I WANT THE JUSTICE SYSTEM TO DEAL WITH ME FAIRLY: I SHOULD NOT BE PERSECUTED FOR NO PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT. I WANT TO UPHOLD THE PUBLIC INTERESTS THAT THE COMMON PEOPLE GET FAIR LEGAL SERVICES
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
CHIEF JUSTICE PROMISE TO MAURICE TO INVESTIGATE THE COMPLAINT ON THE FALSIFICATIONS OF THE COURT RECORDS IN CIV 1131 OF 2006
Abbot CJ in R v. Burdett(1820) 4 B. & Ald. 95; 106 E.R. 873 quoted by Windeyer J in Jones v. Dunkel & Anor [1959] 101 CLR 298 at 319 said: “No person is to be required to explain or contradict, until enough has been proved to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, in the absence of explanation or contradiction; but when such proof has been given, and the nature of the case is such as to admit of explanation or contradiction, if the conclusion to which the proof tends be untrue, and the accused offers no explanation or contradiction; can human reason do otherwise than adopt the conclusion to which the proof tends ? The premises may lead more or less strongly to the conclusion, and care must be taken not to draw the conclusion hastily; but in matters that regard the conduct of men, the certainty of mathematical demonstration cannot be required or expected”
The above is in relation to my request in my letter dated 4.6.2009 to Registrar Powell to provide me and Maurice Law with the bank statement showing that $654.00 was indeed paid by the personal cheque of David Taylor for which the Receipt was given to David Taylor. This is the version of Registrar Powell to back up the story of David Taylor. However, David Taylor did not say the same story as Registrar Powell. The former said in his sworn statement dated 19.3.2007 that he paid $654.20 cents as the court fees for CIV 1131 of 2006 on 10.2.2006 whereas Registrar Powell gave a different story.
Both the letters of Registrar Powell dated 4.6.2009 and 11.6.2009 are given in the CACV 107 of 2008 Yellow Appeal Book filed by me with the Court of Appeal.
Windeyer J, pages 320 to 321, took it a little further and embraced the notion of “fear of exposure” on the part of theparty who fails to call the witness, quoting Wigmore on Evidence: “The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby elucidated, serves to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstances or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts unfavourable to the party”
Kitto J,at page 308 of the same case said: “It was right enough to point out in effect that the evidence given might be the more readily accepted because it had been left uncontradicted, and that the omission to call [Dunkel]as a witness could not properly be treated as supplying any gap which the evidence adduced for the plaintiff left untouched. But what should have been added . . . was that any inference favourable to the plaintiff for which there was ground in the evidence might be more confidently drawn when a person presumably able to put the true complexion on the facts relied on as the ground for the inference has not been called as a witness by the defendant and the evidence provides no sufficient explanation of his absence. The jury should at least have been told that it would be proper for them to conclude that if [Dunkel] had gone into the witness-box his evidence would not have assisted the defendants by throwing doubt on the correctness of the inference which . . . . I consider was open on the plaintiff’s evidence.”
Abbot CJ in R v. Burdett(1820) 4 B. & Ald. 95; 106 E.R. 873 quoted by Windeyer J in Jones v. Dunkel & Anor [1959] 101 CLR 298 at 319 said:
ReplyDelete“No person is to be required to explain or contradict, until enough has been proved to warrant a reasonable and just conclusion against him, in the absence of explanation or contradiction; but when such proof has been given, and the nature of the case is such as to admit of explanation or contradiction, if the conclusion to which the proof tends be untrue, and the accused offers no explanation or contradiction; can human reason do otherwise than adopt the conclusion to which the proof tends ? The premises may lead more or less
strongly to the conclusion, and care must be taken not to draw the conclusion hastily; but in matters that regard the conduct of men, the certainty of mathematical demonstration cannot be required or expected”
The above is in relation to my request in my letter dated 4.6.2009 to Registrar Powell to provide me and Maurice Law with the bank statement showing that $654.00 was indeed paid by the personal cheque of David Taylor for which the Receipt was given to David Taylor. This is the version of Registrar Powell to back up the story of David Taylor. However, David Taylor did not say the same story as Registrar Powell. The former said in his sworn statement dated 19.3.2007 that he paid $654.20 cents as the court fees for CIV 1131 of 2006 on 10.2.2006 whereas Registrar Powell gave a different story.
ReplyDeleteBoth the letters of Registrar Powell dated 4.6.2009 and 11.6.2009 are given in the CACV 107 of 2008 Yellow Appeal Book filed by me with the Court of Appeal.
ReplyDeleteWindeyer J, pages 320 to 321, took it a little further and embraced the notion of “fear of exposure” on the part of theparty who fails to call the witness, quoting Wigmore on Evidence:
ReplyDelete“The failure to bring before the tribunal some circumstance, document, or witness, when either the party himself or his opponent claims that the facts would thereby elucidated, serves
to indicate, as the most natural inference, that the party fears to do so, and this fear is some evidence that the circumstances or document or witness, if brought, would have exposed facts
unfavourable to the party”
Kitto J,at page 308 of the same case said:
ReplyDelete“It was right enough to point out in effect that the evidence given might be the more readily accepted because it had been left uncontradicted, and that the omission to call [Dunkel]as a witness could not properly be treated as supplying any gap which the evidence adduced for the plaintiff left untouched. But
what should have been added . . . was that any inference favourable to the plaintiff for which there was ground in the evidence might be more confidently drawn when a person presumably able to put the true complexion on the facts relied
on as the ground for the inference has not been called as a witness by the defendant and the evidence provides no sufficient explanation of his absence. The jury should at least have been
told that it would be proper for them to conclude that if [Dunkel] had gone into the witness-box his evidence would not have assisted the defendants by throwing doubt on the correctness of the inference which . . . . I consider was open on the plaintiff’s evidence.”