IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA OM NO: 1877 OF 2010
HELD AT PERTH
In the matter of the wrongful removal of the Applicant’s Caveats in the Hazelmere and Mt Lawley Properties of late Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall by Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008.
And
In the matter of the falsifications of the court records in CIV 1131 of 2006 by David Taylor Solicitor.
And
In the matter of the judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in CACV107 of 2008, particularly at paras. 54 and 55 relying on the letter of Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009.
And
In the matter of the Rationale of the High Court in Special Leave Dispositions of the High Court of Australia in P1 of 2010 providing the legal basis for the causal connection between the Applicant’s Solicitors Work in CIV 1142 of 2006 and the removal of the caveats of Spunter’s Pty Ltd in order to enable the Applicant to establish a statutory first charge over the salvaged properties under s.244 of the former Legal Practice Act, 2003.
EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
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Date of document: 3rd April, 2011
Date of filing: 3rd April, 2011.
Filed on behalf of: The Ex parte Applicant
Prepared by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Phone: 08 92757440;
387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA Mobile: 0421642735
WA 6059 Emails: nnchin@msn.com; nnchin1@gmail.com
WRITTEN OUTLINE OF SUBMISSIONS BEFORE HIS HONOUR MR. COMMISSIONER SLEIGHT AT 10.00 AM ON 4TH DAY OF APRIL, 2011
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INDEX
Your Honour:
THE JURISDICTION
1. I humbly say that I am invoking the inherent powers of the Supreme Court of Western Australia under ss. 23[1] and 24[2] of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 to rectify the technical slip[3] of his Honour Owen JA found at paragraph 54 and 55 of the joint judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of CACV 107 of 2008 also known as the CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216 heard 12.8.2009 and delivered 12.9.2009 (the rectification).
THE GROUNDS FOR RECTIFICATION:
2. The rectification should be granted by this Honourable Court based on the following grounds:
FRAUD UPON THE COURTS AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF THE PERPETRATORS:
2.1. the fraud upon the court of Jenkins J in CIV 1142 of 2005 causing Her Honour to extend the operations of the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd et al, beyond the 10.2.2006 (the fraud).
2.2. the fraud was caused by David Taylor Solicitor committing perjury contrary to s.124[4] of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA (the Code) by swearing a false affidavit sworn dated and filed 29.3.2007 in CIV 1131 of 2006 attesting to the falsehood that the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed by his office on 10.2.2006 when he knows that he was alerted by me by facsimile on 15.2.2006 that he had not done so by the 15.2.2006 and that he only caused that Writ to be filed on the 16.2.2006 (the perjury).
2.3. he conspired with Registrar Powell to defeat justice contrary to s.135[5] of the Code by causing the latter to falsify court records contrary to s.85[6] of the Code by the latter’s continuing refusal to provide bank documents to witness the fact that the relevant court fees of $654.20 paid for CIV 1131 of 2006 on the date when the Writ was supposed to have been filed (the conspiracy).
THE JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA
2.4. The conspiracy is the result of their cooking up a far-fetched story that part of the court fees or the 20 cents part of it was not paid on the 10.2.2006 and hence justifying their reason for the full fees to be repaid by credit card “again” on 16.2.2006 without disturbing the fact that the Writ was supposed to have taken effect on the 10.2.2006 when it was supposedly deposited with the Court Registry under circumstances when it is reasonably clear to a reasonable observer that this event never happened. His Honour Registrar Powell dishonestly embellished his 20 cents story in his response letter to me dated 11.6.2009 which was relied upon by Owen JA as fresh evidence which was not reasonably available to me at the time of the trial before His Honour Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 earlier on 19.10.2008. The learned Registrar Powell further unrelentingly and dishonestly pursued the 20 cents story in the taxation proceedings of the two void costs orders on 3.11.2010 and 17.12.2010 which eventually led me, upon the request of the Attorney General Department, to lodge a police report and to make an application for a Suspension Order, albeit, unsuccessfully before Pullin and Newnes JJA in CACV 107 of 2008 on 1.4.2011. I have since requested for their Honours to review that decision based on the premise that I had inadvertently missed a salient point in my submissions before them that if those two void or voidable costs orders were executed, I would not be able to get my money back in case I were to win the CIV 1877 of 2010 application or its appeal later on because the beneficiary of those two void costs orders is now in her deathbed and that all her properties gained by her under fraudulent circumstances from Nancy Hall had already been divested to Nancy’s daughter and other third parties. This letter is available at my blogspot at http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/2011/04/stay-of-execution-must-be-granted-for.html (the 20 cents story).
2.5. The public suffered a detriment because the benefit of the filing of the Writ on time was illegally achieved by the 20 cents story for and on behalf of Spunter Pty Ltd et al such that their caveats on Nancy Hall’s property had been illegally extended albeit unwittingly by Jenkins J, thus defrauding Nancy Hall who is a vulnerable victim (who was suffering from a psychiatric morbidity - a form of mental illness) of her rights to remove the Spunter’s Caveats on time. As such Nancy was prevented from prospering in her then ongoing business dealings but for equity in her then real properties being illegally clogged up by these criminal and corrupt acts resulting in her early and untimely death on 13.1.2008 (the damages to Nancy).
2.6. The damages to Nancy and the 20 cents story caused the Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee inter alia to take away my rights to independent legal practice and I was thus prevented from helping Nancy to obtain justice and this caused Nancy her life-time misery until her death (the injustice).
2.7. The injustice arises from Owen JA in CACV 107 of 2008 having relied upon the 20 cents story as real when it is false. It also caused the creation and the existence of the two voidable or void costs orders made in jurisdictional error by Their Honours Master Sanderson in CIV 1775 of 2008 and Owen JA in CACV 107 of 2008 respectively, which is the subject matter of this Application for Writ of Certiorari Orders Nisi in CIV 1877 of 2010 before your Honour. Your Honour’s status as Commissioner is as I understand it to be equivalent to that of a Justice of the General Division of the Supreme Court of WA. Your Honour, therefore, I understand has jurisdiction to hear this matter and to issue Certiorari Orders Nisi, which will have to be confirmed by a Justice of the Court of Appeal[7] and this is what I have been informed through the Court of Appeal Registrar (Your Honour’s jurisdiction).
JUDGMENT OF MASTER SANDERSON AND OWEN JA CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND:
3. The ratio decidendi of the case Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB 702 at 712:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything."
CERTIORARI OR REVIEW FOR FRAUD, DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE OR JURISDICTIONAL ERROR
4. In Craig v South Australia (1995) 69 ALJR 873 at 876-877 the High Court said in a joint judgment of Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ that the writ of certiorari "went only to an inferior court or to certain tribunals exercising governmental powers." Their Honours also said at 877 that:
"Where available, certiorari is a process by which a superior court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, supervises the acts of an inferior court or other tribunal. It is not an appellate procedure enabling either a general review of the order or decision of the inferior court or tribunal or a substitution of the order or decision which the superior court thinks should have been made. Where the writ runs, it merely enables the quashing of the impugned order or decision upon one or more of a number of distinct established grounds, most importantly jurisdictional error, failure to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness, fraud and 'error of law on the face of the record'."
CERTIORARI OR REVIEW APPLIES WHERE THE DOORS FOR APPEAL IS CLOSED:
RE HAMMOND; EX PARTE RODDAN (1996) 17 WAR 50 Reported Decision: Library No. 960137 A CIV:1122/1996 Heard: 27 FEBRUARY 1996. MALCOLM CJ KENNEDY J MURRAY J at page 16 said the following:
Deane J, while accepting that the Federal Court was in error in deciding that it had jurisdiction, held at 383 that the matter was not a proper one for relief by way of prohibition or certiorari. His Honour expressed the view at 384-385 that a superior court of record, even of limited jurisdiction, which was subject to appellate procedures is not "while actually exercising the jurisdiction entrusted to it, subject to the direct intervention or intermeddling of another court exercising original supervisory jurisdiction". Deane J also concluded at 387 that under the general law certiorari "lies only to an inferior court or tribunal and not to a superior court of record".
REFERENCES TO JUDGMENT IN CACV 107 OF 2008: CHIN V HALL [2009] WASCA 216:
(Numbers in (?) refers to paragraph numbers of the judgment)
- (1) Your Honour need to refer to Mc Lure JA for her reserved judgment as to my position as Salvor.
- (2, 3, 21, 22, 23, 28,30, 31, 32) Payment of legal costs agreed by Pullin JA at $20k to me should not be made contingent on the outcome of my appeal as legal work was never performed on a contingency basis. Payment ought to be made before property is sold as Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall is currently in her deathbed and when she dies no one will be responsible for her death. She obtained the properties of Nancy under fraudulent circumstances currently being addressed by Mr. Maurice Law or Spunter Pty Ltd because no money ever changed hands in the mortgage to Kenneth Duncan Hall.
- (3, 4, 5, 6 to 13) Salvor’s charge has priority over Audrey Frances Hall mortgage. My work to remove Spunter’s Caveats in Civ 1142 of 2006 was completed on 10.2.2006 when David Taylor failed to comply with Jenkin’s J Order. He had another 21 days under the law to comply but he did not make use of it. I was within my rights to refuse to act further for Nancy in CIV 1131 of 2006 until the fraud was admitted to by David Taylor.
- (14, 15, 16) David Taylor requested for an extra 7 days to comply with Jenkins J Order and as a result, time was made the essence of that compliance but it was not complied. Caveat lodged by me is to protect the debt of legal fees owing and payable by Nancy to me and is not contingent on the removal of Spunter’s Caveats.
- (17) David Taylor never lodged Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 on 10.2.2006 but only on 16.2.2006 after he was alerted by my facsimile to him dated 15.2.2006 found at page 39 of the Green Appeal Book.
- (18) Mortgage is a legal fiction. No monies ever changed hands as solicitor for Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall refused to provide documentation to this effect to Mr. Maurice Law.
- (19, 20, 45, 46, 47) Spunter’s Caveat was removed by me on 10.2.2006 by operation of law. See paragraph 54 of pages 23 and 24 (explanation) and pages 107 (submissions) of Yellow Appeal Book and page 40 of Green Appeal Book). Unnecessary court actions by Nancy as the Caveats were already removed had David Taylor owned up to the Fraud. I was stopped from helping Nancy by David Taylor’s complaint to the LPCC which caused the LPB to take away my independent legal practice status.
- (24, 25, 26 and 27) When Master Sanderson removed the Spunters Caveat in CIV 1775 of 2008, there was no Spunters Caveat to be removed at that time. They have already been removed by me by operation of law.
- (29) Mrs. Gannaway swore an Affidavit in CIV 2509 of 2002 sworn filed and dated 16.11.2009 to the effect that CIV 1131 of 2006 was never commenced by David Taylor on 10.2.2006 or at any other time.
- (33, 34, 61) Master Sanderson erred in saying that I have not done anything to preserve the caveat property of Nancy. I have removed those caveats by operation of law caused by the fraud of David Taylor pursuant to s. 138B(2)(a) of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 WA. Master Sanderson’s costs order is without jurisdiction and is based on fraud of David Taylor and therefore it either void or voidable.
- (35(1)(d)) – David Taylor’s fraud caused the LPB to take away my right to independent legal practice and I was not able to help Nancy in CIV 1142 of 2005 No.2 which was not necessary if there was no fraud.
- (42) I have salvaged Nancy Properties in some shape or form.
- (48) Nancy suffers from a psychiatric morbidity since a young age. This fact was never disclosed to me until after her death. See page 91 of Yellow Book and also see Michelle Gannaway, Nancy’s daughter Affidavit filed in DC 2509 of 2002 Affidavit sworn 16.11.2009 for a history of Nancy’s vulnerabilities. I was always visited by Nancy and was persuaded by her insistent pleas for help and I did most of her works pro bono until she decided to sign me a statement that I could claim from her Properties, purportedly after she is able to find a solution to David Taylor’s fraud.
- (49, 50) Simmonds J provides Nancy with the copy of the Writ of Summons in CIV 1131 of 2006 which was stamp dated 10.2.2006 but hand-altered to 16.2.2006 indicating that court fees was paid only on 16.2.2006 with two receipts issued by the Supreme Court Registry. His Honour also handed over to Nancy David Taylor’s Affidavit sworn 29.3.2007 filed in CIV 1131 of 2006 which tells a lie about itself. But for this document, the 20 cents story of Registrar Powell could never be detected to be a falsehood. See page 32 and paras. 118 of page 38 of the Yellow Appeal Book. See Registrar Powell’s refusal to provide bank records for the truth of David Taylor’s fraud at page 39 of the Yellow Appeal Book.
- (51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 to 60) There are exceptions to the Wollongong’s case for fresh evidence to be admitted: fraud of David Taylor, mis-reception of evidence, wrongful rejection of evidence, malpractice, jurisdictional error of Owen JA and Master Sanderson. I have exercised reasonable diligence to get those evidence but it was not possible until after the trial on 11.6.2006 when the 20 cents story came out from Registrar Powell. Examples are: I wrote to Associate of Jenkins J Ms. Pryer at page 30 of Green Appeal Book. Malice of David Taylor at page 52 of Green Appeal Book. Refusal to provide bank statement by Registrar Powell at page 50 of Yellow Book. Dishonesty of Registrar in agreeing not to sign the Allocatur in the taxation proceedings on 3.11.2010 and 17.12.2010 until after the objection but he sign it earlier and the transcript says he did not sign it. Owen JA reversed the legal effects of the law relating to fresh evidence regarding the 20 cents story. See DGT 14 receipts of the Supreme Court where 20 cents was paid on 10.2.2006 and not on 16.2.2006 as contended by Registrar Powell in his letter dated 11.6.2006.
- (67) Buss JA agree that my continuing work for this appeal and my continuing litigation may constitute works involving in the recovery or the preservation of the Properties of Nancy Hall.
.
REFERENCES TO HIGH COURT SPECIAL LEAVE DISPOSITIONS IN P1 OF 2010 DATED 26.5.2010
- (2) The High Court says that the issue of whether my salvor charge over Nancy Properties has priority over Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall charge is not in issue. What is in issue now is for me to establish the causal connection between my solicitors work in CIV 1142 of 2005 No 1 and the removal of the Spunter’s Caveat by way of operation of law as provided for in s. 138B(2)(a) of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (the causal connection). Once that causal connection is established, by the exposure of the Fraud of David Taylor, the salvor effects will come into existence with retrospective effect from 10.2.2006. That causal connection would come into effect but for the fraud of David Taylor and it must be exposed and be recognised by this Court.
REFERENCES TO MASTER SANDERSON DECISION IN CHIN V HALL (2008) WASC 255 OR CIV 1775 OF 2008
- (6) Nancy Hall is the owner of those properties. She has rights of ownership to employ me as her solicitor. Mrs. Audrey Frances Hall is the mortgagee of the impugned properties of Nancy. She has no rights of ownerships to employ me as her solicitor for the purpose of removing the Spunter’s Caveats. There were fraudulent circumstances under which she was awarded the rights of ownership to Nancy Properties only after Nancy’s death on 13.1.2008. I was never working at Mrs. Hall directions but was at all material times at the beck and call of Ms. Hall, the rightful owner and not the supposed mortgagee. I have done most of the solicitors for Nancy Hall on a pro-bono basis based on her insistent nature. But the CIV 1142 of 2005 is the only work where I register my name as her solicitor in court and where there is a written undertaking by her to pay me my solicitor’s legal fees. There is a causal connection between my solicitors work for her in the removal of the Spunter’s Caveat but for the fraud of David Taylor in CIV 1131 of 2006. I am therefore entitled to my rights as the salvor of Nancy properties into whosever hands they might later fall into. That is the law.
………………………………………………
Signature of: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
[1] 23. Supreme Court authorised to perform certain acts required to be performed by courts in England
Where any Act of Parliament in force in England on 1 June 1829, and applicable to Western Australia, or any Act of Parliament adopted and directed to be applied in Western Australia, authorises and directs any proceeding, act, matter, or thing to be had, done, performed, or executed by or before Her Majesty’s Courts at Westminster, or the respective judges thereof, or by or before the Lord Chancellor or any Equity Judge, in the administration of justice, every such proceeding, act, matter, and thing, subject to any express enactment to the contrary and to any rules of court for the time being in force, shall be, and the same is hereby authorised and directed to be had, done, executed, and performed by the Supreme Court and the judges thereof in like manner as if the same had been in and by such Act of Parliament expressly authorised and directed to be had, done, executed, and performed by the said Supreme Court or the judges thereof.
[2] 24 . Law and equity to be concurrently administered
(1A) Subject to the express provisions of any other Act, in every civil cause or matter commenced in the Supreme Court, law and equity shall be administered by the Court according to the rules set out in subsections (1) to (7).
(1) If any plaintiff or petitioner claims to be entitled to any equitable estate or right, or to relief upon any equitable ground against any deed, instrument, or contract, or against any right, title, or claim whatsoever asserted by any defendant or respondent in such cause or matter, or to any relief founded upon a legal right, which before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 could only have been given by a court of equity, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall give to such plaintiff or petitioner such and the same relief as ought to have been given by the Court in its equitable jurisdiction in a suit or proceeding for the same or the like purpose properly instituted before the commencement of the said Act.
(2) If any defendant claims to be entitled to any equitable estate or right or to relief upon any equitable ground against any deed, instrument, or contract, or against any right, title or claim asserted by any plaintiff or petitioner in such cause or matter, or alleges any ground of equitable defence to any claim of the plaintiff or petitioner in such cause or matter, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall give to every equitable estate, right, or ground of relief so claimed, and to every equitable defence so alleged, such and the same effect, by way of defence against the claim of such plaintiff or petitioner, as the Court in its equitable jurisdiction ought to have given if the same or the like matters had been relied on by way of defence in any suit or proceeding instituted by the Court for the same or the like purpose before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 .
(3) The Court, and every judge thereof, shall have power to grant to any defendant in respect of any equitable estate or right, or other matter of equity, and also in respect of any legal estate, right, or title claimed or asserted by him —
(a) all such relief against any plaintiff or petitioner as such defendant shall have properly claimed, by his pleading, and as the Court, or any judge thereof, might have granted in any suit instituted for that purpose by the same defendant against the same plaintiff or petitioner; and
(b) all such relief relating to or connected with the original subject of the cause or matter, and in like manner claimed against any other person, whether already a party to the same cause or matter or not, who shall have been duly served with notice in writing of such claim pursuant to any rule of court or any order of the Court, as might properly have been granted against such person if he had been made a defendant to a cause duly instituted by the same defendant for the like purpose.
(3A) Every person served with any such notice as mentioned in subsection (3)(b) shall thenceforth be deemed a party to such cause or matter, with the same rights in respect of his defence against such claim, as if he had been duly sued in the ordinary way by such defendant.
(4) The Court, and every judge thereof, shall recognize and take notice of all equitable estates, titles, and rights, and all equitable duties and liabilities appearing incidentally in the course of any cause or matter, in the same manner in which the Court in its equitable jurisdiction would have recognized and taken notice of the same in any suit or proceeding duly instituted therein before the commencement of the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 .
(5) No cause or proceeding at any time pending in the Supreme Court shall be restrained by prohibition or injunction; but every matter of equity on which an injunction against the prosecution of any such cause or proceeding might have been obtained, if the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 had not been passed, either unconditionally or on any terms or conditions, may be relied on by way of defence thereto.
(5A) However —
(a) nothing in this Act shall disable the Court, if it thinks fit, from directing a stay of proceedings in any cause or matter pending before it; and
(b) any person, whether a party or not to any such cause or matter, who would have been entitled, if the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 had not been passed, to apply to any court to restrain the prosecution thereof, or who may be entitled to enforce, by attachment or otherwise, any judgment, decree, rule, or order, contrary to which all or any part of the proceedings in such cause or matter may have been taken, may apply to the Court, by motion in a summary way, for a stay of proceedings in such cause or matter, either generally or so far as may be necessary for the purposes of justice; and the Court shall thereupon make such order as shall be just.
(6) Subject to the foregoing provisions for giving effect to equitable rights and other matters of equity, and to the other express provisions of this Act, the Court, and every judge thereof, shall recognize and give effect to all legal claims and demands, and all estates, titles, rights, duties, obligations, and liabilities existing by the common law or by any custom, or created by any statute, in the same manner as the same would have been recognized and given effect to if the Supreme Court Act 1880 7 had not been passed in any branch of its jurisdiction, or by the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.
(7) The Court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it by this Act, in every cause or matter pending before it, shall have power to grant, and shall grant, either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and conditions as shall seem just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in such cause or matter; so that, as far as possible, all matters so in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined, and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of such matters avoided.
[3] 33. Judgments and orders, correction of
If any judgment or order of the Court contains a clerical mistake or any error arising from an accidental slip or omission, the Court may correct the judgment or order without an appeal.
[4] 124. Perjury
Any person who, in any judicial proceeding, or for the purpose of instituting any judicial proceeding, knowingly gives false testimony touching any matter which is material to any question then depending in that proceeding, or intended to be raised in that proceeding, is guilty of a crime which is called perjury.
It is immaterial whether the testimony is given on oath or under any other sanction authorised by law.
The forms and ceremonies used in administering the oath or in otherwise binding the person giving the testimony to speak the truth are immaterial, if he assents to the forms and ceremonies actually used.
It is immaterial whether the false testimony is given orally or in writing.
It is immaterial whether the court or tribunal is properly constituted, or is held in the proper place, or not, if it actually acts as a court or tribunal in the proceeding in which the testimony is given.
It is immaterial whether the person who gives the testimony is a competent witness or not, or whether the testimony is admissible in the proceeding or not.
[5] 135. Conspiring to defeat justice
Any person who conspires with another to obstruct, prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
[6] 85. Falsification of records by public officer
Any public officer who, in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment, corruptly —
(a) makes any false entry in any record; or
(b) omits to make any entry in any record; or
(c) gives any certificate or information which is false in a material particular; or
(d) by act or omission falsifies, destroys, alters or damages any record; or
(e) furnishes a return relating to any property or remuneration which is false in a material particular; or
(f) omits to furnish any return relating to any property or remuneration, or to give any other information which he is required by law to give,
is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
[7] Heenan J in RE JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN; EX PARTE CHIN [2010] WASC 212 said at paragraph 9, the following words:
“Putting aside matters arising under federal jurisdiction and the constitutional writs of prohibition and
mandamus, which do not arise here, the established principle is that judicial review by prerogative remedies does not lie against a State Supreme Court or against a Judge of a State Supreme Court by another Judge of the same court. Authority for that includes Craig v State ofSouth Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 174 - 175
(Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron & McHugh JJ), and a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 (Bell J). The rule is set out in a passage from the reasons of Deane J in Re Gray; Ex parte Marsh [1985] HCA 67; (1985) 157 CLR 351, 385 quoted at [22] of her Honour's judgment in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks. Other decisions to the same effect are Re Western Australian Industrial Appeal Court; Ex parte Carter (1992) 7 WAR 348, 354; (1992) 44 IR 171; Barton v Walker [1979] 2
NSWLR 740, 755; and Mayor of London v Cox (1867) LR 2 HL 239. The same principle applies to applications for mandamus and prohibition: Re Jarman; Ex parte Cook (No 1) [1997] HCA 13; (1997) 188 CLR 595.
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