MY FACSIMILE RESPONSE LETTER DATED 28.4.2011 TO THE FACSIMILE LETTER OF THE STATE SOLICITOR OF WA DATED THE SAME DAY .

Our Ref: CIV1689 OF 2011.  

Your Ref: SSO 3289-10

Thursday, April 28, 2011

The State Solicitor for Western Australia

141 St. Georges Terrace

PERTH WA 6000

Atten: Ms. Kah Yee Loh, Solicitor. 

Fax: 08 9264 1670    BY FACSIMILE

Dear Sir

CIV 1689 OF 2011: THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA V NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

I refer to your facsimile letter dated today responding to my facsimile letters to you dated 21, 22 and 25 April, 2011.

Until I hear from you responding to me each of my statements as contained in my three letters to you indicated above, I shall not be in a position to provide you with my unavailable dates and the estimated time required for the hearing. 

Please note that I shall only agree to be heard before a panel of five judges from the judicial system of another State or Territory of Australia unless I am convinced by your response letter that the State Solicitor Office is strictly adhering to the rules to ensure that I will get justice at the end of day and that I am satisfied that this is not a mere exercise to get rid of me because I have been outspoken.  I would like to draw your attention by repeating what the High Court per Kirby J said in Re Attorney General (Commonwealth); ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321 at 323 in this context:

"First, it is always important for every Judge to keep an open mind in case a person who has been rejected by courts in the past may have, hidden amongst the verbiage of his or her arguments, a point which has not been previously seen and which may have merit. Vigilance, and not impatience, are specifically required where that person is not legally represented; secondly, it is regarded as a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts. The rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. It is a rare thing to declare a person a vexatious litigant. It is extremely rare in this Court to use the power, whether under the inherent power or .....to require leave before a person may commence proceedings invoking the court's jurisdiction; thirdly, the court must never shy away from the determination of a point sought to be argued simply because it may have major ramifications. .....I should not be reluctant to provide relief on the legal grounds ...simply because to provide relief would be to attack both the banking and taxation and other economic systems of this country. The history of this Court since its establishment in 1903, including recently, has shown that the court does not refrain from offering relief where the law req Re Attorney General (Commonwealth); ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321 at 323uires it simply because its decisions may have large consequences for the nation or particular interests in it; fourthly, ...seeking relief by way of the writs of certiorari and mandamus. It is not necessary for me, in the decision which I have arrived at, to determine whether they are in each case, or in any of the cases, the appropriate process of the court to invoke its jurisdiction. ....today unrepresented. If he had commenced proceedings by an irregular process which had any separate or different merit from the matters which have already been determined by the court, I would endeavour to assist him to get such proceedings into proper form or require him to commence again in proper form. I would not dispose of his application upon such a formal basis; ... "

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

MY THIRD LETTER TO THE STATE SOLICITOR OF WA AND THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR DATED 25.5.2011 EXPLAINING THE FUTILITY OF PROSECUTING ME AS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD OF AVOIDING WASTAGE OF PUBLIC FUNDS

Our Ref: CIV1689 OF 2011.  

Your Ref: SSO 3289-10

Sunday, April 24, 2011

The State Solicitor for Western Australia

141 St. Georges Terrace

PERTH WA 6000

Atten: Ms. Kah Yee Loh, Solicitor. 

Fax: 08 9264 1670    BY FACSIMILE

The Principal Registrar

Mr. Keith Frederick Chapman

Supreme Court of Western Australia

Spring Garden, Barrack Street, Perth WA 6000

Fax: 08- 9221 4436    BY FACSIMILE

Dear Sir

CIV 1689 OF 2011: THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA V NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

I write to you again in further elucidation of my previous two facsimile letters to you dated 21.4.2011 and 22.4.2011 in relation to the above matter - persuading you to reconsider your prosecuting me unfairly and to no purpose -  having regard to the following circumstances:

a)             The Principal Registrar is making an application to declare me a vexatious litigant and, at the same time, to stay my CIV 1981 of 2010 upon unjustified grounds.  The reason is that Ken Martin J had not negated nor denied my specific allegations as to the particulars of his biasness against me; it is very obvious that the learned judge came to judge the two cases in CIV 1903 of 2008[No.2] and CIV 1112 of 2007 with a biased mind.  I have already explained to that learned judge, the reason that I was not acting in conflict of interests in the latter case and as a result, he did correct his judgment on the latter case.  But he still persisted in having a hand in the decision of the two cases albeit in jurisdictional excesses, after he was being requested by me to recuse himself.  I requested him to consolidate the two cases on the ground that they arose out of the same subject matter but he separated them and refused to hear me on the latter case citing conflict of interests for which I have successfully rebutted.  Yet, he recognised and therefore removed the unlawful caveat of Mr. Thies in the latter case by favouring the other party and denied me natural justice.   His judgment is therefore voidable or void as he was on a frolic of his own for a set purpose to stultify illegally the Review Process started by Hasluck J in CIV 1903 of 2008 [No.1] by interposing it with an unjustified and illegal security costs order to favour the other party.  The fact that the learned judge did not answer my specific allegations of the particulars and instances of his biasness against me, he is taken to have admitted to them: qui non negat, fatetur - he who does not deny, admits them. 

b)            A judge hearing the Principal Registrar’s claim that I am a vexatious litigant should bear in mind the four cardinal points (as underlined below) of Kirby J of the High Court of Australia in Re Attorney General (Commonwealth); ex parte Skyring (1996) 70 ALJR 321 at 323, in the following words:

"First, it is always important for every Judge to keep an open mind in case a person who has been rejected by courts in the past may have, hidden amongst the verbiage of his or her arguments, a point which has not been previously seen and which may have merit. Vigilance, and not impatience, are specifically required where that person is not legally represented; secondly, it is regarded as a serious thing in this country to keep a person out of the courts. The rule of law requires that, ordinarily, a person should have access to the courts in order to invoke their jurisdiction. It is a rare thing to declare a person a vexatious litigant. It is extremely rare in this Court to use the power, whether under the inherent power or .....to require leave before a person may commence proceedings invoking the court's jurisdiction; thirdly, the court must never shy away from the determination of a point sought to be argued simply because it may have major ramifications. .....I should not be reluctant to provide relief on the legal grounds ...simply because to provide relief would be to attack both the banking and taxation and other economic systems of this country. The history of this Court since its establishment in 1903, including recently, has shown that the court does not refrain from offering relief where the law requires it simply because its decisions may have large consequences for the nation or particular interests in it; fourthly, ...seeking relief by way of the writs of certiorari and mandamus. It is not necessary for me, in the decision which I have arrived at, to determine whether they are in each case, or in any of the cases, the appropriate process of the court to invoke its jurisdiction. ....today unrepresented. If he had commenced proceedings by an irregular process which had any separate or different merit from the matters which have already been determined by the court, I would endeavour to assist him to get such proceedings into proper form or require him to commence again in proper form. I would not dispose of his application upon such a formal basis; ... "

c)        The Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2011, the VR 87 of 2010, the CIV 1877 of 2010 and the CIV 1491 of 2010 proceedings have not reached a point of finality yet (all my cases reaching finality).  We will have to wait until the final stages have been reached and not only that: there must be no more points or issues that have originally been advanced by me, right from the beginning of those proceedings and without my having abused the process of courts; they must not be left unraveled or undecided or avoided decision thereof.  If they have been so avoided, it would be evident in their judgments.  In the meantime, it would not be an abuse of process on my part if there is a duty for the courts or the tribunal to assist me to get those proceedings into proper form just as Kirby J indicated above.   On this point of finality, I quote the case of Hunters Hill Municipal Council v Pedler [1976] 1 NSWLR 478 at 488 where Yeldham J said: 

"When a final decision has been given, any attempt, whether by way of appeal or application to set it aside, or to set aside proceedings taken to enforce such a decision, which is in substance an attempt to re-litigate what has already been decided, is the institution of legal proceedings. It is to the substance of the matter that regard must be had and not its form."

Appeals of an existing action do not count as “final determinations”. Appeals and writs that are related to a current

action do not count as “final determinations” or additional determinations, because until all avenues of appeal have

been exhausted the determinations cannot be construed as “final” (Childs v. Painewebber, Inc. (1994), 29 Cal.App.4th 982,)

“Interlocutory decisions before a judgment cannot be considered “final determinations””(See: Holcomb v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, (2005), 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 578).

d)          When all my cases have been dealt with in such a manner by the respective judges in its state of finality, where there are no more issues that was originally claimed by me to be decided, then only I should not be allowed to re-litigate them again, and if I do, then only you should help the court to find that I have abused the process of court or that I am indeed a vexatious litigant.  I therefore quote: First Western Development Co. v. Superior Court, (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 860, 864, 261 Cal.Rptr. 116, which also said:
A judgment is final for all purposes when all avenues for direct review have been exhausted

e)             At the present moment, there must not remain a misconception in you or the Principal Registrar that I am currently re-litigating an issue or some issues that have already been litigated, but what I am litigating are merely issues that have been avoided by the judges in the past as in VR 107 of 2008 by Chaney J, in CACV 105 of 2008, CACV 75 of 2010 and CACV 107 of 2008 [No.2] by Pullin and Newnes,  JJA, in CACV107 of 2008 [No.1] by Owen JA, and in CIV 1903 of 2008 [No.2] and CIV 1112 of 2007 by Ken Martin J.  All my cases at the point of finality must be objectively assessed by you to be completely untenable or utterly hopeless before you can declare it as vexatious.  In this context, I would like to quote the case of Cox v Journeaux [No 2] (1935) 52 CLR 713 at 720 to stress the special and extreme features of the jurisdiction of the court when it is about to declare that I am a vexatious litigant in the context of what Dixon J said:

"The inherent jurisdiction of the court to stay an action as vexatious is to be exercised only when the action is clearly without foundation and when to allow it to proceed would impose a hardship upon the defendants which may be avoided without risk of injustice to the plaintiff. The principle, in general paramount, that a claim honestly made by a suitor for judicial relief must be investigated and decided in the manner appointed, must be observed. A litigant is entitled to submit for determination according to the due course of procedure a claim which he believes he can establish, although its foundation may in fact be slender."

f)         If you think, I am a vexatious litigant,  I would have to pass the test of vexatiousness in the case of Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481),  where Roden J formulated the following tests for the determination of whether or not proceedings are vexatious (at 491): 

"It seems then that litigation may properly be regarded as vexatious for present purposes on either objective or subjective grounds. I believe that the test may be expressed in the following terms: 
(i) Proceedings are vexatious if they are instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought. 
(ii) They are vexatious if they are brought for collateral purposes, and not for the purpose of 
having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise.
(iii) They are also properly to be regarded as vexatious if, irrespective of the motive of the litigant, they are so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless.

g)          Further, in the context of Western Australia, Heenan J in GRANICH PARTNERS -v- YAP [2003] WASC 206 at para 47 said: 

“In Western Australia under the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act (2002) the requirement for habitual and persistent institution of vexatious proceedings has, as already explained, disappeared. Furthermore, the necessity for the proceedings to be "utterly hopeless" was said to be too narrow a test by Anderson J in Attorney General v Michael [1999] WASCA 181 in a judgment in the Full Court with which Pidgeon and Steytler JJ expressed agreement.”

h)            And, in Attorney General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481, Anderson J said: 

"With all respect, if this means that, absent male fides in one form or another, proceedings will not be vexatious unless they are 'so obviously untenable or manifestly groundless as to be utterly hopeless', I think that test is too narrow as a test of general application under our Act. I think proceedings may be vexatious for the purposes of the Western Australian statute without necessarily being 'utterly hopeless' which I take to mean plainly devoid of any merit whatever. The litigant who seeks dark conspiracies and the threat of great harm to himself or herself in the trivial wrongs of another may provide an example. The commencement of an action by such a person, containing outlandish allegations and seeking forms of relief that the courts do not grant, may be vexatious, notwithstanding that it may be possible for the court to identify for the litigant a cause of action for which, arguably, there may be some form of remedy..... Whilst it is not possible to say that the claim of nuisance in respect of the loud playing of music is 'utterly hopeless', the allegations as to that, and the relief sought in respect of it, are so deeply buried in bizarre allegations and untenable claims for relief that the court ought to be able to say, as a matter of judgment, that it is a vexatious proceeding within the meaning of the section."

i)            I have appeared before the Chief Justice Martin and before Justice Le Miere, but they merely declare that they have no jurisdictions to hear the matters before them, and they are not repeated motions that are so devoid of merit nor so frivolous as in: 

“Repeated motions must be "so devoid of merit and be so frivolous that they can be described as a flagrant abuse of the system, have no reasonable probability of success, lack reasonable or probable cause or excuse, and are clearly meant to abuse the processes of the courts and to harass the adverse party than other litigants."(See:  Morton v. Wagner, (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 963, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 818).

The elements of a valid cause of action for abuse of process in most common law jurisdictions are as follows: (1) the

existence of an ulterior purpose or motive underlying the use of process, and (2) some act in the use of the legal

process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings (Cartwright v. Wexler, Wexler & Heller, Ltd.,

369 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977))

j)              Finally, I am not guilty of any ABUSE OF PROCESS as in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co[4] [2000] UKHL 65; [2002] 2 AC 1, per Lord Bingham at 30-1: Henderson -v- Henderson – 1843 – Sir James Wigram VC – Litigation Practice.  The LPCC, however, is guilty of abuse of process because it repeated the litigation of issues which are res judicata in VR 87 of 2009 because they are the very same issues that had already been decided by Judge Eckert of SAT on 12.9.2009 in VR137 of 2006, which had been set aside by the then President of the Court of Appeal, Steytler JA, of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in CACV 43 of 2007 on 26.9.2007.  The Pseudo Board refused to honour that consent judgment and again repeat the findings of the phantom deficiency of my professional knowledge (the phantom deficiency) till today.  Those very same issues was used by Judge Eckert to find that I was not guilty of any professional misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct, but only points to my being guilty of the phantom deficiency.  When I complained that I should not have been barred in my independent practice before Chaney J, that learned Judge converted the phantom deficiency into professional misconduct or unsatisfactory conduct (professional misconduct) by merely waving a wand. Is that not malice?  Using these very same issues, Chaney J in stealth made that finding of professional misconduct in my absence.  His Honour, however, retracted that judgment made in stealth.  That learned Judge also refused to explain my specific allegations as to the particulars of his biasness against me similar to what happened subsequently to Ken Martin J. But the difference between the two judges is that the former did recuse himself whereas the latter refused to recuse himself but bull-dozed through the two cases in CIV 1903 of 2008 [No.2] (whilst CIV 1903 of 2008[No.1] was done righteously by Hasluck J) and the CIV 1112 of 2007 by making the two void judgments which is the subject matter of CIV 1981 of 2010 to set aright.  The common law courts had set down the principles to be applied in abuse of process cases, where a matter was raised again which should have been dealt with in earlier proceedings as indicated in the words (as underlined below) of Sir James Wigram VC said:

“In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”

k)             The question now before Judge Sharp in VR 87 of 2009 on 11.10.2011 is not the trial of the res judicata issues of VR 137 of 2006 of Judge Eckert but when they are going to stop the wrong doings of the Pseudo Board working in collaboration with the LPCC against me and how they are going to compensate me for those wrongs and when they are going to give me back my independent legal practice status.  This issue was mooted by Judge Sharp and Ms. Le Miere of the LPCC on 26.11.2011 which was confirmed by Judge Sharp in the proceedings on 8.4.2011 when Le Miere was not able to answer my eight questions contained in my letter to the LPCC dated 21.3.2011. 

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT IS PROSECUTING ME FOR VEXATIOUS LITIGATION THROUGH THE STATE SOLICITOR OFFICE IN CIV 1689 OF 2011

Our Ref: CIV1689 OF 2011.  

Your Ref: SSO 3289-10

Thursday, April 21, 2011

The State Solicitor for Western Australia

141 St. Georges Terrace

PERTH WA 6000

Atten: Ms. Kah Yee Loh, Solicitor. 

Fax: 08 9264 1670    BY FACSIMILE

The Principal Registrar

Mr. Keith Frederick Chapman

Supreme Court of Western Australia

Spring Garden, Barrack Street, Perth WA 6000

Fax: 08- 9221 4436    BY FACSIMILE

Dear Sir

CIV 1689 OF 2011: THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA V NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

I refer to your having served me with a Notice of Originating Motion under s. 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restrictions Act, 2002 yesterday.  I refer to my telephone conversation with your Solicitor Ms. Kah Yee Loh this morning, in which I had broached the subject of the State Solicitor having misconceived this action.  The misconception refers to what I would consider is a fanciful idea that I am a vexatious litigant under circumstances where I can truly vouched that I have never ever abused the process of court of tribunal, nor ever started or conduct any action with the intention to annoy, harass or to cause delay or detriment to the regulator of the legal profession in WA for the purpose of achieving any wrongful purpose; as all my actions are based on reasonable grounds.  

I am pinpointing to the fact that what I am faced with is not a dark conspiracy, but a real conspiracy in “life and blood” proportions, of the malicious prosecution of me by the LPCC and the Pseudo Board working hand in hand with members of the judiciary, a member of which is Registrar Powell who has already resigned and the matter is now under police investigation.  The problem is that the Pseudo Board is reasonably seen to be acting without authority to protect their cronies in the persons of Solicitor David Taylor and Timothy Robin Thies etc.  The Real Board is unaware that its legal authority has been usurped by a Pseudo Board going on a frolic of its own.  I have managed to put up my website which is accessible by any member of the public at my blogspot by Googling my name “NICHOLASNCHIN” where you read for more details, which may not be obtainable from the 16 volumes of court documents delivered to me by you.   

All my troubles started through my having responded to my duties as an officer of the court, to the court first and to my former client Dr. Kheng Su Chan, second, when I unwittingly offended a former President of the Law Society of Western Australia, Mr. Pino Monaco.  The trail of evidence points literally to the fact that all my troubles emanates from the portals of the Law Society of Western Australia wielding its clandestine influence over its former Presidents in the persons of their Honours Judge Eckert, the then Judge and now Justice Chaney and Justice Ken Martin, who adopted a belligerent attitude towards me and who were not willing to do their duties to uphold justice by respecting the three pillars of justice namely: INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE and IMPARTIALITY.  I have also my learned friends misleading the court, unscathed, like barrister Peter Quinlan submitting before Judge Eckert that it is “okay” to create falsehoods about me so that I could be restrained in my independent law practice based on the false notion of a perceived deficiency of my professional knowledge and barrister Scott Ellis telling Ken Martin J telling the untruth that there is no evidence before the court that the consent judgment of Registrar Susan Wilde in FR417 of 2007 was caused by the duress of solicitor Timothy Robin Thies, in CIV 1903 of 2008, exerted upon that learned registrar.   Indeed the Pseudo Board does not have the public good intention of promoting better governance of Western Australia.  In other states and other nations, where a member of the public has been swindled by a solicitor, the victim goes to the Court alleging fraud and his case is being dismissed.  It is then expected that the police will take action.  But invariably, the Police does not take action in this State until recently.  But in my case, it is going to be different, because you can take a Mandamus against the Police Commissioner and this is not going to be construed as vexatious proceedings.

I have been through all the actions which you are thinking of considering them as an abuse of process of court, and they are now nearly at their completion stages.  Although I have made mistakes in the process I have not, however, abused the process.  The issues for trial may have been avoided by Chaney J, Pullin, Newnes JJA and Ken Martin J but they have now become clearer; they have since been tried before the Court of Appeal in CACV41 of 2010 comprising of Newnes, Murphy JJA and Hall J: my two disputes with fellow solicitors David Taylor and Timothy Robin Thies, the Pseudo Board and the President Steytler Consent Judgment in CACV 43 of 2007.  Once these four issues are fully tried they will be in the form of a written judgment.  If it is deficient, I will have the issues that are wrongly judged be corrected by a Review Process and if they are being left out or avoided and then I will have it litigated again in another forum as they are not barred by the principles of res judicata.  Surely, this cannot be an abuse of process.  

All I can say is that I had depended on the various Justices in the past to decide only on those issues that were before them, but not every Justice was willing to fulfill their duties arising from their respective oaths of office, either inadvertently or purposefully.  It all boils down to one fact, if they have been on a frolic of their own, the evidence is in their respective reasons for decision in their written judgment.  If they are deficient they cannot be used to enforce the rights of the respective parties, let alone the rights of the Legal Practice Board.  It is not until the written judgments reached the acme of their perfections that I will have to stop the legitimate process of re-litigation on non-res judicata issues. 

The complexity of my case caused by my ambition to reach “finesse” in my current litigation has sent heads reeling, like Ms. Le Miere who was recently unable to answer my eight questions as contained in my letter dated 21.3.2011 to the LPCC.  Her inability to answer those questions means that she is admitting to the facts as contained in the many associated letters and this means that there are no longer any issues to be tried in VR87 of 2009 which are scheduled before Judge Sharp, the former State Solicitor and the Deputy President of SAT.  The reason is that the VR87 of 2009 is a malicious persecution of me by the LPCC who are either acting in ignorance or in complacency with those members of the judiciary involved in the conspiratorial links of the Pseudo Board (the persecution).  The persecution is re-litigating the issues that had already been litigated before Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006, whose decision had already been set aside by the Steytler Consent Judgment in CACV 43 of 2007 on 26.9.2007.  What should have happened thereafter, is that I should have been returned to my former position but the Pseudo Board is continuing its wrong-doings to me, which had caused me to go through the High Court in my Application for Special Leave to Appeal in P36 of 2009.  It is usual for the High Court to dismiss Special Leave Applications and it is only the rare circumstances that that this Special Leave would be allowed.  But the High Court does not neglect me on each of the three occasions why my Special Leave Applications were dismissed by it as it gives me pointers to enable me to solve my problems with the Supreme Court of Western Australia.   Everything I have explained in this letter is being carefully manifested in my actions as contained in my blogspot.  

My case against Timothy Robin Thies is now clear as it approaching towards the point of its perfection as I have taken Certiorari Review Orders Application in CIV1491 of 2011 reviewing the decision of Newnes and Pullin JJA after the High Court had given me the pointers.  My case against David Taylor is also clear as Pullin JA and Newnes JA have been pointed out to be wrong in their recent judgment in CACV 107 of 2008 [No.2] that the fresh evidence of the 20 cents false story of Registrar Powell to cover-up the fraud of David Taylor Solicitor in CIV 1131 of 2006 can be admissible into the Court of Appeal contrary to the judgment of Owen JA in paragraph 57 in CACV 107 of 2008 [No.1].  This also happens after the High Court had given me its pointers.   My case against the Pseudo Board is clear because the Pseudo Board had on three occasions admitted liability that it usurped the legal authority of the Real Board by being unable to produce the necessary minutes signifying the legally-required majority consent of the Real Board in imposing the unconscionable constraint upon my freedom to practice law as an independent lawyer.  This also happens after the High Court had given me its pointers.  My case against the LPCC is clear because it refused to perform its statutory duties with regard to the enforcement of my rights after the Steytler Consent Judgment had set aside the wrongful decision of the Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006 through its malicious persecution of me in VR87 of 2009 that was executed by Chaney J in stealth (and he was not able to answer my queries as to his integrity) but this wrong was retrieved by His Honour when he graciously recused himself.  We hope that this matter is now headed for a happy conclusion before Judge Sharp who is the former State Solicitor.   His Honour, a steadfast judge, true to his duties has raised his concerns with the LPCC that I should be returned to my former position on 26.11.2010 as soon as possible, and we hope for a fair settlement by the trial date scheduled for 11.10.2011.   Ms. Le Miere of the LPCC was errant in her ways most recently and I hope the proposed settlement is not being derailed by any influential member of the conspiracy, which is currently under police investigation.  See an example of the many wrongdoings of the LPCC and the Pseudo Board in my blogspot at:  http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2011/04/ms-le-miere-representing-on-842011-did.html.

I would like to conclude that it would be too onerous for the State Solicitor to go through the rigmarole of the process of the futile prosecution of me for the non-purpose of myself being a Vexatious Litigant as it would be a repeat of those processes that have been handled by the Court of Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 and Commissioner Sleight in CIV 1877 of 2010 recently and the judicial process that is being set down for a three day trial before Judge Sharp in VR 87 of 2009 on 11.10.2011.   This is a waste of governmental resources and it should be done away with, unless there exists a secret purpose of the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court to aid the conspirators to use unfair tactics to defeat justice against me contrary to s. 135 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA, which I believe there is not.  Ms. Braesich had secretly contacted Heenan J in CIV 1019 of 2010 and this cause his turnabout decision which led to my Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010.  Recently, the Pseudo Board also tried to fix his Honour Newnes JA in CACV 41 of 2010.  The Pseudo Board had indicated its intention not to be involved in the Appeal in CACV 41 of 2010 yet it is seen to be meddling in the affairs of the hearing of that appeal by Newnes JA which I tried to request His Honour to recuse himself on the ground of conflict of interests which are clearly explained in my blogspot.  

Having regard to the above, I would propose that if the State Solicitor still insists on persecuting me to no purpose, I would like to request for a forum of a panel of some five judges from the New South Wales judicial system to hear these proceedings under the Vexatious Proceedings Act, 2002 and that I am giving you NOTICE that I shall not be liable for any costs as a result as I would not be the culpable person.   Unless you read my documents in the 16 volume of documents, you will not be able to find the needle of my rights in the haystack.     

Yours faithfully

NICHOLAS N CHIN

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR HEARING OF CIV 1877 OF 2010 BEFORE COMMISSIONER SLEIGHT DATED 3.4.2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   OM NO: 1877 OF 2010

HELD AT PERTH

In the matter of the wrongful removal of the Applicant’s Caveats in the Hazelmere and Mt Lawley Properties of  late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall by Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008.

And

In the matter of the falsifications of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor Solicitor.

And

In the matter of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in CACV107 of 2008,  particularly at paras. 54 and 55 relying on the letter of  Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009.  

And

In the matter of the Rationale of the High Court in Special Leave Dispositions of the High Court of Australia in P1 of 2010 providing the legal basis for the causal connection between the Applicant’s Solicitors Work in CIV 1142 of 2006 and the removal of the caveats of Spunter’s Pty Ltd in order to enable the Applicant to establish a statutory first charge over the salvaged properties under s.244 of the former Legal Practice Act, 2003.

EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date of document:                                                        3^rd April, 2011

Date of filing:                                                                3^rd April, 2011.

Filed on behalf of:                                                         The Ex parte Applicant

Prepared by:

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN                                      Phone: 08 92757440;

387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA                              Mobile: 0421642735

WA 6059                                                         Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com

           

WRITTEN OUTLINE OF SUBMISSIONS BEFORE HIS HONOUR MR. COMMISSIONER SLEIGHT AT 10.00 AM ON 4^TH DAY OF APRIL, 2011

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INDEX

THE JURISDICTION                                                                                                                       2

THE GROUNDS FOR RECTIFICATION:                                                                                     3

FRAUD UPON THE COURTS AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF THE PERPETRATORS:                                                                                                              3

THE JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA       4

JUDGMENT OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND:                                                                                                                        5

CERTIORARI OR REVIEW FOR FRAUD, DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR JURISDICTIONAL ERROR                                                                                           6

CERTIORARI OR REVIEW APPLIES WHERE THE DOORS FOR APPEAL IS CLOSED:                                                                                                                         6

REFERENCES TO JUDGMENT IN CACV 107 OF 2008: CHIN V HALL [2009] WASCA 216:                                                                                                                   6

REFERENCES TO HIGH COURT SPECIAL LEAVE DISPOSITIONS IN P1 OF 2010 DATED 26.5.2010                                                                                                           8

REFERENCES TO MASTER SANDERSON DECISION IN CHIN V HALL (2008) WASC 255 OR CIV 1775 OF 2008                                                                                9

Your Honour:

THE JURISDICTION

1.       I humbly say that I am invoking the inherent powers of the Supreme Court of Western Australia under ss. 23[1] and 24[2] of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 to rectify the technical slip[3] of his Honour Owen JA found at paragraph 54 and 55 of the joint judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of CACV 107 of 2008 also known as the CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216 heard 12.8.2009 and delivered 12.9.2009 (the rectification).

THE GROUNDS FOR RECTIFICATION:

2.       The rectification should be granted by this Honourable Court based on the following grounds:

FRAUD UPON THE COURTS AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF THE PERPETRATORS:

2.1.  the fraud upon the court of Jenkins J in CIV 1142 of 2005 causing Her Honour to extend the operations of the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd et al, beyond the 10.2.2006 (the fraud).

2.2. the fraud was caused by David Taylor Solicitor committing perjury contrary to s.124[4] of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA (the Code) by swearing a false affidavit sworn dated and filed 29.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 attesting to the falsehood that the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed by his office on 10.2.2006 when he knows that he was alerted by me by facsimile on 15.2.2006 that he had not done so by the 15.2.2006 and that he only caused that Writ to be filed on the 16.2.2006 (the perjury). 

2.3. he conspired with Registrar Powell to defeat justice contrary to s.135[5] of the Code by causing the latter to falsify court records contrary to s.85[6] of the Code by the latter’s continuing refusal to provide bank documents to witness the fact that the relevant court fees of $654.20 paid for CIV 1131 of 2006 on the date when the Writ was supposed to have been filed (the conspiracy). 

THE JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA

2.4. The conspiracy is the result of their cooking up a far-fetched story that part of the court fees or the 20 cents part of it was not paid on the 10.2.2006 and hence justifying their reason for the full fees to be repaid by credit card “again” on 16.2.2006 without disturbing the fact that the Writ was supposed to have taken effect on the 10.2.2006 when it was supposedly deposited with the Court Registry under circumstances when it is reasonably clear to a reasonable observer that this event never happened.  His Honour Registrar Powell dishonestly embellished his 20 cents story in his response letter to me dated 11.6.2009 which was relied upon by Owen JA as fresh evidence which was not reasonably available to me at the time of the trial before His Honour Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 earlier on 19.10.2008.  The learned Registrar Powell further unrelentingly and dishonestly pursued the 20 cents story in the taxation proceedings of the two void costs orders on 3.11.2010 and 17.12.2010 which eventually led me, upon the request of the Attorney General Department, to lodge a police report and to make an application for a Suspension Order, albeit, unsuccessfully before Pullin and Newnes JJA in CACV 107 of 2008 on 1.4.2011.  I have since requested for their Honours to review that decision based on the premise that I had inadvertently missed a salient point in my submissions before them that if those two void or voidable costs orders were executed, I would not be able to get my money back in case I were to win the CIV 1877 of 2010 application or its appeal later on because the beneficiary of those two void costs orders is now in her deathbed and that all her properties gained by her under fraudulent circumstances from Nancy Hall had already been divested to Nancy’s daughter and other third parties. This letter is available at my blogspot at http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2011/04/stay-of-execution-must-be-granted-for.html (the 20 cents story). 

2.5. The public suffered a detriment because the benefit of the filing of the Writ on time was illegally achieved by the 20 cents story for and on behalf of Spunter Pty Ltd et al such that their caveats on Nancy Hall’s property had been illegally extended albeit unwittingly by Jenkins J, thus defrauding Nancy Hall who is a vulnerable victim (who was suffering from a psychiatric morbidity - a form of mental illness) of her rights to remove the Spunter’s Caveats on time.  As such Nancy was prevented from prospering in her then ongoing business dealings but for equity in her then real properties being illegally clogged up by these criminal and corrupt acts resulting in her early and untimely death on 13.1.2008 (the damages to Nancy).

2.6. The damages to Nancy and the 20 cents story caused the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee inter alia to take away my rights to independent legal practice and I was thus prevented from helping Nancy to obtain justice and this caused Nancy her life-time misery until her death (the injustice).

2.7. The injustice arises from Owen JA in CACV 107 of 2008 having relied upon the 20 cents story as real when it is false. It also caused the creation and the existence of the two voidable or void costs orders made in jurisdictional error by Their Honours Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 and Owen JA in CACV 107 of 2008 respectively, which is the subject matter of this Application for Writ of Certiorari Orders Nisi in CIV 1877 of 2010 before your Honour.  Your Honour’s status as Commissioner is as I understand it to be equivalent to that of a Justice of the General Division of the Supreme Court of WA.  Your Honour, therefore, I understand has jurisdiction to hear this matter and to issue Certiorari Orders Nisi, which will have to be confirmed by a Justice of the Court of Appeal[7] and this is what I have been informed through the Court of Appeal Registrar (Your Honour’s jurisdiction).

JUDGMENT OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND: 

3.        The ratio decidendi of the case Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702 at 712:

"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."

CERTIORARI OR REVIEW FOR FRAUD, DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR JURISDICTIONAL ERROR

4.         In Craig v South Australia (1995) 69 ALJR 873 at 876-877 the High Court said in a joint judgment of Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ that the writ of certiorari "went only to an inferior court or to certain tribunals exercising governmental powers." Their Honours also said at 877 that:

"Where available, certiorari is a process by which a superior court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, supervises the acts of an inferior court or other tribunal. It is not an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the order or decision of the inferior court or tribunal or a substitution of the order or decision which the superior court thinks should have been made. Where the writ runs, it merely enables the quashing of the impugned order or decision upon one or more of a number of distinct established grounds, most importantly jurisdictional error, failure to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness, fraud and 'error of law on the face of the record'."

CERTIORARI OR REVIEW APPLIES WHERE THE DOORS FOR APPEAL IS CLOSED:

RE HAMMOND; EX PARTE RODDAN (1996) 17 WAR 50 Reported Decision: Library No. 960137 A CIV:1122/1996 Heard: 27 FEBRUARY 1996. MALCOLM CJ KENNEDY J MURRAY J at page 16 said the following:

Deane J, while accepting that the Federal Court was in error in deciding that it had jurisdiction, held at 383 that the matter was not a proper one for relief by way of prohibition or certiorari. His Honour expressed the view at 384-385 that a superior court of record, even of limited jurisdiction, which was subject to appellate procedures is not "while actually exercising the jurisdiction entrusted to it, subject to the direct intervention or intermeddling of another court exercising original supervisory jurisdiction". Deane J also concluded at 387 that under the general law certiorari "lies only to an inferior court or tribunal and not to a superior court of record".

REFERENCES TO JUDGMENT IN CACV 107 OF 2008: CHIN V HALL [2009] WASCA 216:

(Numbers in (?) refers to paragraph numbers of the judgment) 

1. (1)  Your Honour need to refer to Mc Lure JA for her reserved judgment as to my position as Salvor.
2. (2, 3, 21, 22, 23, 28,30, 31, 32) Payment of legal costs agreed by Pullin JA at $20k to me should not be made contingent on the outcome of my appeal as legal work was never performed on a contingency basis.  Payment ought to be made before property is sold as Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall is currently in her deathbed and when she dies no one will be responsible for her death.  She obtained the properties of Nancy under fraudulent circumstances currently being addressed by Mr. Maurice Law or Spunter Pty Ltd because no money ever changed hands in the mortgage to Kenneth Duncan Hall.  
3. (3, 4, 5, 6 to 13) Salvor’s charge has priority over Audrey Frances Hall mortgage.  My work to remove Spunter’s Caveats in Civ 1142 of 2006 was completed on 10.2.2006 when David Taylor failed to comply with Jenkin’s J Order.  He had another 21 days under the law to comply but he did not make use of it.  I was within my rights to refuse to act further for Nancy in CIV 1131 of 2006 until the fraud was admitted to by David Taylor.  
4. (14, 15, 16) David Taylor requested for an extra 7 days to comply with Jenkins J Order and as a result, time was made the essence of that compliance but it was not complied.  Caveat lodged by me is to protect the debt of legal fees owing and payable by Nancy to me and is not contingent on the removal of Spunter’s Caveats.
5. (17) David Taylor never lodged Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 on 10.2.2006 but only on 16.2.2006 after he was alerted by my facsimile to him dated 15.2.2006 found at page 39 of the Green Appeal Book.
6. (18) Mortgage is a legal fiction.  No monies ever changed hands as solicitor for Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall refused to provide documentation to this effect to Mr. Maurice Law.
7. (19, 20, 45, 46, 47) Spunter’s Caveat was removed by me on 10.2.2006 by operation of law.  See paragraph 54 of pages 23 and 24 (explanation) and pages 107 (submissions) of Yellow Appeal Book and page 40 of Green Appeal Book). Unnecessary court actions by Nancy as the Caveats were already removed had David Taylor owned up to the Fraud. I was stopped from helping Nancy by David Taylor’s complaint to the LPCC which caused the LPB to take away my independent legal practice status.
8. (24, 25, 26 and 27) When Master Sanderson removed the Spunters Caveat in CIV 1775 of 2008, there was no Spunters Caveat to be removed at that time. They have already been removed by me by operation of law.
9. (29) Mrs. Gannaway swore an Affidavit in CIV 2509 of 2002 sworn filed and dated 16.11.2009 to the effect that CIV 1131 of 2006 was never commenced by David Taylor on 10.2.2006 or at any other time. 
10. (33, 34, 61) Master Sanderson erred in saying that I have not done anything to preserve the caveat property of Nancy.   I have removed those caveats by operation of law caused by the fraud of David Taylor pursuant to s. 138B(2)(a) of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 WA.  Master Sanderson’s costs order is without jurisdiction and is based on fraud of David Taylor and therefore it either void or voidable. 
11. (35(1)(d)) – David Taylor’s fraud caused the LPB to take away my right to independent legal practice and I was not able to help Nancy in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 which was not necessary if there was no fraud.
12. (42) I have salvaged Nancy Properties in some shape or form.
13. (48) Nancy suffers from a psychiatric morbidity since a young age.  This fact was never disclosed to me until after her death.  See page 91 of Yellow Book and also see Michelle Gannaway, Nancy’s daughter Affidavit filed in DC 2509 of 2002 Affidavit sworn 16.11.2009 for a history of Nancy’s vulnerabilities.  I was always visited by Nancy and was persuaded by her insistent pleas for help and I did most of her works pro bono until she decided to sign me a statement that I could claim from her Properties, purportedly after she is able to find a solution to David Taylor’s fraud.
14. (49, 50) Simmonds J provides Nancy with the copy of the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 which was stamp dated 10.2.2006 but hand-altered to 16.2.2006 indicating that court fees was paid only on 16.2.2006 with two receipts issued by the Supreme Court Registry.   His Honour also handed over to Nancy David Taylor’s Affidavit sworn 29.3.2007 filed in CIV 1131 of 2006 which tells a lie about itself.  But for this document, the 20 cents story of Registrar Powell could never be detected to be a falsehood.  See page 32 and paras. 118 of page 38 of the Yellow Appeal Book.  See Registrar Powell’s refusal to provide bank records for the truth of David Taylor’s fraud at page 39 of the Yellow Appeal Book.
15. (51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 to 60) There are exceptions to the Wollongong’s case for fresh evidence to be admitted: fraud of David Taylor, mis-reception of evidence, wrongful rejection of evidence, malpractice, jurisdictional error of Owen JA and Master Sanderson.  I have exercised reasonable diligence to get those evidence but it was not possible until after the trial on 11.6.2006 when the 20 cents story came out from Registrar Powell. Examples are: I wrote to Associate of Jenkins J Ms. Pryer at page 30 of Green Appeal Book.  Malice of David Taylor at page 52 of Green Appeal Book. Refusal to provide bank statement by Registrar Powell at page 50 of Yellow Book.  Dishonesty of Registrar in agreeing not to sign the Allocatur in the taxation proceedings on 3.11.2010 and 17.12.2010 until after the objection but he sign it earlier and the transcript says he did not sign it.  Owen JA reversed the legal effects of the law relating to fresh evidence regarding the 20 cents story.  See DGT 14 receipts of the Supreme Court where 20 cents was paid on 10.2.2006 and not on 16.2.2006 as contended by Registrar Powell in his letter dated 11.6.2006.      
16. (67) Buss JA agree that my continuing work for this appeal and my continuing litigation may constitute works involving in the recovery or the preservation of the Properties of Nancy Hall.

.

REFERENCES TO HIGH COURT SPECIAL LEAVE DISPOSITIONS IN P1 OF 2010 DATED 26.5.2010  

1. (2) The High Court says that the issue of whether my salvor charge over Nancy Properties has priority over Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall charge is not in issue.  What is in issue now is for me to establish the causal connection between my solicitors work in CIV 1142 of 2005 No 1 and the removal of the Spunter’s Caveat by way of operation of law as provided for in s. 138B(2)(a) of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (the causal connection).  Once that causal connection is established, by the exposure of the Fraud of David Taylor, the salvor effects will come into existence with retrospective effect from 10.2.2006. That causal connection would come into effect but for the fraud of David Taylor and it must be exposed and be recognised by this Court.  

REFERENCES TO MASTER SANDERSON DECISION IN CHIN V HALL (2008) WASC 255 OR CIV 1775 OF 2008

1. (6)  Nancy Hall is the owner of those properties.  She has rights of ownership to employ me as her solicitor. Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall is the mortgagee of the impugned properties of Nancy.  She has no rights of ownerships to employ me as her solicitor for the purpose of removing the Spunter’s Caveats. There were fraudulent circumstances under which she was awarded the rights of ownership to Nancy Properties only after Nancy’s death on 13.1.2008.  I was never working at Mrs. Hall directions but was at all material times at the beck and call of Ms. Hall, the rightful owner and not the supposed mortgagee.  I have done most of the solicitors for Nancy Hall on a pro-bono basis based on her insistent nature.  But the CIV 1142 of 2005 is the only work where I register my name as her solicitor in court and where there is a written undertaking by her to pay me my solicitor’s legal fees.   There is a causal connection between my solicitors work for her in the removal of the Spunter’s Caveat but for the fraud of David Taylor in CIV 1131 of 2006.  I am therefore entitled to my rights as the salvor of Nancy properties into whosever hands they might later fall into.  That is the law.

………………………………………………

Signature of: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

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[1] 23. Supreme Court authorised to perform certain acts required to be performed by courts in England

Where any Act of Parliament in force in England on 1 June 1829, and applicable to Western Australia, or any Act of Parliament adopted and directed to be applied in Western Australia, authorises and directs any proceeding, act, matter, or thing to be had, done, performed, or executed by or before Her Majesty’s Courts at Westminster, or the respective judges thereof, or by or before the Lord Chancellor or any Equity Judge, in the administration of justice, every such proceeding, act, matter, and thing, subject to any express enactment to the contrary and to any rules of court for the time being in force, shall be, and the same is hereby authorised and directed to be had, done, executed, and performed by the Supreme Court and the judges thereof in like manner as if the same had been in and by such Act of Parliament expressly authorised and directed to be had, done, executed, and performed by the said Supreme Court or the judges thereof.

[2] 24 .  Law and equity to be concurrently administered

(1A)  Subject to the express provisions of any other Act, in every civil cause or matter commenced in the Supreme Court, law and equity shall be administered by the Court according to the rules set out in subsections (1) to (7).

(1) If any plaintiff or petitioner claims to be entitled to any equitable estate or right, or to relief upon any equitable ground against any deed, instrument, or contract, or against any right, title, or claim whatsoever asserted by any defendant or respondent in such cause or matter, or to any relief founded upon a legal right, which before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ could only have been given by a court of equity, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall give to such plaintiff or petitioner such and the same relief as ought to have been given by the Court in its equitable jurisdiction in a suit or proceeding for the same or the like purpose properly instituted before the commencement of the said Act.

(2)  If any defendant claims to be entitled to any equitable estate or right or to relief upon any equitable ground against any deed, instrument, or contract, or against any right, title or claim asserted by any plaintiff or petitioner in such cause or matter, or alleges any ground of equitable defence to any claim of the plaintiff or petitioner in such cause or matter, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall give to every equitable estate, right, or ground of relief so claimed, and to every equitable defence so alleged, such and the same effect, by way of defence against the claim of such plaintiff or petitioner, as the Court in its equitable jurisdiction ought to have given if the same or the like matters had been relied on by way of defence in any suit or proceeding instituted by the Court for the same or the like purpose before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ .

(3)  The Court, and every judge thereof, shall have power to grant to any defendant in respect of any equitable estate or right, or other matter of equity, and also in respect of any legal estate, right, or title claimed or asserted by him — 

(a) all such relief against any plaintiff or petitioner as such defendant shall have properly claimed, by his pleading, and as the Court, or any judge thereof, might have granted in any suit instituted for that purpose by the same defendant against the same plaintiff or petitioner; and

(b) all such relief relating to or connected with the original subject of the cause or matter, and in like manner claimed against any other person, whether already a party to the same cause or matter or not, who shall have been duly served with notice in writing of such claim pursuant to any rule of court or any order of the Court, as might properly have been granted against such person if he had been made a defendant to a cause duly instituted by the same defendant for the like purpose.

(3A) Every person served with any such notice as mentioned in subsection (3)(b) shall thenceforth be deemed a party to such cause or matter, with the same rights in respect of his defence against such claim, as if he had been duly sued in the ordinary way by such defendant.

(4)  The Court, and every judge thereof, shall recognize and take notice of all equitable estates, titles, and rights, and all equitable duties and liabilities appearing incidentally in the course of any cause or matter, in the same manner in which the Court in its equitable jurisdiction would have recognized and taken notice of the same in any suit or proceeding duly instituted therein before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ .

(5)  No cause or proceeding at any time pending in the Supreme Court shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction; but every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained, if the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ had not been passed, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defence thereto.

(5A) However —

(a) nothing in this Act shall disable the Court, if it thinks fit, from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it; and

(b) any person, whether a party or not to any such cause or matter, who would have been entitled, if the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ had not been passed, to apply to any court to restrain the prosecution thereof, or who may be entitled to enforce, by attachment or otherwise, any judgment, decree, rule, or order, contrary to which all or any part of the proceedings in such cause or matter may have been taken, may apply to the Court, by motion in a summary way, for a stay of proceedings in such cause or matter, either generally or so far as may be necessary for the purposes of justice; and the Court shall thereupon make such order as shall be just.

(6)  Subject to the foregoing provisions for giving effect to equitable rights and other matters of equity, and to the other express provisions of this Act, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall recognize and give effect to all legal claims and demands, and all estates, titles, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities existing by the common law or by any custom, or created by any statute, in the same manner as the same would have been recognized and given effect to if the Supreme Court Act 1880 ⁷ had not been passed in any branch of its jurisdiction, or by the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.

(7) The Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by this Act, in every cause or matter pending before it, shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and conditions as shall seem just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in such cause or matter; so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided. 

[3] 33. Judgments and orders, correction of

If any judgment or order of the Court contains a clerical mistake or any error arising from an accidental slip or omission, the Court may correct the judgment or order without an appeal.

[4] 124. Perjury

Any person who, in any judicial proceeding, or for the purpose of instituting any judicial proceeding, knowingly gives false testimony touching any matter which is material to any question then depending in that proceeding, or intended to be raised in that proceeding, is guilty of a crime which is called perjury.

It is immaterial whether the testimony is given on oath or under any other sanction authorised by law.

The forms and ceremonies used in administering the oath or in otherwise binding the person giving the testimony to speak the truth are immaterial, if he assents to the forms and ceremonies actually used.

It is immaterial whether the false testimony is given orally or in writing.

It is immaterial whether the court or tribunal is properly constituted, or is held in the proper place, or not, if it actually acts as a court or tribunal in the proceeding in which the testimony is given.

It is immaterial whether the person who gives the testimony is a competent witness or not, or whether the testimony is admissible in the proceeding or not.

[5] 135. Conspiring to defeat justice

Any person who conspires with another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

[6] 85. Falsification of records by public officer

Any public officer who, in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment, corruptly —

(a) makes any false entry in any record; or

(b) omits to make any entry in any record; or

(c) gives any certificate or information which is false in a material particular; or

(d) by act or omission falsifies, destroys, alters or damages any record; or

(e) furnishes a return relating to any property or remuneration which is false in a material particular; or

(f) omits to furnish any return relating to any property or remuneration, or to give any other information which he is required by law to give,

is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

[7] Heenan J in RE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EX PARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212 said at paragraph 9, the following words:

“Putting aside matters arising under federal jurisdiction and the constitutional writs of prohibition and

mandamus, which do not arise here, the established principle is that judicial review by prerogative remedies does not lie against a State Supreme Court or against a Judge of a State Supreme Court by another Judge of the same court. Authority for that includes Craig v State ofSouth Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 174 - 175

(Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ), and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 (Bell J). The rule is set out in a passage from the reasons of Deane J in Re Gray; Ex parte Marsh [1985] HCA 67; (1985) 157 CLR 351, 385 quoted at [22] of her Honour's judgment in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks. Other decisions to the same effect are Re Western Australian Industrial Appeal Court; Ex parte Carter (1992) 7 WAR 348, 354; (1992) 44 IR 171; Barton v Walker [1979] 2

NSWLR 740, 755; and Mayor of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239. The same principle applies to applications for mandamus and prohibition: Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (No 1) [1997] HCA 13; (1997) 188 CLR 595.