June 20, 2011
INVOICES AND RECEIPT OBTAINED FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA BY MAURICE FREDERICK LAW
CAVEATS OF SPUNTER PTY LTD ON THE HAZELMERE AND MT LAWLEY PROPERTIES WAS REMOVED BY SOLICITOR FOR NANCY HALL IN CIV 1142 OF 2005 ON 11.2.2006. THE FRESH EVIDENCE OF REGISTRAR POWELL'S LETTER DATED 11.6.2009 MISLED THE COURT OF OWEN JA IN CACV 107 OF 2008. OWEN JA DID NOT ACCEPT THE FRESH EVIDENCE OF REGISTRAR POWELL'S LETTER SUBMITTED BY APPELLANT IN CACV 107 OF 2008. THIS IS AN ERROR OF LAW ON THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS WHICH MUST BE UNRAVELLED OR REMOVE FROMN THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS
WRIT OF SUMMONS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 IF FILED ON 10.2.2006 MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PART PAYMENT OF THE FILING FEES. THE DEPOSIT OF THE FILING FEES WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN PAID BY REGISTRAR POWELL ON 10.2.2006 BY DAVID TAYLOR AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF WRIT IN CIV 1131 OF 2006. THAT WRIT WAS NEVER FILED ON 10.2.2006 BUT ONLY FILED ON 16.2.2006. THEREFORE IT MISSED THE DEADLINE AS ORDERED BY JUSTICE JENKINS. THEREFORE NANCY WON THE CASE OF HAVING REMOVED THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT ON 11.2.2006. THE REMOVAL OF THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT IS AUTOMATIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT STATUTE LAW. THERE SHOULD BE NO LONGER THIS CONTROVERSY. THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SOLICITOR'S WORK OF NICHOLAS N CHIN AND THE REMOVAL OF THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT IS PROVEN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT.
COMMISSIONER SLEIGHT IN RE HALL; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2011] WASC 155 HEARD 4.4.2011 DELIVERED 15.6.2011 AT PARAGRAPH 44 SAID THE FOLLOWING WORDS:
"44. However, the Court of Appeal held that even if Mr Chin were able to prove that action CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006, it would not have produced a different result, as the caveat remained [47] - [57]. See also Chin v Hill [No 2] [2011] WASCA 96 [3]. Given the conclusions of the Court of Appeal in Chin v Hall, in my view, it not be appropriate to refer the matter back to the Court of Appeal, when the Court of Appeal has already ruled that the commencement date of action CIV 1131 of 2006 would make no difference to the outcome. "
PULLIN & NEWNES JJA IN CHIN -v- HILL [No 2] [2011] [3] WASCA 96 IS ACTUALLY CHIN -v- HALL [No 2] [2011] WASCA 96 [3] WHO SAID THESE WORDS: "3 During the appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr Chin applied to adduce some additional evidence. The evidence that he sought to adduce was evidence to show that an action, CIV 1131 of 2006, was not commenced on 10 February 2006: see [51] of the Court of Appeal reasons. The court held that the evidence would not have produced a different result had it been available to the master: see [57]."
OWEN JA IN CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216 HEARD 12.8.2009 DELIVERED 9.12.2009 AT PARAGRAPH 51 SAID THE FOLLOWING WORDS: 51 In this appeal Chin filed an application to adduce further evidence to show that CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006. The circumstances in which a court will entertain further evidence on appeal are well known. The general principle guiding the admission of further evidence on appeal was formulated by Dixon CJ (with whom Williams, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreed) in Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 where he said (at 444):
(Page 16) If cases are put aside where a trial has miscarried through misdirection, misreception of evidence, wrongful rejection of evidence or other error and if cases of surprise, malpractice or fraud are put on one side, it is essential to give effect to the rule that the verdict, regularly obtained, must not be disturbed without some insistent demand of justice. The discovery of fresh evidence in such circumstances could rarely, if ever, be a ground for a new trial unless certain well-known conditions are fulfilled. It must be reasonably clear that if the evidence had been available at the first trial and had been adduced, an opposite result would have been produced or, if it is not reasonably clear that it would have been produced, it must have been so highly likely as to make it unreasonable to suppose the contrary. Again, reasonable diligence must have been exercised to procure the evidence which the defeated party failed to adduce at the first trial."
oWEN JA IN CHIN V HALL (2009) SAID: 57 Leaving aside the question of whether, in light of CDJ v VAJ, Chin needs to establish that his evidence is fresh and, if so, whether it possesses that quality, it is clear that the evidence would not have produced a different result had it been available before the master. I have already
(Page 18) dealt with the letter from the registrar dated 11 June 2009. None of the other evidence which Chin seeks to adduce establishes that CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006. As the evidence the subject of the application would not have made a difference to the outcome of the master's decision had it been available before him, I would dismiss the application to adduce further evidence.
OWEN JA IN CHIN V HALL [2009] FURTHER SAID: 52 The test formulated in Wollongong Corporation was thus taken to require that the evidence be 'fresh' (that is, it could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained for use at trial) and that had it been available at trial, it is reasonably clear that the opposite outcome would have ensued: see, for example, Australian Electrical Electronics Foundry & Engineering Union Western Australia Branch v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 145 at 161 - 162; Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459 at 466. 53 In CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; (1998) 197 CLR 172 McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ in their joint judgment expressed the opinion that Wollongong Corporation had 'authoritatively laid down' the general law principles in relation to admitting fresh evidence on appeal [89]. Their Honours noted, however, that if a right of appeal is conferred by statute, the terms of the statutory grant determine the nature of the appeal and consequently the right, if any, to adduce further evidence [95]. Despite the admission of further evidence being a matter of statutory construction, the joint judgment noted that [111]:
The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the [court] is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial. 54 I have reviewed the evidence which Chin seeks to adduce and it does not prove his contention. The high point of Chin's evidence is a letter written to him by a registrar of this court dated 11 June 2009 saying:
OWEN JA FURTHER CONTINUED AT PARA. 54 OF THE SAME CASE: You state you have a copy of the writ. In that case you will note it has 2 dates on it.
The first is 10 February 2006 with a notation that the fee was $654.20. The second is the assessment which in its original form shows a date of 10 February 2006 and an assessment no of 201702. That assessment was cancelled after close of business on 10 February 2006 when it was realised by the Court that the cheque tendered for payment was for $654.00 and was therefore 20 cents short.
I assume that fact was forwarded to the plaintiffs' solicitors because on 16 February 2006 the correct amount was paid: $654.00 by credit card and 20 cents cash. The assessment stamp was altered to 16 February 2006 and the new assessment number 202483 entered on the altered stamp. The assessment number is given on payment.
55 The letter does not establish that the action was not commenced on 10 February 2006. It indicates that the writ was filed on 10 February 2006 and, through an oversight, the filing fee paid was 20 cents short of the proper amount. The underpayment was brought to Spunter's solicitor's attention and the correct amount was paid. This does not mean that the writ was not filed until the correct fee was paid. 56 Order 4 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) provides that an action must be commenced by a writ of summons. Order 5 r 6 provides that a writ is issued upon its being sealed by the proper officer, and r 7 and 8 provide that a copy shall be left with the appropriate officer for filing. Regulation 6 of the Supreme Court (Fees) Regulations 2002 (WA) requires that fees be paid before documents are filed. Regulation 7, however, confers on the court and registrars a discretion to waive, reduce, refund or defer fees. Regulation 11 provides that an unpaid fee is a debt due to the State and may be recovered by action in a court of competent jurisdiction. It seems to me that on the proper interpretation of the Rules it does not necessarily follow that a document is deemed not to be 'filed' merely because, as a result of oversight, the correct fee has not been paid. This conclusion is supported by authority from other jurisdictions: see Davies v Lewis [2001] NTSC 105; (2001) 11 NTLR 81; Gower v Woodman Sales Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 15.
LOOK AT THE TWO INVOICES: 202483 DATED 25.9.2009 AND 2021702 DATED 10.2.2006. ON THE LATTER OR EARLIER DATE 10.2.2006, THE FILING FEES WAS NOT PAID BY DAVID TAYLOR. THEREFORE CIV 1131 OF 2006 WAS NEVER FILED ON 10.2.2006. THAT IS A FACT. JUSTICE JENKINS ORDER THAT DAVID TAYLOR COMMENCED LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 WAS NEVER COMMENCED. THERE IS NOT DISPUTE TO THIS. HOW CAN THIS BE NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AS THE LPCC PUT IT IN ITS LETTER TO MAURICE LAW DATED 4.8.2011.
LOOK AT THE DESCRIPTION OF BOTH THE INVOICES AGAIN. WHEN I SOUGHT AN ANSWER FROM REGISTRAR POWELL VOICING THE DISCREPANCY, THE LEARNED REGISTRAR FABRICATED THE NEW EVIDENCE BY CREATING THE RECEIPT NOS SCR 1441 FOR $654.00 FOR A CREDIT CARD PAYMENT AND DATED IT 16.2.2006 AND ANOTHER RECEIPT SCR 1442 FOR THE MISSING 20 CENTS AND DATED BOTH AS 16.2.2006. THIS ACT OF THE FALSIFICATION OF THE COURT RECORDS WAS DONE ON 16.2.2006. THEREAFTER REGISTRAR POWELL WROTE TO ME HIS LETTER OF FALSIFICATION OF THE COURT REFCORDS WHICH WAS REFUSED ADMISSION INTO THE COURT OF APPEAL BY OWEN JA IN CACV 107 OF 2008. THAT LETTER IS CONTAINED AT PAGE 136 OF THE YELLOW APPEAL BOOK IN THAT APPEAL CASE. THAT FRESH EVIDENCE MUST BE ADMITTED BECAUSE ITS ADMISSION WOULD HAVE CHANGED MY POSITION INTO THE SALVOUR OF THE TWO PROPERTIES OF THE LATE NANCY HALL. THAT IS THE ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS WHICH MUST BE SET ARIGHT.
I JUST REALIZED THAT WHENEVER YOU ASKED THE SUPREME COURT TO CHECK ITS RECORDS FOR INVOICE NO. 202483, THE DATE 19.5.2009 WILL VARY AS TO WHEN THAT INVOICE WAS REQUESTED. IF YOU REQUEST IT TODAY, THAT INVOICE WILL BE DATED 6.9.2011. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE DATE THAT INVOICE 202483 WAS FALSIFIED ON 16.2.2006. INVOICE 201702 IS A FICTION AND IS NON-EXISTENT IN THE COURT RECORDS. ITS A FABRICATED DOCUMENT BY DAVID TAYLOR WHICH STATES THAT BOTH THE SUM OF $654.00 AND THE 20 CENTS THAT WAS SHORT WAS PAID ON 10.2.2006. REGISTRAR POWELL WHEN TELLING THE UNTRUTHS TO COVER UP FOR DAVID TAYLOR SAID THAT BOTH SUMS WAS PAID ON 16.2.2006 TO COINCIDE WITH WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. THIS FRAUD HAS CAUSED ME TO LOSE MY INDEPENDENT PRACTICE AS A LAWYER AND AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS CAUSED ME TO LOSE NANCY CAVEAT'S CASE IN CIV 1142 OF 2005 WHEN I WAS HER SOLICITOR. THEREFORE I WANT TO BE COMPENSATED FOR THIS WRONG BY THE COURT OF APPEAL IN CACV 107 OF 2008. I HAVE THEREFORE MAKE AN APPLICATION FOR THE ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE COURT RECORDS TO BE EFFACE ON 15.7.2011.
First, the essence of the action is fraud. As in all actions based on fraud, particulars of the fraud claimed must be exactly given and the allegations must be established by the strict proof which such a charge requires: Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298 at 301; McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (at 497). Secondly, it must be shown, by the party asserting that the judgment was procured by fraud, that there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that fresh facts have been found which, by themselves or in combination with previously known facts, would provide a reason for setting aside the judgment: see Lord Selborne LC in Boswell v Coaks (No 2) (1894) 6 R 167 at 170, 174; 86 LT 365 at 366, 368; Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 147; McDonald v McDonald [1965] HCA 45; (1965) 113 CLR 529 at 533; Everett v Ribbands (1946) 175 LT 143 at 145, 146; Birch v Birch [1902] P 130 at 136, 137-138; Ronald v Harper [1913] VicLawRp 80; [1913] VLR 311 at 318. This rule has an ancient lineage: see, eg, Shedden v Patrick (1854) 1 Macq 535 at 615, 622; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 26, par 560 at 285. It is based upon a number of grounds. There is a public interest in finality of litigation. Parties ought not, by proceeding to impugn a judgment, to be permitted to relitigate matters which were the subject of the earlier proceedings which gave rise to the judgment. Especially should they not be so permitted, if they move on nothing more than the evidence upon which they have previously failed. If they have evidence of fraud which may taint a judgment of the courts, they should not collude in such a consequence by refraining from raising their objection at the trial, thereby keeping the complaint in reserve. It is their responsibility to ensure that the taint of fraud is avoided and the integrity of the court’s process preserved. Thirdly, mere suspicion of fraud, raised by fresh facts later discovered, will not be sufficient to secure relief: Birch v Birch (at 136, 139); McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (at 498); Ronald v Harper (at 318). The claimant must establish that the new facts are so evidenced and so material that it is reasonably probable that the action will succeed. This rule is founded squarely in the public interest in finality of public litigation and in upholding judgments duly entered at the termination of proceedings in the courts.
Error apparent on the Court Records: The error must be clear based on the appellate record and you will not be permitted to supplement the record with additional evidence or documents. Your arguments will be limited to referring to items/documents already present in the appellate record.
“An error cannot be said to be apparent on the fact of the record if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. An error apparent on the face of the record means an error which strikes the eye on merely looking at it and does not need long-drawn-out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions, such an error should not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest and clear that no Court would permit it to remain on record. If the view accepted by the Court in the original judgment is one of the possible views, the case cannot be said to be covered by an error apparent on the face of the record”.
CAVEATS OF SPUNTER PTY LTD ON THE HAZELMERE AND MT LAWLEY PROPERTIES WAS REMOVED BY SOLICITOR FOR NANCY HALL IN CIV 1142 OF 2005 ON 11.2.2006. THE FRESH EVIDENCE OF REGISTRAR POWELL'S LETTER DATED 11.6.2009 MISLED THE COURT OF OWEN JA IN CACV 107 OF 2008. OWEN JA DID NOT ACCEPT THE FRESH EVIDENCE OF REGISTRAR POWELL'S LETTER SUBMITTED BY APPELLANT IN CACV 107 OF 2008. THIS IS AN ERROR OF LAW ON THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS WHICH MUST BE UNRAVELLED OR REMOVE FROMN THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS
ReplyDeleteWRIT OF SUMMONS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 IF FILED ON 10.2.2006 MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A PART PAYMENT OF THE FILING FEES. THE DEPOSIT OF THE FILING FEES WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN PAID BY REGISTRAR POWELL ON 10.2.2006 BY DAVID TAYLOR AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF WRIT IN CIV 1131 OF 2006. THAT WRIT WAS NEVER FILED ON 10.2.2006 BUT ONLY FILED ON 16.2.2006. THEREFORE IT MISSED THE DEADLINE AS ORDERED BY JUSTICE JENKINS. THEREFORE NANCY WON THE CASE OF HAVING REMOVED THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT ON 11.2.2006. THE REMOVAL OF THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT IS AUTOMATIC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT STATUTE LAW. THERE SHOULD BE NO LONGER THIS CONTROVERSY. THE CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SOLICITOR'S WORK OF NICHOLAS N CHIN AND THE REMOVAL OF THE SPUNTER'S CAVEAT IS PROVEN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT.
ReplyDeleteCOMMISSIONER SLEIGHT IN RE HALL; EX PARTE CHIN [No 2] [2011] WASC 155 HEARD 4.4.2011 DELIVERED 15.6.2011 AT PARAGRAPH 44 SAID THE FOLLOWING WORDS:
ReplyDelete"44. However, the Court of Appeal held that even if Mr Chin were able to prove that action CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006, it would not have produced a different result, as the caveat remained [47] - [57]. See also Chin v Hill [No 2] [2011] WASCA 96 [3]. Given the conclusions of the Court of Appeal in Chin v Hall, in my view, it not be appropriate to refer the matter back to the Court of Appeal, when the Court of Appeal has already ruled that the commencement date of action CIV 1131 of 2006 would make no difference to the outcome. "
PULLIN & NEWNES JJA IN CHIN -v- HILL [No 2] [2011] [3] WASCA 96 IS ACTUALLY CHIN -v- HALL [No 2] [2011] WASCA 96 [3] WHO SAID THESE WORDS:
ReplyDelete"3 During the appeal to the Court of Appeal, Mr Chin applied to adduce some additional evidence. The evidence that he sought to adduce was evidence to show that an action, CIV 1131 of 2006, was not commenced on 10 February 2006: see [51] of the Court of Appeal reasons. The court held that the evidence would not have produced a different result had it been available to the master: see [57]."
OWEN JA IN CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216 HEARD 12.8.2009 DELIVERED 9.12.2009 AT PARAGRAPH 51 SAID THE FOLLOWING WORDS:
ReplyDelete51 In this appeal Chin filed an application to adduce further evidence to show that CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006. The circumstances in which a court will entertain further evidence on appeal are well known. The general principle guiding the admission of further evidence on appeal was formulated by Dixon CJ (with whom Williams, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ agreed) in Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 where he said (at 444):
(Page 16)
If cases are put aside where a trial has miscarried through misdirection, misreception of evidence, wrongful rejection of evidence or other error and if cases of surprise, malpractice or fraud are put on one side, it is essential to give effect to the rule that the verdict, regularly obtained, must not be disturbed without some insistent demand of justice. The discovery of fresh evidence in such circumstances could rarely, if ever, be a ground for a new trial unless certain well-known conditions are fulfilled. It must be reasonably clear that if the evidence had been available at the first trial and had been adduced, an opposite result would have been produced or, if it is not reasonably clear that it would have been produced, it must have been so highly likely as to make it unreasonable to suppose the contrary. Again, reasonable diligence must have been exercised to procure the evidence which the defeated party failed to adduce at the first trial."
oWEN JA IN CHIN V HALL (2009) SAID:
ReplyDelete57 Leaving aside the question of whether, in light of CDJ v VAJ, Chin needs to establish that his evidence is fresh and, if so, whether it possesses that quality, it is clear that the evidence would not have produced a different result had it been available before the master. I have already
(Page 18)
dealt with the letter from the registrar dated 11 June 2009. None of the other evidence which Chin seeks to adduce establishes that CIV 1131 of 2006 was not commenced on 10 February 2006. As the evidence the subject of the application would not have made a difference to the outcome of the master's decision had it been available before him, I would dismiss the application to adduce further evidence.
OWEN JA IN CHIN V HALL [2009] FURTHER SAID:
ReplyDelete52 The test formulated in Wollongong Corporation was thus taken to require that the evidence be 'fresh' (that is, it could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained for use at trial) and that had it been available at trial, it is reasonably clear that the opposite outcome would have ensued: see, for example, Australian Electrical Electronics Foundry & Engineering Union Western Australia Branch v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 145 at 161 - 162; Franich v Swannell (1993) 10 WAR 459 at 466.
53 In CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; (1998) 197 CLR 172 McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ in their joint judgment expressed the opinion that Wollongong Corporation had 'authoritatively laid down' the general law principles in relation to admitting fresh evidence on appeal [89]. Their Honours noted, however, that if a right of appeal is conferred by statute, the terms of the statutory grant determine the nature of the appeal and consequently the right, if any, to adduce further evidence [95]. Despite the admission of further evidence being a matter of statutory construction, the joint judgment noted that [111]:
The power to admit the further evidence exists to serve the demands of justice. Ordinarily, where it is alleged that the admission of new evidence requires a new trial, justice will not be served unless the [court] is satisfied that the further evidence would have produced a different result if it had been available at the trial. Without that condition being satisfied, it could seldom, if ever, be in the interests of justice to deprive the respondent of the benefit of the orders made by the trial judge and put that person to the expense, inconvenience and worry of a new trial.
54 I have reviewed the evidence which Chin seeks to adduce and it does not prove his contention. The high point of Chin's evidence is a letter written to him by a registrar of this court dated 11 June 2009 saying:
OWEN JA FURTHER CONTINUED AT PARA. 54 OF THE SAME CASE:
ReplyDeleteYou state you have a copy of the writ. In that case you will note it has 2 dates on it.
The first is 10 February 2006 with a notation that the fee was $654.20.
The second is the assessment which in its original form shows a date of 10 February 2006 and an assessment no of 201702. That assessment was cancelled after close of business on 10 February 2006 when it was realised by the Court that the cheque tendered for payment was for $654.00 and was therefore 20 cents short.
I assume that fact was forwarded to the plaintiffs' solicitors because on 16 February 2006 the correct amount was paid: $654.00 by credit card and 20 cents cash. The assessment stamp was altered to 16 February 2006 and the new assessment number 202483 entered on the altered stamp.
The assessment number is given on payment.
55 The letter does not establish that the action was not commenced on 10 February 2006. It indicates that the writ was filed on 10 February 2006 and, through an oversight, the filing fee paid was 20 cents short of the proper amount. The underpayment was brought to Spunter's solicitor's attention and the correct amount was paid. This does not mean that the writ was not filed until the correct fee was paid.
56 Order 4 r 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) provides that an action must be commenced by a writ of summons. Order 5 r 6 provides that a writ is issued upon its being sealed by the proper officer, and r 7 and 8 provide that a copy shall be left with the appropriate officer for filing. Regulation 6 of the Supreme Court (Fees) Regulations 2002 (WA) requires that fees be paid before documents are filed. Regulation 7, however, confers on the court and registrars a discretion to waive, reduce, refund or defer fees. Regulation 11 provides that an unpaid fee is a debt due to the State and may be recovered by action in a court of competent jurisdiction. It seems to me that on the proper interpretation of the Rules it does not necessarily follow that a document is deemed not to be 'filed' merely because, as a result of oversight, the correct fee has not been paid. This conclusion is supported by authority from other jurisdictions: see Davies v Lewis [2001] NTSC 105; (2001) 11 NTLR 81; Gower v Woodman Sales Pty Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 15.
LOOK AT THE TWO INVOICES: 202483 DATED 25.9.2009 AND 2021702 DATED 10.2.2006. ON THE LATTER OR EARLIER DATE 10.2.2006, THE FILING FEES WAS NOT PAID BY DAVID TAYLOR. THEREFORE CIV 1131 OF 2006 WAS NEVER FILED ON 10.2.2006. THAT IS A FACT. JUSTICE JENKINS ORDER THAT DAVID TAYLOR COMMENCED LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006 WAS NEVER COMMENCED. THERE IS NOT DISPUTE TO THIS. HOW CAN THIS BE NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AS THE LPCC PUT IT IN ITS LETTER TO MAURICE LAW DATED 4.8.2011.
ReplyDeleteLOOK AT THE DESCRIPTION OF BOTH THE INVOICES AGAIN. WHEN I SOUGHT AN ANSWER FROM REGISTRAR POWELL VOICING THE DISCREPANCY, THE LEARNED REGISTRAR FABRICATED THE NEW EVIDENCE BY CREATING THE RECEIPT NOS SCR 1441 FOR $654.00 FOR A CREDIT CARD PAYMENT AND DATED IT 16.2.2006 AND ANOTHER RECEIPT SCR 1442 FOR THE MISSING 20 CENTS AND DATED BOTH AS 16.2.2006. THIS ACT OF THE FALSIFICATION OF THE COURT RECORDS WAS DONE ON 16.2.2006. THEREAFTER REGISTRAR POWELL WROTE TO ME HIS LETTER OF FALSIFICATION OF THE COURT REFCORDS WHICH WAS REFUSED ADMISSION INTO THE COURT OF APPEAL BY OWEN JA IN CACV 107 OF 2008. THAT LETTER IS CONTAINED AT PAGE 136 OF THE YELLOW APPEAL BOOK IN THAT APPEAL CASE. THAT FRESH EVIDENCE MUST BE ADMITTED BECAUSE ITS ADMISSION WOULD HAVE CHANGED MY POSITION INTO THE SALVOUR OF THE TWO PROPERTIES OF THE LATE NANCY HALL. THAT IS THE ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE COURT RECORDS WHICH MUST BE SET ARIGHT.
ReplyDeleteI JUST REALIZED THAT WHENEVER YOU ASKED THE SUPREME COURT TO CHECK ITS RECORDS FOR INVOICE NO. 202483, THE DATE 19.5.2009 WILL VARY AS TO WHEN THAT INVOICE WAS REQUESTED. IF YOU REQUEST IT TODAY, THAT INVOICE WILL BE DATED 6.9.2011. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE DATE THAT INVOICE 202483 WAS FALSIFIED ON 16.2.2006. INVOICE 201702 IS A FICTION AND IS NON-EXISTENT IN THE COURT RECORDS. ITS A FABRICATED DOCUMENT BY DAVID TAYLOR WHICH STATES THAT BOTH THE SUM OF $654.00 AND THE 20 CENTS THAT WAS SHORT WAS PAID ON 10.2.2006. REGISTRAR POWELL WHEN TELLING THE UNTRUTHS TO COVER UP FOR DAVID TAYLOR SAID THAT BOTH SUMS WAS PAID ON 16.2.2006 TO COINCIDE WITH WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. THIS FRAUD HAS CAUSED ME TO LOSE MY INDEPENDENT PRACTICE AS A LAWYER AND AT THE SAME TIME IT HAS CAUSED ME TO LOSE NANCY CAVEAT'S CASE IN CIV 1142 OF 2005 WHEN I WAS HER SOLICITOR. THEREFORE I WANT TO BE COMPENSATED FOR THIS WRONG BY THE COURT OF APPEAL IN CACV 107 OF 2008. I HAVE THEREFORE MAKE AN APPLICATION FOR THE ERROR OF LAW APPARENT ON THE COURT RECORDS TO BE EFFACE ON 15.7.2011.
ReplyDeleteFirst, the essence of the action is fraud. As in all actions based on fraud, particulars of the fraud claimed must be exactly given and the allegations must be established by the strict proof which such a charge requires: Jonesco v Beard [1930] AC 298 at 301; McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (at 497).
ReplyDeleteSecondly, it must be shown, by the party asserting that the judgment was procured by fraud, that there has been a new discovery of something material, in the sense that fresh facts have been found which, by themselves or in combination with previously known facts, would provide a reason for setting aside the judgment: see Lord Selborne LC in Boswell v Coaks (No 2) (1894) 6 R 167 at 170, 174; 86 LT 365 at 366, 368; Cabassi v Vila [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 147; McDonald v McDonald [1965] HCA 45; (1965) 113 CLR 529 at 533; Everett v Ribbands (1946) 175 LT 143 at 145, 146; Birch v Birch [1902] P 130 at 136, 137-138; Ronald v Harper [1913] VicLawRp 80; [1913] VLR 311 at 318. This rule has an ancient lineage: see, eg, Shedden v Patrick (1854) 1 Macq 535 at 615, 622; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed, vol 26, par 560 at 285. It is based upon a number of grounds. There is a public interest in finality of litigation. Parties ought not, by proceeding to impugn a judgment, to be permitted to relitigate matters which were the subject of the earlier proceedings which gave rise to the judgment. Especially should they not be so permitted, if they move on nothing more than the evidence upon which they have previously failed. If they have evidence of fraud which may taint a judgment of the courts, they should not collude in such a consequence by refraining from raising their objection at the trial, thereby keeping the complaint in reserve. It is their responsibility to ensure that the taint of fraud is avoided and the integrity of the court’s process preserved.
Thirdly, mere suspicion of fraud, raised by fresh facts later discovered, will not be sufficient to secure relief: Birch v Birch (at 136, 139); McHarg v Woods Radio Pty Ltd (at 498); Ronald v Harper (at 318). The claimant must establish that the new facts are so evidenced and so material that it is reasonably probable that the action will succeed. This rule is founded squarely in the public interest in finality of public litigation and in upholding judgments duly entered at the termination of proceedings in the courts.
Error apparent on the Court Records:
ReplyDeleteThe error must be clear based on the appellate record and you will not be permitted to supplement the record with additional evidence or documents. Your arguments will be limited to referring to items/documents already present in the appellate record.
“An error cannot be said to be apparent on the fact of the record if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. An error apparent on the face of the record means an error which strikes the eye on merely looking at it and does not need long-drawn-out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions, such an error should not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest and clear that no Court would permit it to remain on record. If the view accepted by the Court in the original judgment is one of the possible views, the case cannot be said to be covered by an error apparent on the face of the record”.
ReplyDelete