TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS IN CIV 1689 OF 2011 BEFORE HIS HONOUR MURRAY J

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THE SUPREME COURT OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

1689 of 2011

THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT

and

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

MURRAY J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON MONDAY, 29 AUGUST 2011, AT 10.30 AM

(In Chambers)

MS L.A. EDDY appeared for the plaintiff.

The defendant appeared in person.

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(s&c)

THE ASSOCIATE:   In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, matter CIV 1689 of 2011, The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and Nicholas Chin.

MURRAY J:   Ms Eddy?

EDDY, MS:   May it please the court.  I appear on behalf of the applicant.

MURRAY J:   Thank you, Ms Eddy.  Mr Chin, you are appearing for yourself this morning?

CHIN, MR:   Yes, sir.

MURRAY J:   Thank you.  Ms Eddy, what has happened to all those papers?  They are all down there.  I see, okay.  Have you got volume 1?  Thank you very much.  What I have done, Ms Eddy, is read the originating motion, the application, I have read your outline and then there is a useful document that is an aide‑memoire there that helps to focus on particular aspects, I have read Mr Chin's outline, the authorities to which you have referred and I have read - is it Ms Loh's affidavit?  Yes?  I'm sorry.  It's my ignorance not being able to say whether the deponent was male or female, but I have read the affidavit and I have not gone into detail in relation to the exhibited documents, so whatever you would like to add to all that I would be happy to hear.

EDDY, MS:   Certainly, your Honour.  It would seem that the principles of law are not in dispute at all, so I had anticipated, your Honour, merely taking you through the references referred to in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the affidavit so that you can see the exhibited material that is referred to there.

      In essence, though, the aide‑memoire which was produced to assist your Honour, the affidavit is described in terms of groups or types of proceedings, and then the aide‑memoire attempts to put them in chronological order so that one can see what decision is being sought to be reviewed in each of the subsequent matters and so using that document, together with the annexures to the affidavit material, was really what I had intended to take your Honour through to highlight what the applicant says shows that the respondent has commenced vexatious proceedings and that in the court's discretion it ought to make both the orders sought.

MURRAY J:   Thank you.  The application, as I have understood it, relies on ‑ ‑ ‑

EDDY, MS:   There are two orders sought, effectively, your Honour.

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MURRAY J:   Yes, there are two orders.  No, that's fine.  I have understood that.  That wasn't what I was going to take you to.  Yes, the first order is simply the order in general terms and then the other focuses specifically upon proceedings which Mr Chin has in course of being dealt with now.

EDDY, MS:   They are adjourned sine die, those proceedings.

MURRAY J:   Yes, I'm sorry.  They have not been finally disposed of is a better way to put that.

EDDY, MS:   They haven't been finally disposed of.  There certainly are other proceedings.

MURRAY J:   I have noticed that one of the things that Mr Chin expresses concern about is more active proceedings which he has in the District Court.  Did you see that?

EDDY, MS:   It wasn't entirely clear.  There do seem to be some proceedings again to do with the caveats whereby Ms Gannaway has applied to have caveats removed but I had understood they were completed.

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MURRAY J:   You may be right. 

EDDY, MS:   There is also the disciplinary proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal, which is the VR 87 of 2009 and those proceedings are currently on foot and it may well be ‑ ‑ ‑ 

MURRAY J:   The material that had caught my eye was - no, I see.  It was in proceedings that are given the number VR 87 of 2009.  The case is currently before Judge Sharp, the deputy president of SAT. 

EDDY, MS:   Yes.  That hasn't been determined yet.

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   And that is not a proceeding that was instituted by Mr Chin, so that wouldn't be affected by either of the orders proposed.

MURRAY J:   No.

EDDY, MS:   It could be, however, that if this court considers that he ought to have the ability to appeal that proceeding, if he's unhappy with the tribunal's decision, that we could carve out from order 1 an ability to appeal that decision only, in accordance with the rules that would allow an appeal from an error of law.

      The problem is of course that in the past, as you will see as I take you through the documents, your Honour, Mr Chin has shown a very tenacious approach ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   ‑ ‑ ‑ and is not willing to accept decisions that go against him on appeal; and he then, as you will see when I take you through in relation to the earlier decision which was the decision of the legal practice committee and not the disciplinary committee, Legal Practice Board, to put conditions on his licence he did appeal that but he has also sought to attack it a number of times in collateral proceedings and in the wrong courts; certiorari, mandamus et cetera.

      He has also sought to attack an interlocutory decision in this later disciplinary proceedings, VR 87 of 2009, again a number of times.  So this interlocutory decision indicating that res judicata didn't apply to the disciplinary proceedings, Mr Chin again has shown this tenacious unwillingness to accept decisions made, so we would submit that great care ought to be taken as to what should be carved out of order 1, if anything, subject to your Honour being satisfied the orders are appropriate of course; because remember even if order 1 is in place, he

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can obtain leave from the court if he can show the court

that it's a proper proceeding and so that it may well be the order wouldn't affect VR 87 of 2009 being concluded.

      If he then had a legitimate right to appeal, he would simply have to show a judge that and that would save the courts having to go through, with respect, what the applicant says.  An inordinate amount of resources have been spent in relation to proceedings disputing and seeking to agitate again and again and again earlier decisions; for example, the earlier State Administrative Tribunal proceedings.

      Your Honour, if one looks just simply at the aide‑memoire and through the material I will take you to, the first of the State Administrative Tribunal is 107 of 2008 and that was the review of the decision of the board to impose the conditions on the respondent's licence.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   You then see that that's taken to the Court of Appeal and the date is 3/11/2008, CACV 105 of 2008.  That's appeal of that State Administrative Tribunal decision in 107 of 2008.  You then see that there's a High Court application on 28/8/2009 where there's an application for special leave against the decision of the Court of Appeal.

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   That would ordinarily be what you would expect to be the run of the matter and that should be the end of it.  It isn't in this instance, however.  What one sees then is that in ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   On 3 May 2010. 

EDDY, MS:   Before that.

MURRAY J:   Before that?

EDDY, MS:   6/1/2010 we have got CIV 1019 of 2010, an application for certiorari in relation to VR 107 of 2008, also the 87 of 2009.

MURRAY J:   Where does that appear in the ‑ ‑ ‑

EDDY, MS:   There's an entry 6th of the 1st ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   I see, right at the bottom of that page.

EDDY, MS:   Yes; and in fact above that you will see another application for certiorari in relation to 87 of 2009, this is his interlocutory decision in the current proceedings in the tribunal; so there's an attempt to, despite the fact that it has gone through to the High

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Court, relitigate it in the Supreme Court. 

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   Again, the application for mandamus in May 2010.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   Again it seems, it's difficult to tell but this is a case which is often the case in these sorts of proceedings where a respondent has an honest belief that their position has not been vindicated and if they keep litigating somehow their position will be litigated, but that any decision that is made that doesn't suit his perception of events or of what should have been the answer, he has extreme difficulty accepting and so he just keeps trying.

      He has the legal knowledge to know that it's completely inappropriate to commence certiorari proceedings or mandamus proceedings after a matter has been appealed to the High Court.  That doesn't stop him.  You also see that's just one aspect of which he is litigating and the amount of time and resources that this takes of the court and where private litigants are concerned, the expenses involved in them.

      Your Honour, the proceedings in relation to the dispute between the respondent and Mr Thies is an example.  I will take you through the proceedings, the materials, but what was in dispute was a sum of $6000, your Honour, and yet that dispute, there is a claim in the Magistrates Court for recovery of a debt and that's a claim against the respondent.  That's concluded by consent orders and that's referred to you will see, your Honour, in the second line of the first page of the affidavit, reference to FR 417 of 2007.

      After that the respondent commences FR 944 of 2007, seeking to recover part of the settlement sum and this is the commencements of these proceedings whereby it's alleged that the consent orders were obtained by duress and therefore should be invalidated.  This goes on so that the decision of the magistrate to dismiss proceedings 944 of 2007 as effectively an abuse of process because the proceedings had been determined by the Magistrate's proceedings 417 of 2007 by consent orders and that another Magistrate's proceeding was not able to do anything in relation to that.

      That decision is appealed to the District Court and that's the third line on the first page, so appeal 6 of 2008 is an appeal to the District Court in relation to FR 944 of 2007 and that's, your Honour, the second Magistrates Court proceedings relitigating what was dealt

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with by consent, although it's alleged by the respondent that the basis is that the consent order was obtained by duress. 

      We follow that through and the District Court appeal decision is part of the application for review in CIV 1903 of 2008, that's the third line down on the second page of the aide-memoire. 

MURRAY J:   That application ‑ ‑ ‑

EDDY, MS:   This is all about this dispute originally over $6000 between the respondent and Mr Thies.  I think the respondent's son is also involved in these proceedings but the respondent's son certainly has not litigated in the way that the respondent has.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

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EDDY, MS:   So he seeks to review the original Magistrates Court, FR 944 of 2007, decision, "I can't do this because it has already been determined by this court."  Also a review of the consent orders in FR 417 of 2007 and also a review of the District Court appeal in appeal 6 of 2008. 

MURRAY J:   The ‑ ‑ ‑

EDDY, MS:   That decision - I apologise, your Honour.  Were you going to say something?

MURRAY J:   Yes.  No; that's all right.  It's a useful document, the aide‑memoire, read together with the way in which the affidavit of Ms Loh breaks the events up under general headings and makes it possible to follow it through, I can see that, and I will have to spend some time I think reviewing all of this material and making sure that I understand where it's going and what it is about it that is said to give rise to the application of the act, because, as I have understood it, the application is based upon both limbs of section 4 subsection (1) of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act; in other words, what is said to look at is:  look at the past conduct and you will find a series of proceedings which might have had or originally had elements of understandable dispute to be resolved but have been pursued and pursued and pursued in different forums and in different forms despite the fact, as I have understood the submission you are making, the substantive issue has long since been determined. 

      What's being said then is this, isn't it:  that conduct of proceedings in that way in the past over a period of years demonstrates that Mr Chin is likely to conduct himself in relation to any dispute which arises in which he takes an interest or has an interest in the same way in the future? 

EDDY, MS:   That is the submission of the applicant.  It's not only the relitigation of matters which I have taken you through part of, your Honour.  I think it's also the way that the respondent will commence and pursue legal proceedings with no reasonable ground.  So not only does he relitigate but he time and time again has proceedings which - the courts are clearly saying over and over again, "There's no reasonable ground, there's no reasonable prospect, there's nothing here.  It's manifestly hopeless." 

      Those are the references that are referred in paragraph 15 and the third matter - so it's not just relitigation.  It's not just matters that have no prospect of success.  It's the way that the respondent does it as well and you will find throughout the materials and I have referred to some of them - the references here, your Honour - if your Honour goes simply to these references, they encapsulate the applicant's argument beautifully. 

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      It is said time and time again by the court that the respondent's submissions and applications are confused, incomprehensible.  They show a willingness to make offensive, scandalous and serious allegations without foundation.  So this on top of this relitigation, on top of a willingness to institute proceedings without any prospect of success, manifestly hopeless proceedings, shows that the respondent is a person who needs to be made the subject of this order. 

      That is an onerous restriction on his rights but he has shown time and time again that he needs it and that where he does have a proper cause of action, he will be able to proceed with that because he will be able to show a judge that he has one, but in the past he simply doesn't. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.  In the light of that submission, are you able to identify for me the particular aspects of the definition of vexatious proceedings upon which the applicant relies?  I think I can identify that you are relying upon paragraph (a).  I'm not sure that I have a grasp of what in the context of this legislation is meant by an abuse of the process of the court; there's that. 

      Is it intended to place reliance upon any aspect of paragraph (b) or is it otherwise intended to rely upon specifically paragraph (c) of the definition and with elements of paragraph (d) in relation to the context of some of the processes and the observations that are made and the imputations that are cast upon the motivations of judicial officers and others involved in the litigation?

EDDY, MS:   The applicant's main grounds are (a) and (c).  Those we say are the strongest matters.  The other matters both go to - it's very unclear whether there's any subjective intent to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment because it does seem that the flavour of the proceedings is this tenacious belief that somehow if he litigates often enough, his view of the world will be shown to be true and anyone who makes a decision contrary to his view of the world must necessarily be biased, must have altered documents, must have done all sorts of things.  It's not clear.  So we don't rely on any subjective intent to harass or annoy. 

      There is one reference in one of the transcripts where the respondent is making submissions and effectively saying, "I'm never going to stop doing this.  I'm going to keep on going and going," but I'm not sure that's clear enough to say there's a real intent.  So we don't rely on that as such.  We do rely - that the proceedings are conducted in a manner so as to harass or cause delay or detriment because so many scandalous things are within these proceedings. 

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      We also rely on that as a factor in the discretion because of course even if we make out that the respondent has commenced vexatious proceedings, your Honour

has to be satisfied in your discretion such an onerous order should be made.

MURRAY J:   I want to come back to that in just a second.  Can I ask you whether there's any authority which deals specifically with what is meant by the term "an abuse of the process of the court" in the context of this legislation?  Ordinarily, Ms Eddy, you would look to litigation being characterised as involving an abuse of process if it was, although potentially justifiable, use of the processes of the court for an extraneous or collateral purpose. 

      You are familiar I am sure with the - I can't remember just for the moment the names of the High Court decisions but there are a number of them which make abundantly clear that even though you may have justification for use of the process, it will be struck down if your motivation is a collateral purpose which is not the proper object of the availability of the process employed.  Are you content with a meaning like that in the context of this legislation?

EDDY, MS:   Your Honour, those themes are very much the themes that are referred in the context of this legislation in Attorney-General v Michael, the 2005 decision of the Western Australian Supreme Court, 202, also in Granich Partners and Yap which is an earlier decision, a 2003 decision of the Western Australian Supreme Court, 2006, and in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride and Ors, another Western Australian decision, 2004, 177. 

      These all look at what is an abuse of process within the context of this legislation and they are using exactly that language, your Honour, as has been highlighted in the submissions at paragraph 7, references to both Michael and Granich:

Proceedings may be an abuse of process if they are instituted or pursued without reasonable ground by objective standard regardless of any subjective intention, motive or state of mind.

      That's the theme your Honour adverting to.  Further, Granich confirms, as outlined in paragraph 9, that the definition even in (d) might be vexatious regardless of personal intention, motive or state of mind.  That's proceedings conducted in a manner set out to harass or annoy.  So that one also doesn't necessarily need subjective intent.

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      At paragraph 10 I think that's a clear reliance on the High Court authorities, it's a clear case of an abuse of process and vexatious proceedings where there's further or collateral attempts to challenge a final decision of a court binding on the party - Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Bride is referred and relied on in paragraph 11 there to emphasise that you don't need to show the plaintiff has any ulterior motive, as long as it emerges that the effect of bringing the proceedings is to relitigate an issue which has previously been conclusively determined. 

      Helpfully Commonwealth does also talk about the idea that proceedings instituted without reasonable grounds including claims with unintelligible pleadings, misconceived or hopeless appeals, appeals without any lack of basis and proceedings with no prospect of success - so all the same sorts of themes. 

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MURRAY J:   You see, that I would have thought is a general description of what's involved in paragraph (c).

EDDY, MS:   It seems that, yes, instituted or pursued without reasonable ground.  There looks like a fair bit of overlap. 

MURRAY J:   What this litigation is directing itself to is for the courts and other litigants to have the capacity to protect themselves from either repetitive behaviour which is not genuinely motivated towards achieving the legitimate end of the processes that are employed, or a form of stalking, if you like, or in other words done with the intention to intimidate or annoy for some other purpose, or simply without any reasonable prospect of success and that probably covers it reasonably, I would have thought.

EDDY, MS:   It certainly seems there's room for a fair bit of overlap between the subparagraphs of the definition of "vexatious proceedings" and in the past most of the people, in fact I would say all of the people who have been made subject to an order under this legislation in Western Australia, at least since the current version of the act came out, have all been people who have not been found to have any subjective mala fides. 

      They have all been people who have just been tenacious, determined people who cannot accept that a matter that they believe is correct has been finally determined in the court and that character exposes the courts and other litigants to an incredible amount of resources and costs because of that tenaciousness, that idea that, "I must be right.  Anyone who says I'm not right must therefore be wrong.  As long as I keep trying, I will be able to validate my position one day," with a refusal to accept there is a simple appeal process which has only a limited number of steps and that's the end of it. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, I understand the submission and that brings me back then to the next point which was rattling around in my mind as I read the papers that I said I was going to come back to a minute ago and that is your reference to the discretionary judgment involved and the decision whether or not to make an order.

      I would welcome reference to any authorities dealing with that because at first reading it seems to me that the scheme of the act generally and the way in which section 4 is formulated in particular would suggest that if the court comes to the conclusions which are set out in paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), the use of the word "may" in relation to the forms of order is an empowering rather than a discretionary "may" and I would find it hard to conceive of a case where although (a) and/or (b) were established in the mind of the court, it would say nonetheless let him go

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on and don't make an order.

EDDY, MS:   I would submit that this legislation - it is open to read it that the only discretion is whether you make the order, (c) or (d), not whether you make an order at all but the previous decisions that have looked at this have all referred to this idea that you have to be wary of what an extreme remedy it is and therefore you should take into account the person's rights as well as the rights of society, of the other litigants as well as the court resources and they do tend to infer - it's not entirely clear, your Honour.  They tend to infer that there is a discretion at large, even if the requirements are satisfied.

MURRAY J:   The person who is established to be, if I can use the general term, "a vexatious litigant" isn't regarded by the act as having a right to continue to behave vexatiously. 

EDDY, MS:   I think it's a difficult point, your Honour, in that it isn't entirely clear and I don't think that it has been addressed in any of the previous judgments.  They certainly all refer to this idea of discretion and talking about we first have to be satisfied whether it meets the test and then we have to look at this discretion, and they don't clearly identify that the discretion is only as to what order to make; and, with respect, I take your Honour's point and it's a good one that on the language it may well be that that is the only discretion, which of the orders, but we haven't presented the case that way because earlier authorities suggest this wider discretion.

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   It may be that a person who has conducted a series of litigation has in the past commenced vexatious proceedings but by something else that has happened over time, perhaps by the lapse of time since they have done anything, it may be that the court may be satisfied that it would nonetheless not be appropriate to make an order because there's no ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   Yes, all right.

EDDY, MS:   ‑ ‑ ‑ suggestion that anything more would be done; like if it's a subject matter and only one subject matter and it has been completely concluded and the litigant has given up and it has been some years perhaps. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, I understand.

EDDY, MS:   That might be this idea that perhaps the legislation doesn't require an order made in that case or maybe it says only any existing proceedings should be stayed and otherwise they should be left alone.  In this

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case, we say that the number of matters which have been the subject of these multiple proceedings, plus what can be observed if one looks at the respondent's blogspot which he referred to in his submissions, that in fact he is still litigating; and that's where litigation is commenced by someone else but he's resisting litigation in relation to application to have caveat removed on the same sorts of grounds that were canvassed in that group of proceedings in relation to his solicitor's lien proceedings.

      That alleged lien resulted in the caveat and then there has been various applications in relation to that caveat by the person whose property it is and if one sees what purports to be the transcript of proceedings in August 2011, that the respondent is still making the same submissions that he has made in the proceedings that have already been concluded, albeit, as I said, it's an application by the land owner and not by the respondent.

      The way he responds to it is a relevant fact there; not that he is still instituting proceedings but that he's still defending them on the same grounds.  He still doesn't accept that the court has determined that he didn't have a caveatable interest based on that solicitor's lien.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   We say that the number of actions, the recency of the actions even in the affidavit which go up to December 2010 and by having regard to, as I say, the blogspot referred to in the respondent's submissions, as well as the way and the degree of scandalous nature that shows (a) an ability to assert things without any foundation of fact and it's done time and time again, it's even done in these submissions, these assertions without any ground or explained basis.  It shows a continued tenacious thought pattern which we would submit shows a real likelihood of continued litigation of anything that doesn't match that thought pattern.

      I have been talking a bit longer than I had anticipated, your Honour.  I was going to take you through the references in the submissions, if you like, but I have effectively summarised them.  Would you like me to take you through them?

MURRAY J:   These where you put them in 14, 15 and 16 you mean? 

EDDY, MS:   Yes.

MURRAY J:   I don't see the point really, Ms Eddy, unless there is something particularly you wanted to draw attention to.  I wanted to get a clear understanding of the basis upon which you are proceeding and what you thought about where it all fitted and how it all fitted into the

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framework of the legislation so I could see where the application was coming from. 

      I don't think there's any substitute for my settling down and reading and understanding the objective facts of the litigation and the various steps in the litigation which has been undertaken.

EDDY, MS:   It may assist your Honour - when I prepared the references - to use the aide-memoire as well to see the document that you're referred to, say for example in paragraph 14.  In fact there's one slightly obscure thing in paragraph 14.  I refer to page 414 and that reference is to guide your Honour to look at the documents and oral submissions being made in the State Administrative Tribunal and as you go on to that following document you will see that there are a number of documents that are annexed or put in this bundle of documents for the State Administrative Tribunal which are in fact documents from other proceedings.

      So he has in there affidavits from other proceedings and originating motions from other proceedings, so the point there was relying on material in other proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal; not that those proceedings in themselves were really to get anything, it's his tendency to include all these other documents.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   The others are more patently - if one has regard using the aide-memoire to showing you where these are proceedings that are relitigating already determined matters and that you can look at the litigation and the way that it's phrased if you look at those references and you will see then effectively supporting the aide-memoire, those references.

      In 15, they're all references to decisions where the court has found no reasonable ground, manifestly hopeless, that sort of thing. 

MURRAY J:   But the references to particular documentation in your outline, for example the reference to page 414, does not directly cross-reference itself to the aide‑memoire, although much of that I noticed does. 

EDDY, MS:   I think 414, I just pointed that one out because that's the only unusual one that I had put in there merely to show the types of documents that were being filed.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   The other ones should cross-reference with the aide-memoire.  Basically that's the evidence to show how

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the aide-memoire works. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, I follow. 

EDDY, MS:   So for example, the reference to 702(a) to 799 is in fact the CIV 1604 of 10, which on the aide-memoire 1604 of 10 was an application for mandamus in relation to the SAT decision in VR 107 of 2008 and CIV 109 of 2010, and of course VR 107 of 2008 has already been the subject of proceedings at least two other times.

MURRAY J:   Yes, right. 

EDDY, MS:   So it's intended to be read that way.  Paragraph 15 is at times pinpointing statements by courts as to the fact there is no reasonable grounds when they have decided - making decisions, but in some of them I have just referred to the whole of the decision and I can give your Honour in fact the pinpoint now, because I think that would assist, of where the comments are.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   If your Honour would give me that liberty. 

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   I have referred to 413, 676.  There should be a reference to 677 as well. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   678, 700.  That reference to 2190 and 2205, the relevant part is at 2202 to 03. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   The next reference, the relevant part is 2884 to 5. 

MURRAY J:   I follow.

EDDY, MS:   The next reference, there's a single page, 3168.

MURRAY J:   Thank you. 

EDDY, MS:   The next one it's 3281 and 3282.

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   The last one, 3412. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

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EDDY, MS:   Then paragraph 16 was attempting to show

your Honour this confusing, incomprehensible willingness to make offensive, scandalous and serious allegations; so there are some pinpoint references to where courts are commenting on that, and there are also some references to the material itself so that your Honour can review that for yourself. 

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

EDDY, MS:   There should be two further references, I apologise, following the last one there, 3281.  There should be 3279 and 3281.

MURRAY J:   And 328?

EDDY, MS:   1. 

MURRAY J:   You have got 3281 there.

EDDY, MS:   Have I?  There you are.  Sorry, your Honour. 

MURRAY J:   So there's just one additional one, a reference to 3279?

EDDY, MS:   Yes.  There are then only a number of pinpoint references at paragraphs 25 and 26.  25, that's a reference to that transcript I mentioned before where the respondent states in making submissions what it is submitted is express, an implicit intention to never stop until he achieves what he considers is the correct outcome; and at 26, that's a reference to the respondent's willingness to blatantly ignore orders of the court, it is submitted. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, thank you. 

EDDY, MS:   That it seemed to me was the most helpful material.  Of course, one gets a flavour by simply flicking through the documents both as to the way the documents are worded and as to the themes coming up time and time and time again. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   Unless I can assist you further, those are the submissions for the applicant, your Honour.

MURRAY J:   I think I have come to grips with it.  Thank you very much, Ms Eddy.  Yes, Mr Chin, what would you like to tell me?  Yes, Mr Chin?

CHIN, MR:   Sir, it pains me very much to cast aspersions on the character of any of the judges that have gone through my case, but, your Honour, there is only one version of the truth.  There cannot be two versions of the truth. 

29/8/11                EDDY, MS                        17

      I would like to delve slightly into the philosophy of what is truth and what is untruth, what is real and what is unreal.  Something which is real is good; something that is untrue, is false, is evil, is bad.  Someone who is brave is good; someone who is a coward is bad, your Honour.

      I have been admitted as a barrister and solicitor.  I have tried to defend the truth.  I have tried to become a good person, but I have been destroyed and the destruction is continuing because the judges are not willing to see the truth.  They are not willing to let me speak the truth.  They want me to distort the truth.  Your Honour, if you can tell me how to distort the truth so that I can defend myself, I'm willing to do so so that I wouldn't have to offend anyone, your Honour.  It pains me very much to offend someone and I would not do it, I wouldn't do it but I have to speak the truth. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        18

      The epitome of justice is a fair trial, which I know your Honour is giving me, and for the presiding judge to do justice according to law.  I must have a fair trial and justice must be done in accordance with the law.  If justice is not done in accordance with the law, then I do not have a fair trial.  I do not have justice. 

      These are the twin pillars of justice.  One would never tire of stressing this point.  This is what the rule of law is all about and if a justice were not to upheld (sic) the epitome of justice by giving me a fair trial and do justice in accordance with the law, then he is not a judge but he's a transgressor.  I'm sorry to say this, your Honour.  For there to be a fair trial the presiding judge must be fair-minded and he must administer justice according to law.  If the judge does not do that, then justice has failed.  There will be injustice. 

      The judge must be impartial himself and in his court and he must manifest an appearance of impartiality for justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.  As Lord Galvin observed:

The judge who gives the right judgment while appearing not to do so, maybe tries - blessed in heaven but on earth he is no use at all -

Patrick Galvin, The Judge, at page 3.  The judge who does not appear to be fair, who does not appear to be impartial is useless to the judicial process.  Even though he has given the right judgment, the judge who does not appear to be fair at the hearing lives behind a sense of injustice to the losing party who will feel that he has been singled out by the judge's show of impartiality, such a judge's useless prejudicial process and gives a bad name to the courts of his country. 

Martin Luther once said, "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."  This means that although we may come from..........empowerment for others, we reaffirm and protect our own.

      This is quoted form the former president of the Bar Council Ms Ambiga Sreenevasan when she was awarded the Secretary of State award for International Women of Courage on 11 March 2009 by the first lady, Michelle Obama, and the USA secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. 

      Your Honour, the crux of the issue of all my litigation has never solved at all.  The crux has never been decided by any justices so far.  They were good justices.  They were justices that was willing to do justice but they came and gone before they are able to do justice.  They were at the initial stage and I think they

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        19

11.18

were shooed away; examples are like Barker J; examples are like Hasluck J. 

      These people I (indistinct) with the failings to do real justice but a widow, a doctor from Malaysia, educated in England, daughter of a millionaire, who was (indistinct) in her younger days by her millionaire father, Chan Nguyen, whose home is the present king's place - she is Dr Chan Kheng Su. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        20

      She is a doctor who was married to her husband who is a doctor and who has got two sons and she broke up with her husband, she had a successful practice in Malaysia.  She came over to Australia, migrated here and married a Jewish man, the old man, 90‑year‑old, a billionaire, and she, when the husband died, they put her in prison. 

      They put her in prison and she was bailed out and she came out.  She was successfully defended and then begin a series of plundering and pillaging of her wealth and I was unfortunate at the time when I just came out as a lawyer and she approached me and asked me to help her, and she was in the midst of being plundered by a former president of the WA Law Society and that's how it all began.  That's how I was restricted in my freedom to practise as a lawyer by an initiative to the law society and I fought this case, I won this case.  I got - I achieve a consent judgment by Steytler J. 

      Steytler J is now the parliamentary inspector and he said, "I have no power to do anything."  He knows his consent judgment was to set aside the decision of Judge Eckert, the first decision of the tribunal, of the State Administrative Tribunal which made a finding that I was guilty, not of professional misconduct, not of unsatisfactory conduct but of a deficiency in my professional knowledge.

      As a result a restriction was imposed upon me, preventing me from practising, getting me to work somewhere else but I couldn't find a place where I can work, because they were restricting me and that's why I was fighting.  That's why I discovered that there was a pseudo board.  The regulator has got 52 members.  After 52 members, four members can at any time seek to and make a decision and the four members must be appointed by minutes of the majority members, but my barrister was not able to get the minute validating the four members who sat and imposed restriction on me.

      The LPCC is acting at the behest of someone.  The LPCC is making decisions which it has got no right to make.  The LPCC is making decision that it has got no reason to make and as a result this decision, the dispute about the pseudo board, that issue has been closed; that issue is never raised in a judgment, that issue has never been decided, no action is ever taken. 

      The pseudo board has done the wrong thing to me and the pseudo board, after I've got my consent judgment to set aside the decision of Judge Eckert that was decided on 12 June 2006, the consent judgment was decided on 26 September 2007, the pseudo board keep coming and the pseudo board keep restraining me and I have no way to go.  I keep

on fighting.  No-one dare to decide the decision. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        21

11.24

MURRAY J:   Mr Chin, I have listened carefully to your general remarks and you're starting to now give it some specific focus.  Is it your view that the decision of the board you refer to as a "pseudo board" is a decision although by a quorum with power to act, should never have been made and you have been seeking to have the wider board look again at it?  Is that what you're saying to me?

CHIN, MR:   I am saying, your Honour, all my proceedings in court I have never - is never based on unreasonable grounds.  I have never been found frivolous and as a frivolous and vexatious litigant by any judges.  In fact, Magistrate Musk on 9 January 2008, or 7; 8, she decided that I am not a frivolous and vexatious litigant in FR 944 of 2007 and that is in the transcript.  I have never made any claim based on unreasonable grounds.

      After all these years, after all these years all the issues have been narrowed, all the issues have been decided.  There are only four issues that have never been decided.  If those issues are never decided, they are never contained in any written judgment, they have been brought up before the courts but there have been avoided and evaded and they are never in the written judgment and therefore only those four issues and the four issues is now very focused.

      I can pinpoint only one aspect, one fact for each case, for each of the four issues.  Point number 1 is David Taylor case, CACV 107 of 2008.  It is also CIV 1775 of 2008, that is the decision of Master Sanderson.  That decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 and the three judges, their Honours of the Court of Appeal has made a perfect decision.

There is only one glaring point of error; that is, it is contained - this error is contained in these few pages and I explain and cited all the judgment, all the word what was said by each of the judges.  I have appeal and have been to the High Court and it has come back and they have tried to enforce the judgment against me.  And I have been through Pullin JA and Newnes JA.  Every word that they have said that is related to this point, there's only one point.

      That point is Owen J said the fresh evidence of Registrar Powell in his letter dated 11 June 2009 found at page 136 of the yellow appeal book, that fresh evidence cannot be received by the Court of Appeal unless it has a reversal effect on the outcome of the Court of Appeal decision.  That evidence, that fresh evidence need to be accepted and I have made an application under CACV 107 of 2008 on 15 July 2011.  It has not been registered with the Court of Appeal, it is still pending registration.

      That application is to efface the error of law apparent on the court records and, your Honour, this is the

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        22

proof, the latest receipt from the registry of the Supreme Court.  David Powell (sic) never file CIV 1131 of 2006 on the 10th day of February, because he never pay the fees for CIV 1131 of 2006 on the 10th day of February 2006 but only three years later, 29 May 2009 when I wrote to inquire from the learned Registrar Powell and he falsified the court records. 

      This matter is the subject of the police investigation and the police, the fraud squad has decided that the chief justice must answer it first before the fraud squad moves in, according to protocol.  I have made this application for the effacement of the error apparent on the court records because this error, this error of law must be eradicated from the court records because 200 years later our students of law will still be studying and they will find an error in the court records that has been committed in the year 2008 and that has not been removed.

The other point, shall I submit this to - just for your Honour?

MURRAY J:   If you wish to, Mr Chin, yes.  Thank you, Mr Orderly.  Thank you. 

CHIN, MR:   The next point is Timothy Robin Thies.  It is not the $6000, your Honour, that I'm fighting for.  It is the public interest that I'm fighting for.  The public interest of me, my son, my wife and all other members of the public have been intimidated, have been bullied and have been asked to pay money that is never owed to Mr Timothy Robin Thies and the money and the demand keep on increasing by the week:  "If you don't pay, you increase by $3000; if you don't pay from zero it became $24,000." 

      This $24,000, anybody in my position would have settled it, your Honour, and will rush to settle it, but when we rush to settle it we make sure we inform Registrar Wilde of FR 417 of 2008.  Registrar Wilde is the court official who register the consent order achieved under duress between me and my son and Timothy Robin Thies, and the duress situation is known to Registrar Wilde because Registrar Wilde refused to attend to that consent judgment. 

      There was a delay of a few months and I keep pressing her and I keep writing letters to her and because of the duress settlement, that duress settlement is now involved and I went before Magistrate Musk.  Magistrate Musk was aware of everything and she says this is not a frivolous and vexatious litigation but my application was dismissed before Magistrate Musk.  I appealed to the District Court. It was dismissed by Herron C.  I went before Hasluck J.  Hasluck J saw everything and did justice to me and Hasluck J take the first step of the review process.

      The second stage of the review process was supposed

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        23

to be continued by his Honour Wayne Martin CJ.  Wayne Martin CJ, instead of doing justice placed a stultifying cross-order - a security costs order that I pay $20,000 otherwise the case cannot go on.  I went to appeal to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal refused to give me leave and that is the bar, and the reason for the Court of Appeal to give me leave cannot be understood.

      I went to the High Court.  It is natural for the High Court to refuse leave but the High Court gives a reason.  The High Court says that you must not put the cart before the horse; if you apply for a security costs order, you must apply before Hasluck J make the review decision.  Hasluck J has ordered that the matter be reviewed and it is up to Ken Martin J to implement it and Ken Martin J refused to implement it but stop it with a security costs order by putting the security costs order as the cart before the horse; we should have come earlier, but came later.

      So what happened was that the appeal court, when I appealed to the District Court before Herron C I have to pay $100.  So Registrar Wallace sent me an order out of the blue to tell me, "That hundred dollars that you pay when you appeal against Magistrate Musk's decision, that money is security costs." 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        24

      So they are trying to put the cart before the horse back again.  So I refuse to do that, so I lodge a complaint with Martino J; because the payment of the hundred dollars, at that time when I pay it there was no law requiring me to pay.  The law that requires me to pay security costs order before I appeal to the District Court was - has been repealed at that time, so is no more there, so there was - so it is not right that the hundred dollars that I paid inevitably, for whatever reason I was asked to pay, cannot be regarded as a security cost in order to regularise the whole procedure by putting the horse before the cart. 

      So on 15 April I make an application to the Court of Appeal in CACV 75 of 2010.  So that application is awaiting approval and I have a copy of it, your Honour.  Do you want it?

MURRAY J:   Yes.  I think that's already before me.

CHIN, MR:   Yes. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, that's already before me, isn't it?

CHIN, MR:   You have it?

MURRAY J:   Yes.  It's an annexure to the affidavit. 

CHIN, MR:   No.  That is a different one.  That one was CACV 107. 

MURRAY J:   No.  That's CACV ‑ ‑ ‑

CHIN, MR:   107.

MURRAY J:   - - - 75 of ‑ ‑ ‑

CHIN, MR:   CACV 75 is the Timothy Thies case.

MURRAY J:   75 of 2010?

CHIN, MR:   Yes.  You have a copy of my application; to erase the error apparent on the court records. 

MURRAY J:   I believe so; 3192 to 3282. 

CHIN, MR:   This, your Honour, happens only on 15 July 2011 and all these documents are prepared well before that time.  This application contains 90 pages, your Honour.  I just gave you the first few pages. 

MURRAY J:   I will get Mr Orderly to make copies of that, Mr Chin. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        25

11.44

CHIN, MR:   Your Honour, you want to make the whole set - I have got the whole set here, 90 pages. 

MURRAY J:   No.  That's all right.  Thank you.  The documents that you have shown me were - yes; yes, we will get him to make a copy of that.  Yes, you go on?

CHIN, MR:   90 pages. 

MURRAY J:   I don't need the 90 pages.  I just need your application and your affidavit.  That's what you are relying upon.  You don't need all the supporting material. 

CHIN, MR:   No.  These are filed with the court but there is no numbering yet.  It has not been registered yet, but this application for the Timothy Robin Thies case consists of 90 pages.  Those pages are only the beginning pages. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, all right.  It's impossible for me to copy 90 pages, Mr Chin.  If you had wanted me to have access to those - have you filed them or not?

CHIN, MR:   I have. 

MURRAY J:   You have.  All right.  I will get my associate to dig them out in due course. 

CHIN, MR:   Okay.  The next point is the consent order, your Honour.  The third point is the consent order. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

CHIN, MR:   The consent order of Steytler J in CACV 43 of 2007.  The regulator surrendered to me in that case and therefore will reach a consent order.  The terms of the consent order is that Judge Eckert's decision that I'm deficient in my professional knowledge be set aside. 

      That didn't happen because the pseudo board came again and the pseudo board again reinforced the condition on me.  The pseudo board - and I was with counsel; and the pseudo board was again unable to prove that it has got the majority consent of the full board.  The pseudo board acted improperly, without authority and I appeal against that decision before Chaney J in VR 107 of 2008. 

      If that case was heard by Barker J everything will be okay but Chaney J heard the case and Chaney J refused to decide on the pseudo board issue.  Chaney J again reinforced the condition on me, restrict my independent practice, and that keeps me fighting.  I appeal against Chaney J's decision to the Court of Appeal.  The Court of Appeal refused to give me leave.  I went to the High Court.  The High Court refused leave but the High Court said it depends on the credibility of Chaney J. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        26

      So I decided to use prerogative writs and I came before Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010.  I thought Heenan J was going to be - was doing very well, very fine.  Heenan J ordered for the LPCC to respond, to reply within 10 days when I served the documents on the LPCC, but again the regulator contacted Heenan J secretly and Heenan J made an about-turn.  So instead of having the LPCC respond, the LPCC never have to respond, and my case was dismissed by Heenan J. 

MURRAY J:   So what was the prerogative relief that you were seeking?

CHIN, MR:   Your Honour?

MURRAY J:   What was the prerogative relief that you were seeking?

CHIN, MR:   I was seeking for two orders, one is the VR 107 of 2008 decision of Chaney J to be abolished, the other ‑ ‑ ‑

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        27

MURRAY J:   But I'm sorry, you had already had that tested on the appeals and you said that you didn't get leave.

CHIN, MR:   I appealed that but the leave to appeal was not granted.  So I went to the High Court, the High Court say it's dependent on the credibility of Chaney J.

MURRAY J:   And they dismissed your appeal. 

CHIN, MR:   So I went before Heenan J, CIV 1019. 

MURRAY J:   Let me see if I have understood it.  You appealed against the order made in the tribunal by Chaney J. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes.  It was ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   Your appeals were dismissed.

CHIN, MR:   Leave to appeal was refused.

MURRAY J:   Okay.  Then you took an application for prerogative relief.

CHIN, MR:   I took prerogative writs.

MURRAY J:   What sort of prerogative relief did you want?

CHIN, MR:   On two case.  One is - then the LPCC started on 30 June 2009 to sue me on the same matter that has been decided by Judge Eckert, using the same matter to sue me for professional misconduct and unsatisfactory conduct in VR 87 of 2009 and then I made an application to abolish it because it is res judicata and that decision was dismissed by - what's the name? 

MURRAY J:   Take your time.

CHIN, MR:   Yes. 

MURRAY J:   Did you go back before the tribunal?

CHIN, MR:   Say again?

MURRAY J:   Did you go back before the tribunal?

CHIN, MR:   I appeared before the tribunal, before - I can't remember that name now.  We were talking about him. 

MURRAY J:   You were talking about Chaney J before. 

CHIN, MR:   Justice?

MURRAY J:   You were talking about Chaney J before.

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        28

11.56

CHIN, MR:   Yes, Chaney J.  I went before Heenan J on

two grounds.

MURRAY J:   Yes.

CHIN, MR:   One is to abolish the VR 107 by Chaney J, of 2008.  The other one is to abolish the VR 87, res judicata, poor in judgment by Chaney J. 

MURRAY J:   Okay.  So what sort of prerogative relief were you seeking?

CHIN, MR:   I was seeking mandamus and certiorari. 

MURRAY J:   You were seeking mandamus and certiorari. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes.

MURRAY J:   All right, and that was to achieve the result which you had sought to achieve by the appeals which had been dismissed.

CHIN, MR:   Yes.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

CHIN, MR:   That was dismissed because a brother judge - a court of the same rank do not have the power, prerogative powers over another judge of the same rank. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.  That's right. 

CHIN, MR:   So then I was also invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court, so Heenan J did not decide that. 

MURRAY J:   Sorry, you were invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court?

CHIN, MR:   Yes, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review its own decision.  

MURRAY J:   So if the Supreme Court - if Heenan J took the view that he could not grant prerogative relief, you invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the court to grant relief on that basis.  Is that right?

CHIN, MR:   Yes, then I have got an exhaustive explanation of my rights in Sleight C's decision in CIV 87 of 2010.  After Sleight C's decision, then I know what sort of relief I can get from the Supreme Court.  So Heenan J was right, so I could not - then before I appeal again Heenan J's decision I went before Le Miere J in CIV 1604 of 2009 and Le Miere J say that he has got no power.  Le Miere J says ‑ ‑ ‑

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        29

MURRAY J:   What proceedings did you take before

Le Miere J?

CHIN, MR:   Say again? 

MURRAY J:   What proceedings did you take before Le Miere J?

CHIN, MR:   Mandamus.  Mandamus against Chaney J and mandamus against Heenan J. 

MURRAY J:   So you made applications before Le Miere J to set aside the decisions made by Heenan J who declined to set aside the decision made by Chaney J.

CHIN, MR:   Yes. 

MURRAY J:   And so you wanted Le Miere J to set aside the decision made by Chaney J. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes. 

MURRAY J:   Mr Chin, did it occur to you that these were a series of proceedings that had already been decided to deal with the point upon which you had already lost? 

CHIN, MR:   Your Honour, the issue of the pseudo board was never decided by Heenan J. 

MURRAY J:   I see.  Yes, I see.  All right.  What did Sleight C ‑ ‑ ‑

CHIN, MR:   Sleight C ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   How did he get into it? 

CHIN, MR:   Sleight C, then they want to - Sleight's case is the CIV 87 of 2010.  That is the decision after I got from the High Court about CACV 107 of 2008 about Owen J's decision.

MURRAY J:   And the CIV number with Sleight C was 87 of 2010?

CHIN, MR:   CIV 87 of 2010.

MURRAY J:   I see.  We don't think that's right, but anyway go on. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes.  So that decision, Sleight C dismissed my application but Sleight C is right because Sleight C for the first time explain that you cannot have prerogative orders against your brother judge of the same rank and also Sleight C also refers to Heenan J's decision but Sleight C says I have, I have got a right under the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  And Sleight C says

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        30

that ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   Yes, Ms Eddy?

EDDY, MS:   If I could assist the court.  I believe that the respondent might be referring to CIV 1878 of 2010.  I'm not sure if I'm correct.

MURRAY J:   Is it 1877?  Is it 1877 of 2010?

29/8/11                                                31

CHIN, MR:   Yes, 1877.  I'm sorry, your Honour.

MURRAY J:   1877?

CHIN, MR:   1877. 

MURRAY J:   Okay.  Yes, thank you. 

CHIN, MR:   1877.  So Sleight C opens up the whole story, "Now I can see clearly, where do I go?"  So Sleight C says I can start a separate action against David Taylor which Maurice Law is going to start or which - because I and Maurice Law make a joint application or make a separate application to remove the errors of law apparent on the court records in CACV 107 of 2008. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

CHIN, MR:   So after reading Sleight C's judgment I am thoroughly happy because he decided on the issues that was before him.  He never evaded the issues, your Honour, and he is an honest judge. 

MURRAY J:   Did you say that Sleight C gave a decision in that matter?

CHIN, MR:   He gave a decision in relation to CACV 107 - in relation to CACV 107 ‑ ‑ ‑

MURRAY J:   So this goes past your affidavit, Ms Eddy, does it?  Yes, thank you?

CHIN, MR:   Your Honour, if you read Sleight C's judgment he says on the same point - admission of the fresh evidence, he dismissed it.  He dismissed it but he says he has no power over his fellow brothers, judges.  That's why he dismissed it, he has got no power, and that gives me the idea that I use the error of law apparent on the court records to remove the error of Owen J in CACV 107 of 2008, rather than filing a separate action. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.  What else do you want to tell me?

CHIN, MR:   That was the consent judgment.  The last point is:  Chaney J was trying to help the LPCC to change the decision of Eckert J in VR 137 of 2006 regarding my deficiency in my professional knowledge which does not merit a bar on my independent practice.  That's what I have been fighting for. 

Chaney J wanted to help LPCC to change that by converting that into both professional misconduct and unsatisfactory conduct.  That is the application that was made by LPCC on 30 June 2009 and that is my dispute with Chaney J, because Chaney J was biased against me and I have

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        32

12.06

served upon him 30 questions asking him to explain to me why he is not biased against me.  Chaney J was not able to explain that and that results in Chaney J recusing himself from hearing the case. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        33

MURRAY J:   I'm sorry, did you say that Chaney J recused himself from hearing the case?

CHIN, MR:   87.  VR 87 of 2009. 

MURRAY J:   Yes?

CHIN, MR:   So when Chaney J recused himself, then Judge Pritchard was there for a little while and Judge Pritchard was doing good.  Then Judge Pritchard was promoted to become a justice here in the Supreme Court and then the State Solicitor, then Timothy Sharp became the vice president and he was handling my matter.  He was handling my matter before the LPCC and the LPCC was not able to answer my questions, why they are doing the wrong thing to me.  I make it a point that the LPCC answers those questions before Judge Sharp and LPCC was not able to answer until today. 

      Judge Sharp has on several occasions told the LPCC, "You pull up your socks and get his licence - give back his licence to him quickly," but the most interesting thing is that the LPCC on 4 August made a decision upon the complaint of Maurice Law against David Taylor and the LPCC says that there is no credible evidence against David Taylor and the credible evidence is those documents I have just given to your Honour, why there is no credible evidence, why the LPCC is again helping David Taylor and Registrar Powell.

      This is happening again and again because LPCC does not want to give up.  They just want to do the wrong thing all the time and I have just written a letter to LPCC and to Judge Sharp.  I don't want to go on with the case because LPCC is not sincere and is not honest, because the case before Judge Sharp is on 11 October and I have got this letter here, your Honour. 

MURRAY J:   Yes, thank you.  Yes, go on, Mr Chin.

CHIN, MR:   Your Honour, if you look at the submission of the principal registrar on the last two pages where you have got the eight memo.  I can go through each one of them.  The first one is I lodge a caveat over the properties to protect solicitor's lien; that is entirely perfect, there is no unreasonable ground. 

      The FR 417 of 2007, that is the consent judgment, consent order judgment of Registrar Wilde, under duress, and I have got all copies of documentations that has been communicated with Registrar Wilde and the counsel for Timothy Robin Thies, he told Ken Martin J there is no evidence that Registrar Wilde was aware of the duress and was under duress to enter into that consent judgment.

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        34

12.12

      That became the subject matter of my claim in FR 944

of 2007 and that became appeal number 6 of 2008 at the District Court before Herron C.  That became CIV 1903 of the Supreme Court, of 2008, before Hasluck J.  Number 3 is my claim against Thies seeking to recover part settlement sum in FR 417, is in FR 944.  Magistrate Musk herself said in the transcript that I have never been guilty of any frivolous or vexatious claim.  That is the remark of Magistrate Musk herself, that there is no frivolous claim by Mr Chin against Mr Thies.

      The appeal to the District Court, the next one is appeal number 6 to the District Court that Registrar Wallace most recently in 2011 delivered an order that the hundred dollars paid was the security costs and I have complained against that and that is the subject matter of my application in CACV 75 of 2010, to efface the error of law apparent on the court records.

      The next one is the VR 107 of 2008, that is Chaney's decision and that is contained in volume 1 and 2.  The previous one, the appeal of the District Court is contained in volume 9 and 10 and the FR 944 is contained in volume 9.  The next page we have the FR 147, my application to appeal decision of registrar in relation to consent orders; that is in volume 8. 

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

CHIN, MR:   The next one, 30 June, is the CIV 1775.  That is my caveat.  CIV 1775 was the decision of Master Sanderson to remove my caveat, subject to condition that $20,000 was set aside by Pullin JA to pay me for my solicitor's fees for Nancy Hall and this money was never paid to me.  Master Sanderson did not remove the caveat, did not remove my caveat and did not remove Law's caveat, Maurice Law caveat or Spunter's caveat on 28 October 2008 but the Spunter caveat was removed by me on the 10th day of February 2006 when David Taylor did not comply with Jenkins J's order in CIV 1142 of 2005 where I was the solicitor for Nancy Hall. 

      So that caveat was removed, the Spunter's caveat was removed by me and not by Master Sanderson and not by Anthony Pride and therefore the wrongful past orders against me by Master Sanderson still stands, has not been taken away because my appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 has not been decided yet.  That is in volume 15 and 16 and the CIV 1903 of 2008 is in volume 10, 11, 12 and 13 and the CACV 105, that is my appeal against Chaney's decision to the Court of Appeal is in volume 3 and 4.

      6 November 2008, my application for leave to appeal the decision of the master, that application for leave was granted, volume 16; and on

30 June 09, that is the VR 87 where I am being persecuted by the LPCC, is in volume 4.

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MURRAY J:   Mr Chin, I can readily pick these up.  There's  a cross-referencing process to the affidavit that gives me ready capacity to pick these up. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes.  Yes, your Honour.  Do you want me to continue? 

MURRAY J:   I don't think you need to.  I can readily pick up the chain of documents and locate the decisions by the cross-referencing that goes between that document and the index.

CHIN, MR:   So I don’t have to tell you.

MURRAY J:   No.  That's fine, thank you.

CHIN, MR:   Okay.  All right.

MURRAY J:   All right?  Thank you very much. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes, that's right, your Honour.  Thank you.

MURRAY J:   Thank you, Mr Chin. 

CHIN, MR:   Sir, do you want a continuation or do we finish it today?  It is finished today? 

MURRAY J:   I'm sorry?  Tell me that again?

CHIN, MR:   Is this finished today.  This case is finished today?

MURRAY J:   Today?  Yes, in the next few minutes I would think.  You have been going through ‑ ‑ ‑ 

CHIN, MR:   Okay.

MURRAY J:   ‑ ‑ ‑ methodically. 

CHIN, MR:   Do you want me to make further submission on why, on why I am never guilty of any of the thing that is in here?

MURRAY J:   I thought you had been doing that.  I thought you had been doing that and explaining your situation.  Was there something else that you wanted to tell me about the case?

CHIN, MR:   Yes.  If I just take you to the submission, to the plaintiff's submission.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

CHIN, MR:   Number 1, okay, whether or not the court is satisfied the plaintiff has instituted or conducted vexatious proceeding or is likely to institute or conduct

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vexatious proceedings.  My answer is no, I have never conducted one vexatious proceeding and I am not likely to conduct any future vexatious proceeding.  (b):

If the court is satisfied of those matters, then it will be necessary for the court to consider whether to exercise its discretion to make order under this act. 

      There is no need for this court to make any order under this act, but this court can help me to make sure that my two cases, my two applications are registered and be heard. 

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

CHIN, MR:   Right, and that the issue of the pseudo board be settled by a written judgment.  The issue of the pseudo board has never - is a taboo subject.  It has never been decided by any judge. 

MURRAY J:   I think you have told me all about that, haven't you? 

CHIN, MR:   Yes; yes.  Number (c):

If the court is satisfied it is an appropriate case to exercise its discretion, the court will then need to consider the appropriate terms of any order it makes under this act.

There is no need to.

MURRAY J:   Yes. 

CHIN, MR:   Then number 2:

Before making an order under section 4, the court must be satisfied the plaintiff has instituted or conducted a vexatious proceeding, whether before or after its commencement of this act.

My answer is I have never.  (b):

Is it likely that a plaintiff will institute or conduct vexatious proceedings under section 4 of the act.

      My answer is it is not likely at all, because I am not like Dr Michael.  Dr Michael is a doctorate holder but he is not a professionally trained lawyer.  That's the difference between him and me, your Honour.  For every action that I have done, I have done it correctly.  I may be wrong procedurally in some cases and it is only human nature for me to make mistakes.  But I am a trained lawyer,  I have been through the mill.  I have been trained as an

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        37

articled clerk and I have been trained as a restricted practitioner. 

      If I have not committed any unsatisfactory conduct or any misconduct, then there is no law that I can be restricted in my independent practice.  That is the most important thing to me, your Honour.  I need your help on this point, because otherwise I'll keep going and going and going and going and I never stop because no judge wants to decide on this issue. 

      I have put everything down on paper, everything is there.  Everything is there.  There is no room for doubt.  Everything is there.  You can question - your Honour, the other party can question me on anything.  I'm prepared to answer; and I'm not prepared to tell lies, I'm prepared to tell the truth.  What we are here is to get justice.  We are here not to defeat justice.  I know your Honour is a very honest judge and I kneel down to your Honour for being such a good judge. 

      The same thing happens to Judge Sharp.  Judge Sharp, he knows and understood everything and he knows that they are wrong, but I am afraid that he is not strong enough to stand up if they all go against him.  This legal profession is not a monopoly of a few people who wants to rob and plunder the ordinary common people and get away with it.  I'm sorry to say that, your Honour.  Number 3:

The fact that a person has in the past instituted or conducted vexatious proceeding alone is sufficient to allow the court to make an order under section 4 of the act.

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MURRAY J:   Mr Chin, I think it's not going to be helpful for you to go through each one of these paragraphs. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes.

MURRAY J:   I have been noting what you have said about the various issues and the points that you have been making about that. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes, your Honour.

MURRAY J:   As I have understood what you have been doing, you have been seeking to demonstrate your reasoning and why you have engaged in the processes and what you hope to achieve and what you have learned about the processes that are available in the course of the various pieces of litigation to which you have referred.  That is useful material.  Have you completed your review of those matters?

CHIN, MR:   Yes, I have completed my review.  All my matters are - now focus on only the four issues and that is in my written submission.

MURRAY J:   Yes, and I have noted what you had to say about those in the course of your oral submissions. 

CHIN, MR:   I hope that my two applications in the Court of Appeal, CACV 107 of 2008 and CACV 75 of 2010, those two applications will be heard and also my application CIV 1981, I seek Ken Martin J's decision that he made against me about the stultifying security costs order; I want that removed because Ken Martin J made a void decision, because he was biased against me and Ken Martin J did not provide me the 20 reasons or so that I have ask him to respond to me.  He cannot. 

MURRAY J:   You see, the point I'm making, Mr Chin, is that by my count that's the third time you have told me that.  You don't need to keep repeating it. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes, sir.

MURRAY J:   You tell me once and if I don't understand, I will ask you a question. 

CHIN, MR:   Yes, sir, okay. 

MURRAY J:   So I think if you have told me all that you wanted to say to me, now is the time to resume your seat. 

CHIN, MR:   I have not mentioned about CIV 1981 of 2010, your Honour.  The purpose of this exercise today is to take away that case that I filed in the Supreme Court.  That case was never heard. 

29/8/11                CHIN, MR                        39

12.32

MURRAY J:   Yes; yes, you have mentioned that. 

CHIN, MR:   I want to go before Judge Sharp on 11 October but I'm just frightened because the LPCC has not done the right thing and is dishonest, and I hope the LPCC will respond to me and tell me that it is honest enough so that I can go and face Judge Sharp before the tribunal on 11 October. 

MURRAY J:   Yes; yes, you have spoken about that.

CHIN, MR:   Thank you very much, your Honour.

MURRAY J:   Thank you, Mr Chin.  Is there anything in reply, Ms Eddy?

EDDY, MS:   Only one brief point, your Honour. 

MURRAY J:   Yes.

EDDY, MS:   The material provided to you by the respondent, your Honour, it's submitted that if there was ever any doubt that there's a need for an order ongoing, that the respondent, as he said, will continue and continue without any sense of pause or that he doesn't understand that he is relitigating the same issues.  He has made those points himself very clear it's submitted. 

      The decision of Sleight C that was referred to is a conclusive decision about the concept that certiorari against a Supreme Court judge cannot be considered by a Supreme Court judge but also, quite fairly, goes on to consider the idea of whether a decision of the Supreme Court, if infected by fraud, could be referred to the Court of Appeal, accepts that it can be but then canvasses comprehensively why he should not do that based on the lack of any evidence of fraud - and this is this idea that Registrar Powell somehow commits some fraud; based on the fact that the alleged fraud raises no substantial new issue and that it would be inappropriate in all the circumstances, then dismisses the application on both bases.  Somehow this gives the respondent some sort of enthusiasm to commence another proceeding which is called - and he has handed up an application in CACV 75 of 2010. 

This is an appeal that has been dismissed already. 

      So since the time that these proceedings have been put in place, the respondent's insight into his behaviour is so poor, knowing that he is at risk of these orders, he continues and he has happily handed up to you an application in an appeal that has been dismissed, to relitigate the issue the subject of the appeal; somewhat incomprehensible but, nonetheless, the applicant only says that the submissions made by the respondent and the material handed up by the respondent does nothing but

29/8/11                EDDY, MS                        40

reaffirm the necessity to make the orders sought by the applicant in this case. 

MURRAY J:   Thank you, Ms Eddy.  In view of the extensive submissions that have been made by both sides, I propose not to give reasons extempore.  I think it's appropriate in the circumstances of this case to reserve my decision and I do so.

AT 12.39 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED ACCORDINGLY

29/8/11                EDDY, MS                        41